


JPRS-UMA-94-031  
3 August 1994



**FOREIGN  
BROADCAST  
INFORMATION  
SERVICE**

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# ***JPRS Report***

## **Central Eurasia**

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***Military Affairs***

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# Central Eurasia

## Military Affairs

JPRS-UMA-94-031

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3 August 1994

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## ARMED FORCES

### Edict Reducing Mobilization Capacity, Mobilization Reserves

94UM0502C Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 13 Jul 94 p 4

[Edict of the President of Russia "On the Reduction of  
Mobilization Capacity and the Mobilization Reserve"]

[Text]

#### On the Reduction of Mobilization Capacity and the Mobilization Reserve

With a view to bringing the mobilization plan of the  
economy in conformity with the changed international  
situation and the reduction in the unproductive burden on  
the economy, I decree:

1. For the government of the Russian Federation to  
present for confirmation, within a 2-month period, the  
basic indicators of the mobilization plan of the economy,  
having stipulated in the appropriate manner:

a reduction in the level of mobilization capacities and  
the mobilization reserve by a multiple factor in compar-  
ison with the existing one;

the inclusion in the mobilization plan of the economy the  
production of a narrow range of critical types of arms,  
military equipment, and other military products;

the withdrawal from the mobilization plan of the  
economy of industries for the output of products with a  
lengthy production cycle;

the restriction of the size of the mobilization reserve by  
the existing requirements.

2. For the Government of the Russian Federation:

within a month, to establish a procedure for the removal  
of the previously established tasks for the reduction of  
mobilization capacities and the mobilization reserve, the  
further maintenance of which will be recognized as inex-  
pedient;

within a month after establishment of the basic indi-  
cators for the mobilization plan of the economy, to announce  
its indicators within the framework of a state order to the  
executors;

3. To establish that a state order in part of the mobilization  
plan of the economy can be placed only in enterprises that  
have orders for current production of analogous products  
in peacetime. The involvement of enterprises on the basis  
of the mobilization plan of the economy in the output of  
production other than in their designated specialization  
[neprofil'noye proizvodstvo] (assimilation of enterprises)  
effected exclusively on the grounds of decisions of the  
Government of the Russian Federation.

4. In accordance with the procedure being established by  
the Government of the Russian Federation:

to allow enterprises assimilated under the output of  
arms, military equipment, and other military production  
in accordance with the mobilization plan of the economy  
(except ammunition and special types of fuel) to cancel  
tasks for the preservation of mobilization capacities with  
the simultaneous reduction of the mobilization reserve in  
accordance with changes in the state defense order;

to allow enterprises to cancel orders for the preservation  
of mobilization capacities for the production of arms,  
military equipment, and other types of fuel (except ammu-  
nitions and special types of fuel), the output of which was  
discontinued before 1991, with the corresponding reduc-  
tion of the mobilization reserve;

to allow enterprises to use and sell the material assets  
(with the exception of arms, military equipment, and  
special types of fuel), including equipment, buildings, and  
installations freed as the result of the reduction of mobi-  
lization capacities;

5. To establish that the financial resources of the enter-  
prises that are formed as the result of the reduction of  
mobilization capacities and the mobilization reserve, after  
repayment of bank credits obtained for these purposes, are  
sent by the various units for the replenishment of the  
working capital of the enterprises and credited to the  
federal budget.

6. To establish that the value of the mobilization reserve  
and the mobilization capacities listed in the balance sheet  
of the enterprises are not included in the value of the  
property for assessment of the property tax of the enter-  
prises.

7. To establish that, as of 1 July 1994, amortization  
deductions for mobilization capacities are not effected.

8. The present Edict enters into force from the moment of  
its publication. [Signed] President of the Russian Federa-  
tion, B. Yeltsin  
Moscow, Kremlin  
8 July 1994

No 1483

### Finance Ministry Aide on Armed Forces Audit

MM2607100794 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 23 Jul 94 pp 1-2

[Interview with Foat Dinov, deputy chief of the Russian  
Federation Ministry of Finance Control and Auditing  
Administration, by Lieutenant Colonel Ivan Ivanyuk;  
date and place of interview not stated: "Truth and  
Fabrications About Russian Armed Forces' Financial  
Situation. What Government Check on Defense Min-  
istry Showed"—first two paragraphs are introduction]

[Text] That a comprehensive financial audit is being  
carried out in the Defense Ministry by people from the  
Russian Finance Ministry and seven other departments  
was known in the most varied circles—the truth will out, as  
the saying goes. A commission worked for 40 days, and in  
that time individual reports managed to filter through to

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the mass media which encouraged even greater public interest in this audit. As is usually the case, press items have begun to bristle with all kinds of rumors and stories about the alleged squandering of state money earmarked for the country's defense.

What is the truth here and what is fabrication? Foat Dinov, chairman of the commission and deputy chief of the Russian Federation Finance Ministry Control and Auditing Administration, kindly agreed to answer this and other questions.

[Ivanyuk] Foat Akhmetovich, this is the first time in many years that such a large-scale audit of the legality and expediency of the use of funds earmarked for defense has been carried out. What has caused this? What tasks was the commission set?

[Dinov] First, the overall, extremely complex situation in the country's economy and financial situation required the stepping up of control. Second, this year we have all witnessed unusually keen parliamentary debates on the military budget connected with the fact that the sum requested by the Defense Ministry was twice the amount which could be earmarked for defense needs. In view of such substantial discrepancies in the assessment of the military department's requirements, a Russian Government directive set up a commission involving specialists from the Finance and Economy Ministries, the State Committee for the Administration of State Property, the state taxation service, the State Committee on Issues of Architecture and Construction, the state insurance inspectorate, the federal service for currency and export control, and the Central Bank of Russia. Our main tasks were to ascertain whether the Defense Ministry really is in trouble as regards meeting urgent expenditure or whether the military's demands are exaggerated, and also to take an objective look at how sensibly the money the country can give right now is being spent in the Armed Forces.

[Ivanyuk] And what is the main conclusion that can be drawn?

[Dinov] The commission expressed itself quite definitely. On the one hand the Army is very, very far from the carefree life which some people try to portray, but on the other hand we revealed many shortcomings, omissions, blunders, and abuses of their position by individual commanders and chiefs. That is, facts which we cannot tolerate.

[Ivanyuk] And how do you assess the present level of financing of military expenditure?

[Dinov] It must be said that the financing of the Armed Forces from the federal budget has been deteriorating constantly since 1991. The situation became particularly complex in 1993 and the first half of this year. In 1993, when the requirement was for 10 trillion rubles [R], a figure of R7.5 trillion was approved and in actual fact only R6.5 trillion were handed over. Because of the inadequate volume of financing as of 1 January 1994 the Defense Ministry remained in debt for deliveries, services, and the

payment of wages and salaries to personnel to the tune of R2.1 trillion. Only R1.1 trillion were earmarked from the federal budget to extinguish this debt in 1994.

Because of the inadequate financing in 1994 debts to suppliers for output received and services rendered and also for wages and salaries for personnel as of 1 July had risen to R6.4 trillion, including R3.5 trillion under the "Army and Navy upkeep" heading. In the first half of 1994 every month debts in terms of unpaid wages and salaries reached R160-200 billion.

Of course, over a long period this situation has complicated the reform of the Armed Forces and the solution of the tasks assigned to them. This has also led to unproductive expenditure and harmed the country's economy and led to demands for increased defense appropriations. According to assessments made in the Defense Ministry (we can agree with them), unproductive expenditure due to delayed or incomplete financing in 1993 was in excess of R870 billion.

[Ivanyuk] Foat Akhmetovich, could you now describe the shortcomings revealed.

[Dinov] I want to note immediately that constant and appreciable work has been done in the Defense Ministry to seek ways of reducing military expenditure and to eradicate instances of corruption and extravagance. A number of defense minister's orders and directives have been issued on these questions. On 30 June this year a plan of measures was approved to reduce military expenditure in 1994. And the organization of departmental financial control as a whole met the requirements made. The reports to the Defense Ministry leadership by the Main Directorate for the Military Budget and Financing have been marked by objectivity and a desire to improve the state of affairs.

I have carried out many audits and can say quite definitely that when Army General Pavel Sergeyevich Grachev came to the Defense Ministry leadership there was a marked increase in exactingness on these issues. Thus, under the defense minister's orders alone about 40 generals and other officers have recently been brought to book for breaches of the rules. In 1992-1994 some 130 cases were sent to the Military Prosecutor's Office and criminal proceedings were initiated in 22 of them. In 1993 the Defense Ministry carried out 10,000 audits (96 percent of the plan). But the quality of control is being affected by substantial understaffing as regards inspectors in the Main Directorate for the Military Budget and Financing and lower-ranking financial organs. That problem must be resolved.

The importance of the problem is also borne out by instances of breaches in financial and economic activity and in the expenditure of state funds that we have exposed. They are linked mainly with illegal commercial activity, abuse of position, and illegal expenditure. In military units and Defense Ministry institutions there have been instances of the embezzlement of materials and money, and considerable sums have been diverted into debts

incurred and into the purchase of equipment which for a long time was not used for its intended purpose. Large sums were spent unproductively on the payment of various fines, sanctions, and forfeits, often through the fault of specific officials.

[Ivanyuk] Where was the largest number of such violations revealed?

[Dinov] The comprehensive audit covered only a few branches of the Armed Forces, military districts, and main and central directorates. Among them the largest number of shortcomings was perhaps revealed in the activity of the Main Directorate for International Military Cooperation. Thus, in October-December 1993 Colonel General F. Markovskiy, the chief of this main directorate, gave the "Nadezhda" joint-stock company credit for a total of R6 billion (in fact R5.4 billion were handed over) for a period of up to one year at an annual interest rate of 10 percent, when the Central Bank of the Russian Federation was granting credits at 180-210 percent. The benefit forfeited by the Russian Federation Defense Ministry alone was over R5.8 billion. For the sake of comparison: This sum would be enough to pay the monthly wages of the servicemen of a large military district.

In the period of the audit the commission received a complaint about violations in the General Staff in the allocation of housing. We treated this alert, like others which arrived while we were working, with the utmost attention. The facts set out in the complaint were confirmed.

Using the services of the "Nadezhda" joint-stock company as a middleman and buying up housing at a considerably higher cost per square meter than "Moszhiltsentr" was offering, in 1993 the Main Directorate for International Military Cooperation can be said to have thrown R74.5 million to the winds. No account was taken of apartments in the Defense Ministry housing stock. Of these 12 were used to provide improved accommodations for General staff generals and other officers not on the Russian Federation Defense Ministry Main Billeting and Maintenance Directorate waiting list. Other unseemly occurrences could also be cited. The financial and economic service of the Main Directorate for International Military Cooperation headed by Major General V. Ulyanov kept no record of the completion of contracts by the commission for supplying arms and military equipment, failed to audit reciprocal settlements with foreign economic organizations, and omitted to analyze the economic effectiveness of contracts. This enabled the Main Armored Directorate to obtain illegally from a foreign economic organization the ruble equivalent from the compulsory sale of currency to the tune of around R1 billion [as published], and the directorate of the chief of engineering troops to bypass the established procedure to obtain consumer goods worth 80,000 U.S. dollars under a contract with the "Oboroneksport" all-Russia association.

And it turned out that people employed in training foreign servicemen in our country were not being monitored at all.

Despite the fact that the number of foreign servicemen in Defense Ministry higher educational establishments had declined drastically, professorial and teaching staffs and training personnel numbers had not been promptly reviewed. This list of breaches could be continued....

[Ivanyuk] One of the questions of most concern to our readers is housing. Were any breaches in the funding of the construction and purchase of housing brought to light during the audit, apart from those you have already mentioned?

[Dinov] Yes, they were. Here is just one graphic example. In 1992 the Leningrad Military District Billeting and Maintenance Directorate concluded a contract with the "Sokol" brokerage firm for the construction of 3,700 square meters of housing at a cost of R40.8 million without agreeing it with the financial-economic service. Just 1,716 square meters were handed over to the district. In 1993 three more contracts were concluded but were broken. Nevertheless, last December Colonel A. Sidorenko, chief of the Billeting and Maintenance Directorate, concluded one more contract with the same firm for the construction of a further 60 apartments and transferred R256.9 million to it by way of a preliminary payment. No sanctions were provided for against the firm for violating its obligations on concluding the contracts, and the cost of construction increased by more than R55 million.

As you know, the proceeds from sales of surplus military-technical property are to be channeled into resolving the housing problem in the Army and Navy. But the specialized, financially independent state enterprise set up for the purpose was not properly monitored by the Central Directorate for Material Resources and Foreign Economic Relations, and the proceeds from sales of military property were not transferred promptly to Defense Ministry accounts. From September 1993 through May 1994 considerable sums were permanently, and not always justifiably, kept in accounts held by the specialized independent state enterprise.

The leadership of the specialized enterprise failed to do everything to give real assistance to the Defense Ministry leadership in resolving servicemen's social tasks. The enterprise used the funds earned to purchase not apartments for officers and ensigns but office furniture and equipment and motor transport and to carry out repairs to the premises occupied, which cost almost 250 million rubles.

[Ivanyuk] Tell me, did you check the facts contained in articles in the newspapers MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS, ZAVTRA, and some others? They maintained, in particular, that there were machinations with currency in the Western Group of Forces and many abuses in the funding of the military formations stationed at Baykonur and in the Dniester region. The Defense Ministry Main Directorate for the Military Budget and Financing was also accused of these breaches.

[Dinov] Yes, in the process of the present audit the minister of defense asked the minister of finance to thoroughly investigate all the questions touched on in the press

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in order to finally put an end to this matter and to give the guilty persons, if such there were, their deserts. Despite the lack of time, we organized audits at Baykonur, in the 14th Army, and in the Western Group of Forces. We checked all these facts. They were not confirmed. The newspaper articles, which were intended to cause a sensation, were not borne out by any analysis that was at all objective. For example, how could money not be transferred to Baykonur just because rocket launches were falling through? There were no abuses here. Or another instance. After the withdrawal of units and subunits from the Northern Group of Forces approximately 50 million Polish zlotys were left as a result of fund-saving measures that had been carried out. In late January and early February 1993 the financial service of the Northern Group of Forces converted them into FRG marks under the control of a representative of the Main Directorate for the Military Budget and Financing and credited them to the Western Group of Forces account. Under Polish law the Defense Ministry could not take currency out of that country, there was nothing on which to spend it there, and if this operation had not been carried out then the high inflation to be observed in Poland at that time would very soon have eaten up the whole sum and left nothing. Thus a competent decision was adopted, which made it possible to "rescue" the money and secure an extra U.S.\$456,700 for the Armed Forces.

Of course there were no adventures or abuses here. The claim by one newspaper that one of the military units was eliminated right after the currency was converted proved a pure fabrication. It cited the number of a troop unit of the Western Group of Forces Financial Service, and all Europe knows its account at the Deutsche Bank, since deliveries for the Western Group of Forces have been paid for out of it for many years.

In general, I would point out that the collective of the Main Directorate for the Military Budget and Financing is well trained professionally and resolves the tasks facing it to the proper standard. I will say more: if the same control over the expenditure of funds existed in other ministries and departments as in the Armed Forces, we would be leading a richer life right now.

[Ivanyuk] Tell me, how did the Defense Ministry react to the shortcomings that were brought to light?

[Dinov] In a very principled manner. The results of the check were reported to the minister of defense, who promptly issued an order. A strict yet fair order. In accordance with it, measures have been outlined to eliminate breaches and to eradicate negative facts, and strict disciplinary and material proceedings have been instituted against those responsible. Thus, Colonel General F. Markovskiy, chief of the Main Directorate for International Military Cooperation, has been removed from his post for use of his official position in the interests of a commercial structure, for serious shortcomings in directing the financial and economic activity of a subordinate main directorate, and also for personal immodesty shown in the distribution of apartments. Major General V. Ulyanov,

chief of the directorate's finance and economic service, has been relieved of his post for a negligent attitude to the execution of official duties, for failures in work, and for poor-quality monitoring of work on concluding contracts for deliveries of military output—which helped to cause considerable material harm to the state. Material proceedings have been instituted against them. Many other leaders, generals, and officers have also been punished along disciplinary lines.

On 21 June 1994 the defense minister analyzed the results of the comprehensive audit with Armed Forces leadership personnel. The session was attended by more than 200 people. There was a principled, strict discussion, and specific tasks were set.

[Ivanyuk] Foat Akhmetovich, I believe that such a strict approach to violators of state financial discipline will be perceived with full approval among the troops. But what measures, in your view, must be taken to rectify the financial situation of the Armed Forces as a whole? The audit confirmed that it is far from brilliant.

[Dinov] The results of the audit will undoubtedly be reported to the government as well. We believe that the question of protecting the sums of money derived from foreign economic activity and sales of military property—funds temporarily held in Defense Ministry accounts—must be resolved in agreement with the Ministry of Finance. It is necessary to strengthen the control and auditing organs in the Armed Forces. There are other problems that also need to be resolved. But the chief thing is still that it is necessary to abide by existing legislation with regard to funding the Armed Forces and to maintain their funding at the necessary level. As we know, the law on the federal budget for 1994 requires defense needs to be funded on the basis of the credit-planning method, i.e. regardless of the receipt of revenue in the budget.

This is not being fulfilled at present. I could cite the view of experts of the Brookings Institution, who believe that the Russian leadership is now faced with a choice: to increase defense appropriations despite the complex economic situation, or to drastically cut back the Armed Forces—which will make it possible to ensure their normal functioning within the present level of funding. But continuing the policy of chronically reducing defense expenditure without revising the tasks entrusted to the Armed Forces, their structure, and their numerical strength will inevitably lead, in the opinion of U.S. experts, to the internal disintegration of the Russian Armed Forces in addition to progressive military-technical laggardness behind Western countries. Its most likely manifestation could be "loss of control over stocks of weapons and ammunition and the degradation of safety requirements with regard to the maintenance of nuclear weapons."

This can on no account be permitted.

#### **Aleksey Arbatov on Budgetary Problems**

94UM0511A Moscow OBSHCAYA GAZETA  
in Russian No 25, 24 Jun 94 p 7

[Article by Aleksey Arbatov, director, Center for Geopolitical and Military Forecasts, under rubric "Militaria": "More Is Not Always Better: Dangerous Paradoxes of the New Military Budget"]

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**[Text] Sharp contradictions and indiscriminate mutual accusations of major political figures over the defense section of the 1994 federal budget showed that after two years of Russian reforms, matters here not only are not on the way to recovery, but probably are worse than ever before.**

An entire set of paradoxes and apparent unsolvable contradictions in the sphere of defense policy and its financial and economic support serves as an indicator of clear trouble.

The first is that military expenditures under the first draft budget reached 20 percent (R37 trillion) of the expenditure part of the entire federal budget. They were increased to the level of 23 percent (R41 trillion) by State Duma corrections, but the president, minister of defense and many parliamentarians demand an increase in the proportion of military appropriations to 30 percent (to R55 trillion), while the initial Ministry of Defense request was an entire 44 percent (around R80 trillion).

In principle that proportion conforms to a wartime budget. At the same time, it is generally recognized that Russia now is not threatened by military attack from outside; by the way, this also is written in its new military doctrine. Of course, such a threat is not precluded in the future, but the whole point is that this part (almost 60 percent) of expenditures is accounted for not by long-range work done in advance for the future (advanced weapon programs, experimental development work, in-depth Army reorganization), but for maintaining Armed Forces personnel in their present numbers (2.2 million persons according to the table of organization) and correspondingly large numbers of aging arms and combat equipment. And appropriations for military equipment procurement and experimental development work have been so eroded that they placed industry and science on the verge of bankruptcy (these items dropped from 62 percent of all military expenditures in 1989 to 21 percent in 1994).

Another paradox, as is clear from present budget debates, is the fact that our economy and finances, which are in an unprecedentedly deep crisis, are in no condition to maintain the Army and military-industrial complex in their present size. A further military budget increase (by a proposed R18 trillion, i.e., by 10 percent of all federal expenditures) signifies a sharp growth in taxes and/or an even greater budget deficit and avalanching inflation, which will utterly finish off the economy. Additional defense appropriations will be devalued and as a result the military will receive even less than they were allocated in the beginning.

The third case is connected with the fact that the ongoing reduction in the Army is being carried out by discharging officers to the reserve with all attendant expenditures—and at the same time, each year the Army encounters an enormous shortage of draftees. As a result the personnel shortage is around 30 percent, and in many units and subunits up to 50 percent. The Army is getting rid of professional military men who wish to serve and for whose training the state already has spent enormous amounts,

while boy draftees literally are picked up with the police; and people insist on a further expansion in the draft and increasing harshness of punishments for evading it.

The list of paradoxical phenomena could be continued, but even without that it is apparent that defense policy has entered a closed, vicious circle, if not a spin, into which it is being drawn by deep-seated internal divisions and miscalculations. It is obvious, however, that a thorough revision of the main guidelines of military policy, of military organizational development and of the entire course of reform is required for a fundamental correction of matters.

In this respect the 1994 budget does not provide necessary steps for realization of priorities, and premises about rolling backward in accomplishing military reform and in stabilizing the situation in the Army and military-industrial complex have been incorporated in a number of directions. The fundamental problem is of a dual nature. First of all, it is that inflated expenditures for maintaining personnel, arms and combat equipment at correspondingly high levels "smother" items of expenditure for full-fledged logistic support and maintenance, combat training, arms and military equipment procurements on the minimum necessary scale, and support of experimental development work.

Under the 1994 budget no further reduction in the number of Armed Forces personnel which correspond to the country's economic capacities and to a substantial relaxation in threats to its security, both present as well as presumed, is proposed up to the end of the 1990's. The present level of 2.2 million persons and the command element's official plan to keep the size of the Army at 1.9 million in the future are unrealistic both from an economic as well as from a sociodemographic standpoint. The Armed Forces transition to a volunteer, contract principle of manpower acquisition (payments, allowances, appropriations for contracts and so on are being reduced) is not being supported; to the contrary, it is being undermined.

With respect to military industry itself—and this is the second aspect of the problem—structural perestroika, improvement of economic conditions and closing of enterprises that lack priority and are redundant are not envisaged here. There are no measures for purposeful, planned conversion of the consciously chosen part of the military-industrial complex, and firms conducting conversion successfully are not being given help. There also is insufficient support by the state order for the best military plants remaining in the military-industrial complex.

Meanwhile, it is quite obvious that if arms and equipment procurements now average 10 percent of the state order of the mid-1980's and still less of production capacities, then even doubling it will not save the defense industry. One can count on an even lesser increase in the arms trade—the world market will narrow in the future.

A further "smearing" of limited resources in a thin layer soon will lead to a halt in backward enterprises and advanced enterprises, in necessary enterprises and in

unnecessary enterprises. A chronic shortage of funds for maintaining a much too large army is fraught with a breakdown of order in the Armed Forces and may entail the Army's insubordination and termination of its performance of duties. Failure of the defense industry will evoke a social crisis as a result of mass unemployment. The possibility of effective conversion will be lost forever.

A decline in S&T potential will throw the state back to the level of developing countries and lead to irreplaceable losses of advanced technologies which still also can be used in the civilian sphere. Finally, fulfillment of Russia's obligations under arms reduction and limitation treaties inevitably will be frustrated, with corresponding consequences for its status and authority on an international level.

It is the policy of inertia, the absence of a choice of priorities and the stagnation of reforms which threaten to cause an all-embracing collapse of the Army and military-industrial complex to an even greater degree than a shortage of money. This of course does not mean that the failed economic reform did not affect defense in a most ruinous manner.

At the same time, the experience of the past two years and the present crisis have shown persuasively that radical military reform and purposeful conversion are not someone's political whim, not good dreams and not a tribute to detente with the West. This is a harsh demand of reality, a question of survival of the Russian Armed Forces and the defense industry. This demand cannot be sidestepped, waited out or rejected—the result will be even more destructive.

The only method of fighting the hypertrophy of expenditures for maintaining the Army is to undertake a further reduction in Armed Forces numerical strength in the next few years beginning in 1994, first to 1.7 million, to 1.5 million in 1995, and then even to 1.2 million. It is exceptionally important that this reduction occur only at the expense of rank and file personnel and a reduction in the draft, with preservation of officers and warrant officers (now around one million persons) in the ranks of the Armed Forces. For the transition period (up to 2000) it would be possible to have primarily a cadre army, with installation and arms depot security and simple auxiliary work provided by a minimal draft. Such an army would be the backbone of professional personnel, which subsequently will be augmented by contract personnel (presently 110,000 persons).

Further, one should temporarily stop a large part of capital construction except for housing and depots for the arms and military equipment remaining after the reduction of personnel, after the withdrawal of troops from abroad and after the disbanding of units and formations. (According to certain data, only 10 percent of expenditures for capital construction now goes for housing, with 170,000 officers homeless.)

Funds thereby saved and additional allocated appropriations must be used for supporting the military-industrial

complex and S&T development. Resources should be concentrated in the defense industry in the most advanced, high-technology industries comprising the basis of modern military potential and irreplaceable over many decades.

Carry out an improvement of economic conditions, closing, mothballing and, where possible, conversion of the bulk of remaining industries and enterprises, and ensure creation of new working places.

It is also necessary to increase appropriations for experimental development work, maintaining a high level of military-technical development in order to preserve the possibility of renewing the production of combat equipment in a wide range if necessary.

Finally, it is necessary to allocate sufficient funds for fulfilling disarmament treaties without excessive reliance on foreign assistance. An arms reduction on condition of reciprocity is needed by Russia herself even more than by the West, considering features of the geostrategic and economic situation that are taking shape.

#### **Prosecutor on WGF Corruption Investigation**

944D0073A Moscow FEDERATSIYA in Russian No 2, 1994 [signed to press 23 Jun 94] p 3

[Article by Yuri Prokhanov, FEDERATSIYA special correspondent: "Clever Business General-Style"—For text of earlier article referred to in first paragraph, see the JPRS Central Eurasia Report, MILITARY AFFAIRS, JPRS-UMA-93-017, 26 May 1993, pages 3-4.]

[Text] An article was published under the above headline in the No. 47 April issue of the newspaper in which Boris Isayenko, the senior investigator of particularly important cases, and Vladimir Yelsukov, an investigator of particularly important cases, of the General Procuracy of the Russian Federation, slightly raised the cover of official secrecy on a "piece" of the criminal case associated with the illegal activity of the Trade Directorate of the Western Group of Forces [WGF], and also of the Main Trade Directorate, its superior, in the then Union Ministry of Defense.

We will briefly mention the contents of the article. Within the scope of commerce that was authorized them, the "western forces" were supposed to buy all that was necessary for the military units by concluding contracts with foreigners, first and foremost German companies. But the Trade Directorate conducted strange trade that became the source of super profits for more than 140 foreign firms. The game was invariably played at the same goal: We were supplied commodities of a low quality, even simply rejects and obsolete fashions, at increased prices. Almost no one took them locally, and to send them to Russia for sale was absolutely unprofitable. As a result, a total of about 100 million full-blooded German marks, not "wooden" rubles, were taken out of circulation. This is direct damage to the interests of the state, and to your interests and mine.

One of the central figures who came within the purview of the investigation was the chief of the GUT [Main Trade Directorate] himself—Lieutenant General of Aviation

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Grigoriy Karakozov—with whose direct participation a criminal transaction was rigged with the Moscow Invest firm in the 1992 resale of a large lot of Egyptian perfume for several tens of millions of rubles. And so the time has come to talk about yet another remarkable "episode" in this long criminal story...

When the rather reasonable question confronted the investigators—"But why, as a matter of fact, Invest?"—they looked very intently at a group of military from the Rear Services of Long-Range Aviation of the Soviet Air Force, which was associated with Invest, as it later turned out, through money that was not visible to the outside world. Incidentally, they looked at those who were directly subordinate to Karakozov when he was chief of this Rear Services.

**V.V. Yelsukov:** The question involves Major General Viktor Yudin, the present manager of the Rear Services, senior officers in the rank of colonel and lieutenant colonel—Aleksandr Rogochiy, chief of the commercial branch; Aleksandr Serkov, the manager of another branch, the financial-economic branch, his deputy, Petr Belozarov, and several others. As it appears from very impressive documentary and other evidence (also among the accused is Nikolay Ivanov, the director of Invest), it is impossible to suspect this firm of base ingratitude. A heavy rain poured from its treasury on the gentlemen officers in 1992-1993 in the form of six Zhigulis, two hectares of land in the Moscow suburb of Novo-Podrezkovo—15 hundredths of a hectare each, expensive household appliances, and, of course, pleasantly crisp cash for a sum total of R700 million. It was then that we learned for the first time about a certain secret account that was opened in the Moscow branch of the Vologda commercial bank. It was to it that the generous money came from the firm (for the purpose of deception—through an intermediate point, an aviation unit).

This account, which was classified as a military secret to be kept from outside eyes, proved to be very, well, very interesting. It would seem to be a simple thing, but what maneuvers, simple in a talented way, literally run-of-the-mill, and at the same time not without a certain refinement, made it possible to construct it!

Judge for yourselves. Where do you get the resources? Here is where. At first the simplest possible routine operation was carried out: The authorized budget amount was sent to military units. But after a certain time the stern order arrived: "Return it." It was already being accumulated in a secret account. For financial accountability, forged documents were carefully contrived.

Then the latter-day businessmen of aviation got tired of this "back and forth"—and began to pump what they got from the state directly into an underground business. But the substantial incomes from it again accumulated quietly in the Vologda bank. But in order that the aircraft fly, soldiers be fed, and lights be on in the barracks, they extorted additional appropriations by hook or by crook. At the same time they were guided by a trite but amazingly firm truth: Our state is rich—it will endure.

And although officers were very strictly prohibited from making contacts with mistress commerce by an order of the minister of defense, they developed rapidly against the fruitful background of general ruin and confusion. The businessmen in uniform bought and resold, at a handsome profit, motor vehicles, agricultural equipment, pipes, and other commodities in demand. For a partial 1993 (the account was sequestered in November), this sweeping turnover amounted to no less than R700 million. When required, noncash rubles were successfully converted into cash and stuck to the hands of the members of the by no means much-esteemed company as, for example, happened with Invest money.

It seems that such a long professional and painstakingly conducted investigation will dot all the "i's." And the impartial Themis, despite the important positions and the big stars on the epaulets, will render what is due to the deplorable military men who forgot about the honor of their uniform and ventured into the stormy waves of such a dubious business.

#### **WGF-Central Bank Collusion in Corruption Alleged**

*94UM0510A Moscow MOSKOVSKIY  
KOMSO MOLETS in Russian 30 Jun 94 p 1*

[Article by Dmitry Kholodov: "And Service There Will Seem To Be Honey...: a Military Mafia Exists in Russia"]

[Text] When people say that an entire army of mafiosi is operating in Russia, they do not even imagine how close this is to the truth. Our Russian Army really is clutched in a sea of organized crime. A well organized, disciplined Mafia structure with its strict hierarchy is coming to us from the West...

Our General Procuracy and military procuracy have been meekly silent all the while about the existence of a system of corruption in the Western Group of Forces [WGF]. Even they themselves possibly are up to their ears in this system. One can judge the scope of "operations" THERE from how quite recently two trains with military property—a special coating for airfields—heading for Russia from the WGF disappeared without a trace. It is as if we live in the Bermudas, and not in a European power.

In recent time only General Karakozov, chief of the Ministry of Defense Trade Directorate, and General Semin, chief of the POL Service, have been charged with the commission of crimes in public office in the WGF. First Deputy Commander of 16th Air Army General Seliverstov was arrested for taking bribes. By the way, the latter is regarded as the organizer of a gift which attracted attention: the WGF top leadership bought a Class S Mercedes limousine in Berlin in 1992 through figureheads at a price of over 150,000 marks and shipped it on to Moscow. Soon people began to see Minister of Defense Pavel Grachev in this Mercedes. But when the General Procuracy and Ministry of Security took an interest in this matter, Grachev besieged their noble impulse with a



devastating argument by saying the famous: "But Boris Nikolayevich gave me permission!" There, Boris Nikolayevich, is your "middle echelon."

Here is a curious detail—practically all divisions, brigades and the majority of regiments returning to Russia FROM THERE immediately change their command element. It is difficult to say why this is done from a military standpoint but it is unquestionable that this is an ideal method of covering up tracks. Those who know too much are simply hidden deeper, and those newly assigned are not knowledgeable of previous matters.

Journalist Aleksandr Zhilin, who told in the pages of MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI about specific facts of corruption in the WGF, literally was forced to go underground. In his words, he received repeated phone calls and it was declared that now he was a corpse. The article was about machinations right down to underground trade in armored equipment and MIG's, about the sale of synthetic drugs made in Russian military medical establishments, and about the obvious participation of the Russian Ministry of Defense and law protection agencies in this. Nevertheless, the State Duma recently rejected a proposal to examine this "Russian Watergate." The Parliament and president are engaged in more important state affairs—laws on corruption.

A directive from Pavel Grachev about the appointment directly from Moscow of the chief of the Directorate for Sale of WGF Surplus Military Property, although he had his own person there who was in no way worse, remains a mystery to this day. The following fact also indicates the penetration of the military Mafia into central structures in Moscow. While in Germany, Colonel Kolyaskin, chief of the Russian Federation Central Bank Department of Field Establishments, in an abuse of his official position, stole a government-owned Army vehicle for himself and was caught counterfeiting documents, for which he was held criminally liable under three articles of the Criminal Code at the same time. Fourteen Volvo cars were delivered by transport aviation aircraft to this department in the WGF in December 1992. Nevertheless, Colonel Kolyaskin was not put behind bars; the case was closed with a very original wording: **"in consideration of the fact that Ye. V. Kolyaskin is a soldier-internationalist, has received positive efficiency reports and has fully reimbursed for material damage..."**

Just what kind of protectors must one have in order to conclude a case that way, in style? It is strange that they also have not awarded a medal. Moreover, now the Central Bank is recommending Kolyaskin for a general's rank. This somewhat reminds one of the anecdote about Stirlitz, about whom all the Gestapo were "in the picture" that he was a Russian intelligence agent, but did not arrest him because every dog knew that Stirlitz always would extricate himself. It was no wonder—at one time the chief of field banks did not forget Parshin, chief of the Russian Federation Central Bank Secretariat and Ivanov, director of the Administrative Department, who twice received currency for one and the same TDY trip thanks to the Colonel. And

later, in saving both Kolyaskin and unquestionably the honor of the uniform, Arnold Vaylukov, first deputy chairman of TsBR [Central Bank of Russia], attributed this money to representative purposes. As the finance specialists say, one can believe this only for a decent payment.

By the way, the chief of the WGF Finance Service now is in Moscow attempting to open an account in one of the banks—it turns out that it is for the group of forces, which has ceased to exist. If one compares this with reports that the WGF Mafia is preparing an underground network in Germany which will remain there after withdrawal of the Russian military...

The ceremonial reception of the WGF command element planned for 31 August 1994 by Minister of Defense Directive D-29 resembles the 1945 Victory parade. There will be the ceremony at Chkalovskiy military airfield, then the reception by the Russian leadership, a touching laying of wreaths, and the transfer of colors. More than one million rubles will be spent. For some reason this smells of hypocrisy.

Especially in connection with rumors about Mikhail Kolesnikov's retirement from the post of chief of the General Staff and his replacement by General Burlakov, WGF commander-in-chief, who remains without a position after the withdrawal of troops from Germany. (Talk about Burlakov's retirement hardly can be regarded as serious.) By the way, rumors may remain rumors. It will be difficult for General Burlakov, whose army wallowed in corruption, to lay claim to such a post, and the General Staff also will not take him in. But Burlakov will be capable of the position of Moscow District commander-in-chief, and serious cadre rearrangements in the leadership of Moscow Military District possibly will follow in the very near future. A number of highly placed generals will "depart."

Such a development of events does not presage anything good. People mixed up in shady deals hardly will be able to clean themselves of corruption after ending up in fresh water, if only because they may become the target of blackmail and continue their activity, this time under new conditions, which will lead to drawing those same Moscow military into organized crime. Then it will be necessary to reduce the entire Army. Although someone still will reduce someone else. Can you imagine the Mafia armed with tanks?!

In addition, scandalous revelations are inevitable, which will undermine the positions of our military-industrial complex once and for all. Even now there are many questions that can be addressed to the General Procuracy concerning Colonel Bagdasaryan's (chief of WGF Billeting and Maintenance Unit) brickworks which disappeared and about the fate of computer classrooms which the Germans gave gratis for free retraining of our officers. In general, it would be ideal if the entire WGF leadership retired. Better that they engage in business. And perhaps it is also not worth instituting criminal proceedings. First of all, as it

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turned out, there is no one to do this; secondly, an initial accumulation of capital is under way in Russia, and investigating such cases means going against the current.

### **Edict, Commentary on Housing for Troops Returning From FRG**

94U MOS024 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 13 Jul 94 p 4

[Edict of the President of the Russian Federation "On Carrying Out the Housing Construction Program for Russian Servicemen Belonging to the Russian Troops Being Withdrawn from Germany"]

[Text]

### **On the Realization of the Housing Construction Program for Russian Servicemen Belonging to the Russian Troops Being Withdrawn from Germany**

With a view to the effective use of the funds earmarked by the FRG Government for financing the Housing Construction Program for Russian Servicemen Belonging to the Russian Troops Being Withdrawn from Germany, which is being realized in accordance with the Agreement of the USSR and the FRG on a Number of Transition Measures, dated 9 October 1990, as well as taking into account the social direction of the construction, I decree:

1. For the Government of the Russian Federation to take the necessary decisions to grant to the participants in the realization of the Housing Construction Program for Servicemen Belonging to the Russian Troops Being Withdrawn from Germany (hereafter called—program):

a) Tax credits to the end of the current fiscal year in the amount of the funds subject to payment into the federal budget:

for tax on profit obtained for the volumes of work carried out within the framework of the program;

for tax on property being used in connection with the realization of the program;

for value added tax from turnovers within the framework of the realization of the program;

for special taxes for the maintenance of the most important sectors of the national economy of the Russian Federation and for the financing of construction, reconstruction, repair and maintenance of highways for common use;

b) compensation for effecting obligatory contributions paid into the Pension Fund of the Russian Federation, the Russian Federation Fund for Obligatory Medical Insurance, and the State Fund for Employment of the Population of the Russian Federation, in the volume connected with the realization of the program.

2. For the Government of the Russian Federation to prepare and even before 1 September 1994 to introduce in the State Duma and the Federal Assembly a draft law providing for the relief of the participants in the realization of the program from taxes and levies.

3. To recommend to the organs of state power of the subjects of the Russian Federation and organs of local self-government the release of the participants in the realization of the program from the established taxes and levies.

4. The present Decree enters into force from the moment of its publication. [Signed] President of the Russian Federation, B. Yeltsin  
Moscow, Kremlin  
8 July 1994  
No 1485

### **Comment from Vladimir Bogoslovskiy, the acting chief of administration of the Main Administration for Housing Operation of the RF Ministry of Defense**

By the provisions of the agreement between the former USSR and the FRG on a number of transition measures, dated 9 October 1990, the Protocol dated 15 December 1990, and the Protocol dated 28 March 1991 on additional measures to assist with arrangements for troops returning to Russia, Germany made available free of charge DM 8.35 billion earmarked exclusively for special purpose housing construction project.

And here part of the funds have now proved to be "frozen". Because of taxation.

In the interest of the construction of the largest possible number of apartments, the Ministry of Defense (as the client), the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and the Federal Government of the FRG from the very beginning, advocated that the participants in the program be released from the payment of taxes, duties and levies. This is also practiced in large international projects abroad.

The question has been raised repeatedly on various levels beginning in January 1991; however, it has not met with the requisite understanding and there has been no positive decision. In the opinion of the Ministry of Finance, release from taxes of the participants in the program would create an undesirable precedent for analogous decisions in regard to projects being financed from other sources and the adoption of this decision will lead to losses of budget income, for the compensation of which the budget has no sources."

But meanwhile, the funds made available by Germany are earmarked exclusively for the purpose of housing construction, and our Ministry of Finance does not have right to include them in its planning as sources of income.

On the basis of these funds, contracts have been concluded for the construction of housing camps, housing construction combines, and production lines for the construction industry of the Ministry of Defense, as well as for the delivery of building materials and equipment—for a total sum of DM6.08 billion. The balance of uncommitted [nerealizovannykh] funds amounts to DM1.37 billion, which approximately corresponds to the construction of

10,100 apartments in a complex with institutions providing paid cultural and everyday services [sotskul'ty] and an external infrastructure.

As is well known, on 7 June 1994 negotiations took place in regard to the housing construction program. The German side declared that prior to the solution of the question of taxation, the still remaining orders cannot be placed. The German side once again underscored the necessity of the full release of all participants in the program from the payment of taxes and levies.

Thus, the realization of the program within the time frame stipulated by the intergovernmental agreements was ruined by fault of the Russian side.

The edict of the President of Russia grants a postponement of the payment of taxes until the end of the current fiscal year in the form of tax credits and instructs the government and the State Duma to solve the question of the release of the participants in the realization of the program from taxes and levies within the shortest possible time.

The decree of the President guarantees the successful solution of this problem and makes it possible to raise with the German side the question of the unfreezing of the housing construction for the troops being withdrawn from there.

#### **Edict, Commentary on Housing for Discharged Servicemen**

94UM0502B Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 13 Jul 94 p 4

[Edict of the President of the Russian Federation "On the Realization of the Program To Provide Housing for Servicemen Being Discharged Into the Reserve or Retirement at the Expense of a Grant (Gratuitous Subsidy) Given by the Government of the United States of America"]

[Text]

#### **Edict of the President of the Russian Federation "On the Realization of the Program To Provide Housing for Servicemen Being Discharged Into the Reserve or Retirement at the Expense of a Grant (Gratuitous Subsidy) Given by the Government of the United States of America"**

With a view to the realization of the agreements reached with the United States of America on the realization of the program of gratuitous assistance in the provision of housing to Russian servicemen being discharged into the reserve or retirement, I decree:

1. To approve the text of the Agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the United States of America About the Allocation of a Grant (Gratuitous Subsidy) for a Program to Provide Housing for Russian Servicemen Being Discharged Into the Reserve or Retirement. For the Government of the Russian Federation to secure the completion of the indicated Agreement and its signing.

2. Taking into account the humanitarian character of the assistance being granted, to establish, that equipment, materials, commodities and other property (hereafter called—commodities) that are made available or used in accordance with the program of providing housing for Russian servicemen being discharged into the reserve or retirement at the expense of the grant (gratuitous subsidy) given by the Government of the United States of America (hereafter called—gratuitous U.S. assistance program) are placed under a special customs system. Within the framework of the indicated special customs system, commodities are imported into the customs territory of the Russian Federation and are exported from it without the collection of customs duties, as well as other taxes and levies that are collected in accordance with the legislation of the Russian Federation upon import into the customs territory of the Russian Federation and export from it.

3. To establish that, in case of the use of commodities being imported within the framework of the special customs system for purposes not connected with the gratuitous U.S. assistance program, the commodity is considered released for free circulation, and the sums of customs duties, as well as other taxes and levies previously not collected that are imposed in accordance with the legislation of the Russian Federation upon import into the customs territory of the Russian Federation and export from it, are subject to transfer into the federal budget in full.

The indicated procedure does not extend to cases of the destruction or loss of commodities due to the operation of force majeure.

4. For the Government of the Russian Federation within a month:

To set forth the procedure for placing the goods indicated in Par. 3 of the present Edict under the special customs system;

to take measures to secure monitoring of the special-purpose use of the commodities that are imported within the framework of the special customs system;

to take measures to ban double taxation of foreign participants in the gratuitous U.S. assistance program in accordance with the international agreements of the Russian Federation;

to secure, at the expense of federal budget funds and the budgets of the subjects of the Russian Federation, the financing of the installation of the highway infrastructure necessary for the construction of housing in accordance with the gratuitous U.S. assistance program.

5. To establish that the movement of planes in the air space of the Russian Federation and vessels in the territorial and internal waters of the Russian Federation, which are connected with the gratuitous U.S. assistance program, are relieved from the payment of airport and port levies, customs and other payments established by the legislation of the Russian Federation.

6. To recommend to the organs of state power of the subjects of the Russian Federation and the organs of local self-government to relieve the participants in the gratuitous U.S. assistance program from taxes and levies, as well as to extend assistance to them in the realization of the program.

7. The present Edict enters into force from the moment of its signing. [Signed] President of the Russian Federation, B. Yeltsin  
Moscow, Kremlin  
8 July 1994  
No 1486

**Comment from Anvar Shamuzafarov, chief of the Main Administration for Housing Policy of the State Construction Committee of Russia:**

In accordance with the agreement of the President of the Russian Federation and the President of the United States of America, concluded during the meeting in Vancouver in April 1993, and the decisions of the heads of states of the "Big Seven" in July 1993 in Tokyo, the government of the United States took a decision concerning the financing of the construction of 5,000 units of housing (apartment or one-family house) for Russian servicemen demobilized principally from the Baltic states.

For this, it is envisaged to allot \$160 million. In so doing, it is planned to build 2,500 apartments or houses and to finance the remaining 2,500 apartments through housing certificates issued to the recipients of housing.

The signing of the agreement between the government of the Russian Federation and the government of the United States on the giving of the grant (which means a "gratuitous subsidy") for the program of construction is planned for July-August of the current year.

The program of housing certificates is intended for demobilized servicemen. They will be issued, not money, but certificates for the purpose of concluding transactions for the purchase of housing or for investing into new construction. This makes it possible for the servicemen men themselves to solve their housing problem. The project also includes the possibility of using mortgage financing as means for an additional program of certificates for the acquisition of more expensive housing.

The housing certificates will be issued with determination of a fixed value in U.S. dollars, but with payment in rubles, and the sum will vary depending on the city selected by the serviceman, the size of his family, and the right to additional space.

The cost of the housing and the validity of the transaction will be verified, and upon completion of the transaction the builder will receive the sum of the value of the certificate.

There may be variations to this basic plan, such as gradual payments, and other agreements.

On the American side, the U.S. Agency for International Development has been charged with monitoring the implementation of the program for the construction of housing. Responsibility for the coordination of the activity, by directive of the government of the Russian Federation, has been placed on an interdepartmental commission under the direction of the chairman of the State Committee for Construction, Yefim Basin. The membership of this committee also includes representatives of the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Economics, the Ministry of Defense, the Central Bank, and other interested ministries and agencies of Russia.

The administration of a number of regions and cities of Russia have confirmed their readiness to take part in a competition for the construction of housing for this category of citizens and to allocate plots of land equipped with engineering services and institutions providing paid cultural and everyday services. More than 30 regions have proposed about 200 such areas for the construction of tenement houses and cottages, and 142 of them have been selected. Now the general contractor for the program and subcontractor enterprises are being determined on a competitive basis.

The U.S. Agency for International Development and the Russian State Committee for Construction have conducted a conference with potential subcontractors and explained the rules for participation in the competition. According to the schedule of the program, the results of the competition will be announced in July-August 1994, the conclusion of the contracts—in August. The completion of the construction is planned for September 1996.

At the request of the American side, the expenses for providing the areas under construction with engineering facilities will be the responsibility of Russia.

## POLICY

### **Presidential Commission on Senior Appointments Established**

#### **Commission Statute**

94UM0500A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 24 Jun 94 p 4

[Statute on the Commission for Senior Military Positions and Senior Military and Senior Special Ranks of the Council on Cadre Policy Under the Russian Federation President]

[Text]

#### **STATUTE On the Commission for Senior Military Positions and Senior Military and Senior Special Ranks of the Council on Cadre Policy Under the Russian Federation President**

1. This Statute establishes the order of activity of the Commission for Senior Military Positions and Senior Military and Senior Special Ranks of the Council on Cadre Policy under the Russian Federation President (henceforth called the Commission) and defines its authority.



2. The Commission is an organ of the Council on Cadre Policy under the Russian Federation President; it performs an expert evaluation of recommendations submitted for consideration by the Russian Federation President on appointment to senior military positions and on conferral of senior military and senior special ranks.

3. The Commission is guided in its activity by the Russian Federation Constitution, Russian Federation laws, Russian Federation presidential edicts and directives, and this Statute.

4. The purpose of the Commission is to ensure realization of the Russian Federation President's authority in questions of state service and cadre policy in the defense and security sphere.

5. The following are basic principles of Commission activity:

- accountability of Commission work to the Council on Cadre Policy under the Russian Federation President;
- collective consideration and making of decisions on questions within the Commission's competence.

6. The Commission's main tasks are the following:

- consider recommendations sent to the Russian Federation President by heads of federal organs of executive authority on appointing servicemen to senior military positions; on relieving them from senior military positions in the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense, Russian Federation Ministry of Internal Affairs, organs and troops of the Federal Agency for Government Communications and Information under the Russian Federation President, Russian Federation counterintelligence organs, Russian Federation Main Security Administration, Russian Federation Presidential Security Service, Russian Federation Foreign Intelligence Service, Russian Federation Border Guard Troops, Russian Federation Railroad Troops, Civil Defense Troops and other military force elements; and on discharging senior officers from military service;
- consider recommendations sent by heads of federal organs of executive authority to the Russian Federation President on conferring senior military ranks on servicemen and senior special ranks on employees of internal affairs organs, customs organs and tax police organs of the Russian Federation;
- consider, by order of the Russian Federation President or by decision of the Council on Cadre Policy under the Russian Federation President, other questions of state service in federal organs of executive authority which have subordinate troops and military force elements.

7. To perform its assigned tasks the Commission has the right to request and receive necessary information and documents according to established procedure from Russian Federation state authorities and from organizations and establishments.

8. Commission personnel changes are approved by Russian Federation Presidential directives.

9. The Commission provides opinions or makes suggestions on matters indicated in paragraph 6 of this Statute.

The Commission adopts rules.

10. The Commission chairman directs the Commission's work and is personally responsible for fulfillment of its assigned tasks.

The Commission chairman:

- holds Commission sessions;
- distributes duties among Commission members;
- submits reports on results of Commission activity and on other matters to the Council on Cadre Policy under the Russian Federation President;
- introduces proposals for changing rules for Commission consideration.

11. Decisionmaking by the Commission chairman is allowed within limits of the Commission's competence (with Commission members subsequently informed of the fact that a decision was made):

- when there is a need for a prompt decision on matters of appointment to senior military positions, relief from a position and discharge of senior officers from military service;
- when there is a need for ensuring confidentiality of information on the cadre makeup of Russian Federation foreign intelligence and counterintelligence organs;
- in deciding questions of the discharge of senior officers at the expiration of their term of military service, when they reach maximum age for being on military service, after they have been declared unfit for military service by a military medical board, and in connection with table of organization measures.

12. Organizational and technical support to the Commission's work is provided by the Federal State Service Administration of the Russian Federation President.

The procedure for formalizing, giving an expert opinion on, and considering documents coming to the Commission is determined by Commission rules and by the Director of Administration of the Russian Federation President.

#### **Enabling Edict**

94UM0500B Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 24 Jun 94 p 4

[Russian Federation Presidential Edict No 1292 of 20 June 1994, signed by Russian Federation President B. Yeltsin]

[Text]

#### **EDICT**

##### **of the President of the Russian Federation**

**On Approving the Statute on the Commission for Senior Military Positions and Senior Military and Senior Special Ranks of the Council on Cadre Policy under the Russian Federation President**

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in order to support the work of the Council on Cadre Policy under the Russian Federation President, I decree:

1. Approve the accompanying Statute on the Commission for Senior Military Positions and Senior Military and Senior Special Ranks of the Council on Cadre Policy under the Russian Federation President.
2. Acknowledge as invalid Russian Federation Presidential Edict No 1188 of 7 October 1992 "On the Higher Certification Commission Under the Russian Federation President" and Russian Federation Presidential Directive No 702-rps of 16 November 1992.
3. This Edict enters into force when signed.

**President  
of Russian Federation  
B. Yeltsin**

Moscow, the Kremlin  
20 June 1994  
No 1292

#### **Duma Member Reports Yeltsin's Thinking on Military Issues**

94P50174A Moscow ROSSIYA in Russian No 28,  
27 Jul-2 Aug 94 (signed to press 26 Jul 94) p 1

[Tatyana Sukhomlinova article: "The Details: Sergey Yushenkov on His Meeting With the President"]

[Text] Last Friday, Boris Yeltsin received Sergey Yushenkov, chairman of the Duma Committee on Defense. No press conference was held on this event. However, from an exclusive interview which S. Yushenkov gave to a ROSSIYA correspondent, it has become clear that the 25 minutes which the meeting occupied deserve special attention.

As is known, the holding of joint Russian-American military exercises at Totsk Test Site in Orenburg Oblast has become a sore point for the Communist, Agrarian and K<sup>0</sup> [expansion unknown] fractions in parliament. "We will not permit a single American soldier's boot to trample on our native land!" was the answer to assurances that the proposed exercises would be directed toward working out joint peacekeeping operations. A group of deputies travelled to Orenburg Oblast to meet with the public and with division commanders. As a result, public opinion clearly swung in favor of holding these exercises. Even the head of the local administration, until recently a strong opponent, gave his OK.

In the words of Sergey Yushenkov, the president said that he "would not be led around by communist forces. Once a decision has been made to hold the exercises, then they will be held. A state which did not carry out its own decisions would look ridiculous in the eyes of world public opinion." A date was even set: 16-18 September.

In the words of Sergey Yushenkov, special attention was paid to the problem of financing the Armed Forces. The president is determined, even to the point of demanding

that those, who have not provided financial support for servicemen according to protected budget articles, be fired. It is symptomatic that the subject of the Armed Forces has taken on a tone which is rather unexpected for Russian army traditions. In particular, it was asserted that developing defense policy "is, in general, not the military department's business, but the state's." It was also asserted that, unfortunately, structures to do this do not exist either in the government or in the presidential administration. Judging by everything, a special directorate will be established under the president, which will in the future concern itself with questions of defense policy and with military affairs. In any case, the detailed elaboration of this line of policy has been entrusted to Yuriy Baturin, B. Yeltsin's assistant for national security.

In all likelihood, personnel questions were also discussed at the meeting. S. Yushenkov declined to report any details on this subject, noting, however, that the president was prepared to support the State Duma's demand that V. Kvasov, head of the Russian Federation Government apparatus, be removed. One may venture the suggestion that Kvasov has become a sort of lightning rod, who for some reason "attracted" the "thunder and lightning" of two financial-industrial groups, which have recently been trying to achieve political influence. The groups in question are the Most Group and the Olbi Concern. The new political tendencies which have recently been revealed will probably become clearer after the summer lull.

#### **Colonel General Kolesnikov Interviewed**

94UM0493A Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian  
29 Dec 93 p 9

[Interview with M.P. Kolesnikov, chief of the General Staff and first deputy minister of defense of Russia, by Pavel Felgengauer; place and date not given: "The Actual Reduction in the Army Is Ahead of Schedule"]

[Text] Mikhail Petrovich Kolesnikov was born in 1939. A tank crewman, he is a graduate of a military school and two academies. He has consistently negotiated all rungs of the military career from commander of a tank platoon to chief of the General Staff. Colonel General Kolesnikov has out of service necessity changed his place of residence 23 times.

In September 1991 Kolesnikov was appointed deputy chief of the General Staff—chief of the Main Organization-Mobilization Directorate. After, in the first half of 1992, the Soviet Army General Staff was converted into the General Staff of the Russian Federation Armed Forces, he became first deputy chief of the General Staff. A year ago, on 24 December 1992, President Yeltsin signed an edict appointing General Kolesnikov chief of the General Staff and first deputy minister of defense of Russia.

"We are not currently in a position to plan precisely the organizational development of the army for the medium and long term inasmuch as we do not know what resources will be at our disposal. If the economic resources are to



*hand, we will build; if not, we will manage with what we have. We have to be realists."*

[Felgengauer] In the last year or so there has been a sharp decline in the compulsory military service manning level in the armed forces of the Russian Federation. The operational readiness of many units is declining increasingly. A further spontaneous reduction in the armed forces could bring about a series of environmental, political, and military catastrophes. What are the Russian General Staff's plans for resolving this problem (an increase in the draft, an increase in the number of contract personnel, an accelerated downsizing of the armed forces)?

[Kolesnikov] A recent decree of the now-abolished Supreme Soviet narrowed somewhat the range of draft deferments granted those under military service obligation (I represented the Government of the Russian Federation at that meeting). The deferments for trainees of technical schools and vocational-technical schools were, in particular, canceled.

The decree did not, it is true, take effect, but it was duplicated by a corresponding edict of President Yeltsin (the edict was signed on 2 October). If this rule of law is observed, the manning level of the army thanks to soldiers and sergeants on compulsory military service will have reached 90-95 percent by the end of 1994. The problem will have been resolved. We will emerge from the breach in the course of the present draft even if everything goes as planned. There are still many unbridled attacks in the press on the system of the citizens' draft and, specifically, on the president's latest edict, but in Russian society itself the understanding that there is no real alternative at the present time to the draft system is increasingly noticeable. After all, we are calling up those under compulsory military service obligation not only for ourselves but also for the other power ministries, which ensure internal security and stability in the state.

It has to be said that public opinion as a whole has taken the cancellation of certain deferments quite calmly. The present draft is proceeding in perfectly organized fashion. Even the traditionally "difficult" districts—the Far East and the Transbaykal—are successfully fulfilling the draft quota.

[Felgengauer] So there are no plans to resume the draft of students of the day departments of higher educational institutions?

[Kolesnikov] We believe that there is no need for this. The General Staff by no means advocates everyone being recruited for the army to a man.

At the same time we are consistently reducing the number of military departments in the higher educational institutions. The army is being downsized, and we simply do not need as many reserve specialists (since May 1992 the authorized strength of the Russian Armed Forces has been reduced by 500,000 and now constitutes approximately 2.1 million men—P.F.). But we will continue to train

officers of the reserve in certain unique specialties (at the former Bauman Moscow Higher Technical School, say).

The armed forces are switching to an increasingly great extent to the mixed manning principle. The number of professional soldiers (contract personnel) is increasing, but they cannot fully resolve the problem of the manning level in the coming years. It is the second year that the Ministry of Defense has been without a stable budget. It is very difficult for us to plan ahead precisely how many servicemen we will be able to recruit.

[Felgengauer] In Western armies that are formed thanks to the recruitment of volunteers (the United States, Britain) there is a ramified and multistage system of the selection of potential professional soldiers. Is it planned creating anything similar in Russia? Many army commanders are currently unhappy with the contract personnel contingent.

[Kolesnikov] We are in principle now creating a system of the recruitment of contract personnel, but it will not, most likely, appear all that soon. Many people believe, meanwhile, that the military commissariats should be responsible for the selection of the contract personnel. I, however, believe that the commander of the unit in which they will serve should be responsible. For the selection, for the education, and so forth.

Various people are now coming to us as "contract personnel," of course. But the assertions in the press to the effect that the intake is composed of out-and-out criminals does not correspond to reality. We have a real opportunity for selection. On the books of the military commissariats there are already 20,000 volunteers wishing to serve on contract. But we do not have an opportunity to hire them, unfortunately, since there is no money—there is nothing with which to pay them.

[Felgengauer] The new military doctrine of the Russian Federation no longer contains the former framework figure of a strength of the armed forces of 1.5 million servicemen by the year 2000. So what will the strength of the army be in the coming years and by the end of the century?

[Kolesnikov] I do not believe that strict limitations should be established on the numbers of servicemen. The upkeep of the armed forces is a heavy burden on the country's economy, and the General Staff knows this simple truth. If there is a favorable foreign policy situation, we ourselves will reduce the army to 1.5 million or fewer. We do not need to be urged on.

In accordance with the plan for 1995, we are to have reduced the authorized strength of the armed forces to 2.1 million servicemen. But, as mentioned above, the actual reduction in the army is ahead of schedule.

[Felgengauer] The MVD authorities and the MVD interior forces have been strengthened as of late. To what extent has this been coordinated with the Ministry of Defense? Is there not competition for the increasingly meager human and financial resources?

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[Kolesnikov] We work amicably with the MVD. There is no competition. The government distributes the draft resources in accordance with a recommendation of the General Staff.

[Felgengauer] Has a final decision been made on the disbandment of all current divisions in connection with the declared goal of transition to a brigade system of force organization?

[Kolesnikov] At the present time we are forming a number of new brigades in the North Caucasus Military District. But we by no means intend to abandon divisions altogether.

[Felgengauer] There was much talk in the summer of 1992 about a planned transition from the "division-army" structure to a "brigade-corps" structure...

[Kolesnikov] This was merely talk. It is regiments and divisions that are traditional with us, in the Russian Army. There will be brigades also in the armed forces together with the divisions, for that matter. If there is in an operational sector a corps, fine. If there is a need to have a larger strategic formation, there will be an army. The process of the force organization of the Russian Army is a living process, and it should not be made to fit a rigid framework.

[Felgengauer] What adjustments were made last year to the plans for the reform of the armed forces announced in the summer of 1992?

[Kolesnikov] In principle, everything is going according to plan here. Adjustments are being made in accordance with changes in the situation. It was decided to speed up the withdrawal of the Western Group of Forces from Germany; there was a decision on the reinforcement of 201 Division in Tajikistan. Revisions were made accordingly.

[Felgengauer] So the plan of military reform was not all that rigid?

[Kolesnikov] I am a categorical opponent of rigid plans. Life is richer in invention than us and our calculations. There is, of course, a general direction of our reform. But we frequently encounter objective difficulties, economic primarily. We in the General Staff do not know when our Russian economy will get back on its feet and when military industry will be in a position to start the process of rearmament of the army with more modern weapons.

We are, generally, counting on appreciable improvements in the economy within two or three years. You yourself understand, for that matter, that these calculations are highly relative. We are not currently in a position to plan precisely the organizational development of the army for the medium and long term inasmuch as we do not know what resources will be at our disposal. If the economic resources are to hand, we will build; if not, we will manage with what we have. We have to be realists.

[Felgengauer] To what extent are the constant crises in the funding of the armed forces influencing combat readiness? Are substantial arms purchases planned for the coming

years? Who specifically makes the decision on the final termination of the manufacture of arms at this plant or the other?

[Kolesnikov] The disagreements over funding are a principal difficulty of the functioning of Russia's armed forces. The constant underpayments are undoubtedly exerting a negative influence on their operational capability.

[Felgengauer] Are there sufficient funds for the officers' pay?

[Kolesnikov] The rumors concerning the nonpayment of salaries are somewhat exaggerated. But there have been delays. Even in the central staff of the Ministry of Defense. But this is not what is most important. The level of combat training is declining. If fuel is limited, the General Staff is not in a position to conduct a divisional exercise, say. Flights in the air force, exits of warships to the sea, and so forth are limited.

But what is most awkward is the fact that this is the second year that the ministry has been without a budget. I would prefer a further "cut" in the budget, and what was left to be guaranteed. Now, when there is no budget, no guarantees, any military planning is more than difficult.

We have plans to purchase arms in the coming years, of course. But the realization of these plans will depend on the economic situation in the country. First Deputy Minister Andrey Kokoshin is in charge in the Ministry of Defense of general relations with industry. Not, generally, an enviable job.

The decision to terminate this military works or the other is adopted by the government. But with regard to the opinion of the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff, of course.

There have been instances of the industrial outfits themselves adopting the decision to terminate military production.

[Felgengauer] And they have the opportunity to do so?

[Kolesnikov] It all depends on the form of ownership. If it is a joint-stock enterprise, this is one thing, if it is a state-run enterprise, it is another. The tank plants, say, are themselves interested in manufacturing tanks, come to that.

[Felgengauer] How many operating tank plants are there in Russia at this time?

[Kolesnikov] Two: in Omsk and Nizhniy Tagil. They manufacture the T-80 and the T-72. Production at the Chelyabinsk and Leningrad plants has been terminated. We believe that the two plants are sufficient. The Ministry of Defense is not these plants' sole client, for that matter. They fulfill orders of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations in addition: They work for export.

[Felgengauer] Russian troops are in a zone of combat operations outside of their own territory, in the Caucasus and in Tajikistan. What is the future of these formations?

[Kolesnikov] Russian troops are at this time billeted on the territory of several countries. We will undoubtedly leave Germany and the Baltic. In addition, Russian troops are on the territory of Moldova, Armenia, Georgia, and Tajikistan. This is not counting, of course, units of the missile forces, stations of the missile attack warning system, radiotechnical troops, certain aviation units, and so forth that are temporarily located on the territory of other former Soviet republics. But there are no combined-arms formations there.

The Armenian leadership is of a firm mind that the 127th Motorized Division remain in Armenia, and Gyumri has become the base of the Russian troops. The Armenian leadership also deems necessary a continuation of the present practice of the joint guarding of the Armenian-Turkish border. Both Russian and Armenian servicemen serve jointly in the local border forces.

In Georgia, where the Russian garrisons are larger, the political situation is still far from stable, unfortunately. The Georgian side frequently adopts rash, unsubstantiated political decisions that are subsequently just as rapidly reconsidered. With considerable difficulty we withdrew the 19th Air Defense Army from Georgia, for example. Now the Georgian leadership has begun to talk about restoration of the air defense system. But where is the assurance that everything will not be changed once again? The policy of Shevardnadze and his associates in relation to the Russian troops changes constantly, depending on the domestic political situation in Georgia.

Ideally, the groupings of Russian troops in Georgia should be converted into a system of permanent bases. The mere fact of Russia's military presence in the region is undoubtedly stabilizing the situation. And Russia itself, just as certainly, has serious state interests in the Transcaucasus, most importantly, the preservation of stability, inasmuch as the Transcaucasus is closely connected with the North Caucasus.

[Felgengauer] Is a return of Russian troops to Azerbaijan possible?

[Kolesnikov] Such a possibility is not being discussed at this time. Nor is there anyone with whom to discuss it. Neither Georgia nor Azerbaijan has at the present time a stable government that could consistently comply with the conditions of any serious agreement in the defense sphere. Armenia, where the situation is more or less clear, is another matter. While the administration of President Ter-Petrosyan is in power, in any event. On the whole, it is hard for us at this time to plan anything long-term in the Transcaucasus.

[Felgengauer] At the end of October the Armenian leadership promised to send a reinforced motorized battalion to guard the railroad in Western Georgia together with Russian troops. But subsequently Yerevan officials changed their minds, and the Russian troops had to operate alone. Did this episode not complicate relations with Armenia?

[Kolesnikov] Following the discussion of the matter in the Armenian parliament, it was decided not to send troops

inasmuch as this could have made the position of Armenians living in Western Georgia, Abkhazia, and Ajaria worse. The participation of Armenian troops could have done more harm than good. The situation could have been destabilized even further, and a new stream of refugees could have descended on Russia. So we took an understanding view of the Armenian leadership's decision. We have normal tranquil relations with Armenia, as with Azerbaijan also, for that matter.

[Felgengauer] To what extent is a further escalation of local conflicts possible? Does Russia have serious reserves for a reinforcement of the weak forward groupings at the "flash points" in the event of an escalation of the situation?

[Kolesnikov] An escalation of local conflicts in the areas where the Russian troops are stationed cannot be ruled out. But our possibilities of reinforcement, if necessary, of the groupings of Russian troops are limited. In accordance with the decree of the now-dissolved congress, as of 1 January 1993 servicemen have been able to serve outside of the territory of the Russian Federation only at their own request. This decree is still in effect. So we could not, were anything to happen, send either a brigade or a company.

We consider extremely dangerous the situation on the River Inguri, on the border between Georgia and Abkhazia. There is a very dangerous situation in Tajikistan also. Winter there will, most likely, be tranquil, but tension could increase sharply in the spring. I believe that the present leadership of Tajikistan is not searching all that perseveringly for paths leading to a political solution of the conflict. On the other hand, those who call themselves the "opposition to the current regime" are not making active attempts at a political dialogue either.

[Felgengauer] Following the militant statements of Kitovani, Ioseliani, and Shevardnadze himself on the possibility of a new attempt at a military solution of the Abkhaz problem, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as far as I know, warned Tbilisi that any exacerbation of the situation would lead to an immediate end to military assistance.

[Kolesnikov] I believe that this was a serious and timely step by our Foreign Ministry. I shall not venture to judge how real the intentions of the leadership of Georgia to once again attempt to resolve the Abkhaz problem militarily were, but the fact that the Foreign Ministry was empowered to state our concern was correct. Georgia is constantly requesting additional military assistance, but we have no intention of helping anyone wage war. Conducting offensive military operations on the territory of the former USSR even less.

The same also in the Karabakh war, where both parties have brought each other to complete mutual exhaustion, and now each side is appealing for help.

[Felgengauer] What are the actual numbers of the collective peacekeeping force in Tajikistan? It has been reported that it is planning to deploy 25,000 men.

[Kolesnikov] I personally am hearing the figure of 25,000 for the first time. The agreement on the formation of the

collective peacekeeping force contained no official figures. The actual grouping of the collective peacekeeping force (considering the contingents from the Central Asian states) is at the present time approximately 6,500 men.

[Felgengauer] How successful are the consultations on a revision of the flank quotas ensuing from the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE)?

[Kolesnikov] Russia has, indeed, raised this matter. With the change in the geopolitical situation in Europe we are experiencing serious difficulties over the armament quotas for the so-called flank areas. Our initiative concerning a reconsideration of this part of the CFE Treaty has yet to meet with full understanding among certain other subscribers to the treaty.

But we are not dramatizing the situation. We are continuing the negotiations and hope to persuade our partners. Especially since the question of flank quotas concerns not only Russia but Ukraine also.

[Felgengauer] If the reconsideration of quotas does not succeed (Turkey, for example, is categorically opposed to any reconsideration of flank quotas), how likely is it that in 1995 Russia will altogether refuse, from national security considerations, to comply with this part of the CFE Treaty?

[Kolesnikov] I believe that it is premature to pose such a question as yet. We are not even considering it theoretically.

[Felgengauer] What is the situation concerning START II after the parliament of Ukraine ratified START I with substantial reservations, having refused to reduce more than half the nuclear arms? Does this mean that compliance with both START I and START II is now essentially impossible? What, following this, are relations with Ukraine and the Ukrainian Army like?

[Kolesnikov] This is a very complex issue. I understand the ambivalent position of the Ukrainian leadership and of the president of Ukraine personally, who is reluctant to excite either parliament or the opposition. But the reservations adopted by the Ukrainian parliament essentially signify the stymieing of the accords on strategic arms limitation. It is politicians primarily, that should sort out the treaties, for that matter, not the military.

Our relations with the Ukrainian Army are, generally, normal. Although we could wish for greater mutual candor. I, for example, did not call Ukraine once in the past month inasmuch as I did not feel the need for this. But this is wrong. In reality, we need each other.

[Felgengauer] The new military doctrine provides for nuclear deterrence. Does this mean that in military planning the General Staff will rely on the nuclear forces to a greater extent?

[Kolesnikov] The state of the other arms of the service and branches of the armed forces absolutely does not influence questions of nuclear planning or the use of the strategic nuclear forces. And there are in principle no plans for the

use of tactical nuclear weapons. The General Staff is, generally, not developing plans for the use of tactical nuclear weapons. That is why they are tactical nuclear weapons. We cannot anticipate all the nuances of possible offensive or defense operations. If a situation arises, that is when planning will begin. And in the new military doctrine it is a question merely of situations of the possible use of strategic nuclear weapons.

[Felgengauer] Does the General Staff consider necessary a resumption of nuclear testing in the future?

[Kolesnikov] I am not a specialist nuclear engineer but I believe that testing to improve and check the systems of the reliability and safety of the nuclear weapons is permissible. Especially since serious scientific experiments are conducted at the nuclear test ranges simultaneously. The number of nuclear tests should be strictly limited, though. Testing techniques at the Novaya Zemlya test range are in principle distinguished by reliability. The probability of radiation leaks is practically zero. Back in the perestroika times a public commission surveyed the Semipalatinsk Test Range, for example, but the radiation level proved to be lower than in Moscow.

[Felgengauer] Following the events of 3-4 October, General Grachev acknowledged that the nuclear command and control center was located in the General Staff building. How serious was the threat of the seizure of the General Staff building in the evening of 3 October? How reliable generally is the system of control of the use of the nuclear forces?

[Kolesnikov] A very dependable system of control of the use of our entire nuclear triad has been created, exists, and is functioning successfully in the armed forces of the Russian Federation and the highest command and control bodies and in the General Staff. We have no separate "nuclear command and control center." There is the General Staff Central Command Post, which controls all the armed forces, the strategic nuclear forces included. This center is a very intricate organism. It includes, naturally, the forces performing reconnaissance functions: warning of a missile attack (Missile Attack Warning System), facilities for conveying information to the top national political and military leadership, and systems of command and control, which can formulate and issue commands for the use of our nuclear forces in this version or the other.

These systems are partially located in the General Staff. But this is so serious a business that, naturally, there are backup, parallel command and control posts together with the permanent day-to-day command post. These reserve posts are entirely capable of tackling the set assignment, should the need arise.

The provocation in the evening of 3 October, when militarized squads of supporters of the Supreme Soviet appeared in the area of the General Staff in Arbat Square, was, of course, extremely unpleasant. Officers coming on duty, who work on a Sunday also, were not allowed into



the building, and there were threats of physical reprisals. And this in the capital, at the Ministry of Defense building.

In response we implemented measures to reinforce the security of the buildings of the central staff of the Ministry of Defense, including the administrative building, which everyone calls the General Staff building. We were prepared to act had the armed formations engaged in any provocative actions.

Fortunately, this did not happen. About 2200 these squads formed up in organized fashion and moved off in columns, singing, in the direction of the White House.

[Felgengauer] A great many arguments have been published as of late concerning the "reliability" or "unreliability" of the armed forces at the time of the clashes in Moscow on 3 and 4 October and concerning the fact that it took President Yeltsin a long time to persuade the military in the early hours of 4 October. Who specifically did the president "persuade" when he was in the General Staff building in the early hours of 4 October?

[Kolesnikov] He persuaded no one. He truly did come to the Ministry of Defense building for the meeting of the Security Council, sat there, and listened calmly to the thoughts of the other participants in the meeting. The Security Council meeting was attended by Chernomyrdin, Yerin, Primakov, Golushko, and Lobov. Only Defense Minister Grachev and myself were present from the military. The president did not call any commanders. So there was, strictly speaking, no one to "persuade." And there was no talk of "commitment." A decision was made to call in individual army subunits to impose order around the White House to help the MVD forces. In the morning of 4 October the armed defenders of the dissolved Supreme Soviet were the first to open fire on a column of troops at the distant approaches, in Novyy Arbat, after which the operation, in fact, began. We had no doubt as to the need for and moral justification of our actions.

#### **Deputy Defense Minister on Reform, Conversion, Politics**

94UM0495A Moscow OBSHCHAYA GAZETA  
in Russian No 26/51, 1-7 Jul 94 p 4

[Interview with First Deputy Minister of Defense Andrey Kokoshin by Yegor Yakovlev under rubric "The Professional": "Andrey Kokoshin Is the Guest of Yegor Yakovlev; National Security: A Search for the Optimum Between Swords and Plowshares"; photograph of Kokoshin included]

[Text] [Yakovlev] Previously there was not even a desire to clarify something about the Ministry of Defense, just as about the KGB, by the way. If the person you were talking to did let a word drop, the censor still would cross it out. But now why not ask you: What are the duties of a first deputy minister of defense?

[Kokoshin] The main part of the work consists of questions of the defense economy. It is quite obvious that mutual

relations between state and Army, Army and local authorities, and Army and product suppliers have changed radically. One has to locate and marshal new relations on the move while also taking advantage of world experience. And not simply count money—one always was supposed to save money, but it is true that this was far from always done... It is necessary to analyze and forecast the development of the domestic economy as a whole and of various industrial sectors and work out cooperation with a multitude of organizations and departments and with Federation components. All this forces one to frequent the government and parliament, associate with experts and travel throughout the country. Many problems of combat training and Armed Forces structure, not to mention Army and Navy social problems, also stand out in relief today through economics and questions of financing. A significant part of my duties consists of Ministry of Defense military-technical policy. By the way, we constantly coordinate it with the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Border Guard Troops, Federal Counterintelligence Service and Federal Agency for Government Communications and Information.

In the absence of the minister of defense, I carry out his duties under the existing procedure, and this in turn obligates me to be knowledgeable on all matters, from military-political problems right down to particular incidents in the Army and Navy.

[Yakovlev] Like the majority of people, it is not given to me to understand sums with an astronomical number of zeroes. And of course I am not undertaking to judge who is right: the legislators who did not want to provide additional trillions for you in the budget, or you who attempt to prove that these trillions are needed. But it seems to me there is another important point in the discussion which unfolded over the military part of the budget. For many years, beginning with Khrushchev's times, not to mention the era of "new thinking," we all were inclined to think one thing: the more it was possible to snatch from defense, the better all of us would live. And probably only now did it resound rather harshly in the course of the aforementioned discussion that if you wish to have a worthy army, pay for it.

[Kokoshin] I fully agree with your observation about such an oversimplified approach. According to it, we automatically received benefits for our economy by having reduced expenditures for arms. Of course, it is difficult for the uninitiated to judge particular budget amounts. It is very important to understand the situation in which the Army found itself in the last two years. Above all, the Armed Forces suffered deeply from disintegration of the unified army. Russia has been carrying out such a massive withdrawal of troops in such compressed time periods previously unknown to anyone. As a result, a real threat arose somewhere at the beginning of 1992 of losing controllability of the Armed Forces. Add to this that the manufacture of military products fell 7-9 times in 1992 compared with 1991 due to reduced government financing, although even then it already had been reduced for many directions. Expenditures for scientific research had been reduced

radically by government decisions made at the beginning of 1992, and presently there are no hidden expenditures of any kind for defense, despite certain statements here and in the West. Finally, there has been almost a complete halt to construction of housing which officers could count on, except with funds from the defense budget.

In short, the pendulum swung from one extreme to the other, as often has happened in Russian life. From extraordinary militarization, when 30-35 percent of our country's gross domestic product [GDP] was being spent in one way or another for military needs (and some assert that it was even more than 40 percent), the pendulum moved swiftly to exactly the opposite side: now it is a question of five percent of GDP.

All this led me to the conviction that now was when an acute need had arisen for political decisions with respect to the Armed Forces and the defense industry: an understanding of the Army's role as a guarantor of social stability in the country and of our authority in international affairs, including for success in winning world markets, especially in science-intensive products. The optimum between swords and plowshares still has to be determined in ensuring Russia's national interests and our national security.

**[Yakovlev] You defend interests of the Army and defense industry with a conviction which generals might envy. Just how did it happen, nevertheless, that you, strictly a civilian person known to all of us from scientific works and from the USA and Canada Institute, suddenly ended up in the very heart of the Ministry of Defense?**

**[Kokoshin]** I must say right off that defending the necessary level for ensuring the country's defense capability is for me a very important part of ensuring our national interests as a whole. While working in the USA and Canada Institute, for many years I dealt with our national security policy, participated in developing various military-political topics and worked a great deal together with heads of the Ministry of Defense and General Staff. The fact that I completed Moscow Higher Technical School imeni Bauman, that I received a rather intensive military training as a reserve officer, and that the topics of my course work and degree work in electronics were linked directly with defense subjects played its role in the fact that I dealt with these problems.

I cannot say I was very successful in my basic specialty at Moscow Higher Technical School: even then I was fascinated with social sciences, including our military history.

I myself come from a military family. I know what military service is from more than hearsay: my father, my grandfather and all brothers of my father and mother are military people. I grew up in a military home on Tishinskaya Square. We had a fairly good library on military equipment and military history. In those times, when books of banned authors as a rule were being destroyed, Grandmother saved them for me. Thus for the first time I opened the memoirs of White generals Denikin and Lukomskiy and the works of Red commanders subsequently

repressed in the 1930's. My first book, a gift from my father, was a biography of Suvorov in works of Russian art.

**[Yakovlev] Still, how did you end up in the Ministry of Defense?**

**[Kokoshin]** At one time there was a discussion of what kind of person the minister of defense was to be. Some believed he should be a civilian. Others insisted on a military man.

**[Yakovlev] I remember this discussion back before Grechko's appointment as minister of defense. After the death of Marshal Malinovsky in 1957 they began talking about a civilian minister from the example of the United States, where McNamara was at that time. I remember what Khadzhi Mamsurov, first deputy of our military intelligence, said to me at that time concerning this: "Inasmuch as a U.S. Army lieutenant receives more than me, a colonel general, even a civilian can be minister of defense there. But here, where it is not pay, but drill and discipline that hold up the Army, there is nothing for a civilian to do—only a military man!" Was Mamsurov right?**

**[Kokoshin]** To a certain extent he was right for his time, just as the president was right when he appointed a military man as minister of defense in 1992. I believe the Army was not ready for this post to be held by a civilian, especially during the difficult situation in which it found itself in 1991-1992.

**[Yakovlev] Why did the president decide specifically in your favor?**

**[Kokoshin]** It is hard to say; to this day I do not know how that decisionmaking process developed. I had occasion to accompany Boris Nikolayevich on his first official trip to the United States as president of Russia. I had met him several times, but of course he knew little about me. Evidently a discussion in the press on the question of who was to be Russian minister of defense played its part. General designers of defense design bureaus, military centrists and democrats mentioned my name.

**[Yakovlev] An official proposal finally came?**

**[Kokoshin]** Viktor Vasilyevich Ilyushin unexpectedly phoned to say the president wanted to see me. A Presidential Council was being held in the Great Kremlin Palace on 10 April 1992 in which you probably also took part. The president emerged from the room where the Council was taking place and said he was only slightly familiar with me but had been told more than once that my candidacy was suitable for work as first deputy minister of defense. He added that he himself would be acting minister of defense for several months. He said that Pavel Sergeyevich Grachev also would be appointed first deputy. I was not about to take time to reflect—I responded that I agreed.

Both Grachev and I understood that urgent decisions were needed with respect to ensuring controllability of the Armed Forces—this institution seemed to be outside the historical system of coordinates, without proper reference points. The officer corps could in no way determine its place in the CIS Armed Forces. It was clear to us what



enormous might there was in the hands of our Army, and it could become extremely destructive not only for our country, but also for the entire international community. I can say without exaggeration that I was moved by a specific historical idea: that point in time had come when it was impossible to engage only in analytical work—we had to harness ourselves and engage in rough everyday work while not forgetting about long-range goals and missions and about those problems on which I had been working for years. This abundance of general, rough everyday work helped establish normal and largely also comradesly relationships with Grachev, with the chief of the General Staff and with other deputies. Some of my friends said I had lost my mind: you can continue to write books and articles, lecture in prestigious universities, and be of practical benefit by taking part in politics—with advice, of course. By the way, you all also probably experienced this when you agreed to go head up Ostankino.

I had occasion to be occupied with political military history even before. It was as if I passed our historical traumas through myself. One of the most terrible was the trauma of 1941. More than once I turned to a study of this time. I even dreamed about 1941 repeatedly, although I was born in 1945.

**[Yakovlev]** The tragedy of 1941 is inseparable from the overall tragedy of the country and state.

**[Kokoshin]** For me it is organically interwoven above all with the tragedy of 1937-1938.

**[Yakovlev]** Had our generals not been destroyed four years before, 1941 could have been different?

**[Kokoshin]** It was not just the generals who were destroyed, but also many thousands of educated senior and even junior officers, although I am not at all an admirer, for example, of Tukhachevskiy, the lieutenant, who became army and front commander too quickly...

In general, during the Civil War there were three categories of general and flag officers. The first consisted of Czarist Army generals and colonels who went over to the Bolshevik side. Then there were lieutenants and warrant officers such as Tukhachevskiy and Uborevich. Finally, there were the sergeant majors. For example, Budenny was a brilliant tactician with very poor orientation in operational art, not to mention strategy. And there were very complex relationships among all these categories. Initially the lieutenants together with the sergeant majors contributed to moral and physical destruction of the generals in the late 1920's. Later they began to settle scores with each other.

The beginning of the tragedy of 1941 was during 1928-1929. At that time Svechin, a former Czarist Army general, probably the most outstanding mind of Russian military science and without exaggeration a 20th century Clausewitz, was crushed with Tukhachevskiy's direct involvement. Already at the end of the 1920's he described the initial period of World War II as no one else had. He

predicted that Poland would be Germany's first victim in the upcoming world war and that Poland would be crushed in a very short time. And he warned us to expect no swift victories, that a difficult, protracted war lay ahead. In its first stage it would be necessary to rely on a strategic defense before we acquired the capability to attack. Only by having exhausted the enemy, somewhere in the vicinity of Smolensk, would the Red Army be capable of delivering the first strategic counterthrusts. Svechin was accused (including by Tukhachevskiy) of defeatism, bourgeois sponging, and so on. I digressed from the discussion of today's topics, but not by chance. This past continues to influence us. For decades after World War II a significant part of our military planning efforts was aimed at replaying 1941. And the vector of our military-political and military-strategic thinking to a considerable extent was acting in the wrong direction, which also had a negative effect on the defense economy and consequently also on the country's economy as a whole.

**[Yakovlev]** I would like to return to the Army reform about which people spoke and wrote unceasingly for all the years of perestroika. Now they do not recall it. So did reform happen or not? Speaking of "dedovshchina," it has not decreased, and the criminal base in the Army has grown even more.

**[Kokoshin]** Reform is going on, but not as swiftly and not as deeply as one would like. In order for our society to have a sober impression of military reform problems, it is useful to have an impression of world experience in armed forces reforms. By the way, one should not forget that back before Peter the Great a great deal was undertaken for army reform by Ivan the Terrible and Prince Vasilii Golitsin. In the 18th century probably our most important military reformer after Peter was Prince Potemkin-Tavricheskiy. Victories on the battlefield did not fall to his lot as they did to Rumyantsev, Suvorov and Ushakov, but the latter are largely obligated to Potemkin for their successes, which brought fame to the Russian Army and Navy. To this day our Armed Forces largely live under Milyutin's reforms of the 1860's and 1870's. He conducted his reform for almost 20 years, but it just was not completed for a number of reasons. Evidently this had an effect on our defeat in the Russo Japanese War. It took the Americans at least ten years before they achieved real results in the new armed forces manpower acquisition system.

One must not be hasty, but one also must not delay, otherwise this can be very costly for the country's real security. History has set aside for us a certain time for reform, but do not think it is endless. The most serious problem of progressing in the matter of reforms is financial. An abundance of funds for defense does not stimulate reform, but also their very acute shortage which we experience today binds your forward progress in reforming the Armed Forces. In general I would like to emphasize that Armed Forces reform is not just a job for the Ministry of Defense, it is a statewide task.

**[Yakovlev]** How do you see the main directions of military reform?

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[Kokoshin] It is possible to determine five main components present in a long-range Armed Forces reform policy.

The **first** is a change in the manpower acquisition system. A phased transition to a contract system became one of the main elements of the present Armed Forces organizational development. It is not enough that we have around 200,000 contracts with privates and NCO's; for the time being many servicemen recruited under contract still do not satisfy us in their quality. The entire officer corps, including senior ranks, went over to the contract principle. This is a phenomenon of great importance. It is another matter that the state is not always capable of fulfilling its obligations to servicemen. All this is very complex and many have not realized the essence of the contract system, but it will make itself known in the next five years. The consciousness of the officer corps, for which contractual relations are forming with the state, is coming to be more in line with a forming civilian society and a rule-of-law state. In this connection it is exceptionally important that the state carefully fulfill its obligations established by law.

**Second** is a system of military education. We have military academies of a very high level where both military as well as civilian scientists with a world name traditionally work. The attractiveness of these academies for our officers is high, because along with a high level of special training, their level of general educational disciplines also is high. But the situation is different in many higher military schools. Life shows that evidently we should considerably expand the network of cadet, Suvorov and Nakhimov schools, competition for which has become very high. Development of a network of such schools is an important matter for all of society, and not just for the Army and Navy. It helps take many bright, energetic boys off the street. More attention must be given to training junior commanders and shaping a professional layer of sergeants and petty officers in combat units.

The **third** component of reform is a change in the Armed Forces structure and their command and control system. The Russian Ministry of Defense inherited a very complex, largely cumbersome structure and command and control system, but I repeat once more that when the Russian Ministry of Defense began its work there was no desire to change the structure. The demand was not to permit a loss of command and control, for there was a point in time when many became uneasy over the one thought that such a bulky, cumbersome thing, possessing nuclear and chemical weapons and enormous stockpiles of conventional munitions and weapons, would disintegrate or lose its space-time orientation under completely new conditions.

Now it is necessary to begin more radical transformations. Ministry of Defense collegiums regularly discuss questions of how we are to overcome the ossification of structures and get rid of their unjustified duplication. In a number of cases duplication not only is inevitable, but also even useful; it increases system reliability.

Now **fourth**. The system of supplying the Army is a direct derivative from the country's economic system. In previous times an extremely centralized system functioned: conditionally speaking, products might be sent from the Far East to Ukraine via Moscow District depots and vice versa. In the last two years we succeeded in changing much here and optimizing the ratio between central procurements and what is done by military districts, fleets, air armies, air defense armies and the Strategic Missile Troops. But the main work still lies ahead. A new, less centralized system of deliveries requires intensifying control over the expenditure of funds and accounting for regional features of price formation on goods and services consumed by the Army and Navy.

Now the Army and Navy are being integrated into the system of a forming market economy, with all accompanying pluses and minuses. This largely also is the source of the corruption with which society is stricken today: new opportunities and temptations appeared for such corruption.

**Fifth** and finally, Armed Forces relations with industry. Previously nine industrial ministries, special Gosplan subunits, and the USSR Council of Ministers Commission for Military-Industrial Matters, not to mention corresponding subunits of the CPSU Central Committee, functioned between the Army and the industrial enterprises proper. It would happen that such a system would impose on the Armed Forces that which they did not need, but on the other hand, Armed Forces representatives would be included in lists of state prize laureates and heroes of socialist labor. Expensive systems would be turned over unfinished, and the infrastructure would develop with a conscious lag. For example, after the cruiser Kirov was accepted she required several more years of completion to become combat effective, and it was also the very same with several types of aircraft.

Now we are moving toward relations with industry that are accepted in all civilized countries. More and more, enterprises of all forms of ownership deal directly with the general client from among Ministry of Defense subunits. Far from everything is well in these relations. They also need a strengthening of economic analysis and of control, including supradepartmental control. The incompleteness of structural transformations in industry remains a problem for us. Design bureaus and series plants in many sectors are separated, as they were before. It happens where series aircraft plants and design bureaus act as competitors in world markets. Potential customers of Russian defense products frequently just do not know with whom to deal. The process of reunification of plants and design bureaus was a component part of the process of forming financial-industrial groups supporting interests of Russia's national industry.

We have to organize the establishment of financial-industrial groups, which will permit bringing in nonstate financial resources for the development we need so much and lighten the load on budgets.

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**[Yakovlev]** It is the very time to talk about conversion. If one were to compile a Russian dictionary of words being used endlessly and generally meaning nothing, conversion would occupy its place there.

**[Kokoshin]** Without a doubt. For a long time I have been speaking in favor of getting away from this disorienting term. We must speak above all about a diversification of defense enterprises. In the majority of cases they make up the most valuable part of our industrial and scientific-industrial potential and are almost the main resource for our competitiveness in world markets if we do not wish to turn into a raw-material periphery of the world economy. Many specialists here and abroad repeatedly have emphasized that it is impossible to convert defense complexes on a "purely market basis." After the war many pure defense plants in the United States were simply closed. That proved more profitable. But this was possible only with high labor force mobility in the United States, with a general rapid growth in the civilian economy, with a developed system of social insurance which appeared within the framework of Roosevelt's "New Deal," and so on.

We have a society of a different nature and a different economy. We have at least 70 cities with the entire social sphere that are almost totally dependent on defense industries. This is a very major problem, both social and economic, which is being resolved very slowly.

An important transformation of relationships between defense and civilian technologies occurred in many countries. For many decades defense technologies significantly outstripped civilian technologies. Defense industry achievements were used aggressively in the West for producing science-intensive civilian products. This was done by one and the same companies, which were equally interested both in a profitable military order and in large civilian sales in the world market. As a result, in America and other developed countries, especially Japan, civilian technologies began to move ahead in a number of cases. Major state infusions through the defense budget and purposeful efforts to commercialize these technologies bore their fruit. To this day, however, the military sector of our economy is enormously stronger technologically than the civilian sector. But a purposeful national industrial policy is required for this.

With a rigid system of centralized planning, the old conversion policy as it took shape toward the end of the 1980's still had certain chances for success with us. Defense plants and design bureaus were charged with producing food industry equipment, medical gear, household electronics and so on. All these assignments functioned in the system of prices and demand which had taken shape at that time. Many were diligently fulfilled, albeit at a high price. In the presence of a general decline in production the output of conversion commodities—refrigerators, television sets, stereo tape recorders and so on—grew considerably in 1991. But a great redistribution of prices set in here. Production costs changed sharply as a reaction to prices on original materials and set-completing materials, which had

been artificially undercharged for decades. The jump in prices in the defense sector both on military as well as civilian products turned out to be largely more significant than was the case in the production of civilian products. Previously the defense ruble was considerably heavier than the ruble in civilian machine building, for example. Thus, the defense ruble was 8-10 times more expensive than the dollar in the production of tanks and combat aircraft. Many enterprises adapted to the change in prices and some even increased the production of household appliances. But now these commodities pile up more and more in warehouses: there was a sharp drop in consumer demand. It also affected orders placed by the state. A shortage of various means of transportation and of communications and television equipment is felt acutely in Russia, but finished aircraft, ships, locomotives and satellites are standing in our plants and yards. In the most developed market economy the state must invest money in transportation, communications and power engineering as well as education, science and culture, even at the expense of increasing the budget deficit. By the way, many authoritative economists believe that a budget deficit is not the chief inflationary factor under certain conditions. With proper organization of the matter such investments will result in lower tariffs for the consumer. A state's investments in the infrastructure are not subsidies for unprofitable enterprises. This is money which later will begin to work and will return to the treasury in a few years. Storage tanks have value, a road has value, and a communications satellite has value. By developing the infrastructure a state thereby stimulates creation of a market.

**[Yakovlev]** Let us end our conversation on a fashionable subject—the army and politics. Conversations to the effect that the army always must be outside of politics remind me of discourse about an independent press. There can be neither in an ideal form.

**[Kokoshin]** The army is a tool of politics, but politics of the state, inasmuch as the army is a state institution. For centuries the army was used in various countries for operations within the country, but in time functions of the army and the police were separated more and more and they basically began handling different missions and affairs. Especially now, when the army has become such a colossal force that any bodily movement has become very noticeable. The army's entire ideology is aimed above all at repelling outside aggression. Nevertheless, I can recall a number of instances where under extreme conditions even in the most developed states the army was used to stop disorders in time, when other force elements no longer had the strength.

In recent years, attempts unfortunately have been made by different political forces to appeal to the Army in an attempt to pull it over to a particular side. This is a very dangerous activity. The Army is a relatively rigid, largely conservative institution; it must be the embodiment of stability both for itself and for public opinion. There has to be a precise line of subordination in the Army, it has to know precisely whom to obey. This is a demand of the

nature of armed forces themselves. Therefore the Army actively voted to adopt the new Constitution, specifically because of a thirst for order, organization and preciseness of relations in the state mechanism based on law.

**[Yakovlev]** I understand the meaning of subordination; still, in August 1991 in my view the Army did not proceed from the basis of regulations, but out of civilian considerations.

**[Kokoshin]** The spirit of new times unquestionably has penetrated into the Army. Civilian principles unquestionably penetrated into the Army, but they do not contradict the spirit of subordination and of Army discipline, and, I repeat once more, based on the Constitution and on law. A feeling for law and order is penetrating deeper and deeper into our Armed Forces, and the Ministry of Defense leadership is doing everything possible for this.

**[Yakovlev]** Many pages in the president's last book are devoted to events of 3-4 October. And everything that was said seemingly is incomplete concerning the behavior of the Army and especially of the Minister of Defense in the tragic hours; the author does not give an evaluation or simply an answer as to why.

Remember the lines about how Moscow was defenseless on that night. "And the Army had two and one-half million persons, but not even a thousand fighting men, at least one regiment, could be found to show up now in Moscow and act in defense of the city" (p 383). But what in fact occurred in Grachev's office in the Ministry of Defense? Why could he do nothing for a long time? Finally, why did he not dare undertake something without having received written instructions from the president? Did he wish to secure himself or to have a document for exerting pressure on his subordinates?

**[Kokoshin]** I believe that each person, no matter his position or his rank, has the right to reflect and to assess the situation, especially when it is a question of the lives of hundreds and thousands of people. I can only say that this was a difficult moment for Grachev from a human standpoint, as it also was, by the way, for many others. I am convinced that he attempted to minimize bloodshed.

**[Yakovlev]** Tell me, we do not know a great deal about what occurred in the Army from 3 to 4 October?

**[Kokoshin]** It seems to me the main things are known to the public.

**[Yakovlev]** I am not speaking about you and those around you. I have in mind myself, other people, and society as a whole.

**[Kokoshin]** It stands to reason that there are those moments which particular participants of the given events are in no hurry to share for now, just as they still have not shared the events of August 1991 or the Tbilisi or Vilnius events. To this day we also do not have an exhaustive history, official or unofficial, of the Afghan War. And there is no denying that much still is unclear about the history of the Great Patriotic War.

**[Yakovlev]** In other words, you wish to say that we know just as little about events of 3-4 October as we do about the Afghan War?

**[Kokoshin]** You still have not interpreted me correctly. The events of 3-4 October are considerably more known and obvious. They were made such, including by the mass media.

### Controversy Over Russian-U.S. Maneuvers

PM0807132194 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI  
in Russian 6 Jul 94 p 2

[Report by Valeriy Vedernikov under the "ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI Investigation" rubric: "Maneuvers at the Totskoye Epicenter. Will the Russian-U.S. Exercises Take Place?"]

[Text] Totskoye-2, Orenburg— These two messages arrived in Orenburg almost simultaneously. One was sent to the local newspaper YUZHNY URAL [Southern Ural], the other was sent to the oblast administration. The author of the first was V. Ustinov, chairman of the State Duma Committee for Geopolitics. The second was sent by Colonel General G. Kondratyev, Russian Federation deputy defense minister. They speak of the same thing—the forthcoming Russian-U.S. exercises at the ill-starred Totskoye range in Orenburg Oblast.

The State Duma committee chairman writes: "Twenty-four public organizations from Orenburg Oblast, the Volga Valley, and Mordovia have addressed the Russian Federation Federal Assembly State Duma Committee for Geopolitical Questions, declaring that 'Russia has not joined NATO and there is nothing for U.S. troops to do on our land.'

"The committee backed the public's protest and believes that joint Russian-U.S. exercises at the Totskoye range in Orenburg Oblast with the participation of a motorized rifle division on the Russian side and an infantry division on the U.S. side are at odds with Russia's national interests. According to expert assessments by military specialists, the practical benefit of these maneuvers will be insignificant, while the expenditure will be enormous. The pointless, expensive, ostentatious, and showy exercises in conditions of deepening crisis and the population's low standard of living are generating a massive negative social response.

"Yu.M. Baturin, the president's aide for Russian Federation national security, was sent a letter 24 March 1994 containing the decision of the Committee for Geopolitical Questions and the Committee for Security on the in expediency of the Russian-U.S. exercises on Russian Federation territory and a resolute protest against them...."

The stance of the deputy defense minister, as summarized by the oblast administration press service, amounts to the following:

"It is planned to conduct not field training exercises but command and staff exercises with a limited number of personnel (up to 250 men on each side) and motor vehicle

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equipment. The rehearsal of events in the upcoming exercises will be held at the Totskoye range because it is the site of the only center in Russia set up for the training of peacemaking forces so far. Questions of collaboration during peacekeeping operations, which were discussed at talks between the Russian and U.S. Presidents in Moscow in January 1994, will be resolved during the exercises. The United States is prepared to bear all the expenditure involved in conducting the exercises (up to \$2 million). The Russian Defense Ministry is not planning to draft any additional mobilization resources from Orenburg Oblast. The exercises will not create any problems in conducting agricultural and other work...."

Those are the diametrically opposed stances of two high-ranking figures from Moscow. But here, locally, there are quite a few people in whom the upcoming exercises are not generating any negative emotions. The painful reaction by part of the population is rooted not only in the fact that they perceive the exercises as somehow violating Russia's national interests and undermining its sovereignty. Furthermore, for many people, particularly the older generation, the Totskoye range has become the symbol of a terrible misfortune.

...We drove up to the hollow in an "Uazik" truck, got out, and walked across the fresh grass. Here and there the metal of warped airplanes glistened in the sun. Not real ones—models. "Don't worry," the servicemen assured me, "these are not 'the' models that remain from the nuclear attack." And then there was a monument, rather like an obelisk. The product of soldiers' hands and imagination, it lost its pristine appearance a long time ago. Evidently it too has suffered during bombing exercises.

Another quotation: "I happened to see this terrible film. The cameras, evidently on an automatic setting, were positioned very close to the explosion site. A forest was shown, the crowns of huge trees, specially built brick and wooden houses, tanks, guns.... And afterwards? Pitiful remains, tank caterpillars. In the epicenter of the explosion there was a continuous asphalt desert. This hour-long film is, I think, stored in the annals of the Ministry of Defense. It would not be a bad thing to declassify it and show it to the whole country." This is a fragment of an interview which I once had with General Dmitriy Volkogonov.

Maybe we are at the same place where the cameras had stood in 1954, I don't know. But this is precisely where "our guys" launched an attack against the "enemy" straight after a bomb explosion. An atom bomb explosion. About 15 km from its epicenter, a specially equipped train had stopped at Totskoye station, carrying Marshal Zhukov, leader of the exercises; Defense Minister Bulganin; Academician Kurchatov, father of the USSR nuclear program; and also guests—leaders of the military departments of "fraternal countries."

It is hard to say now who received what dose of radiation on that fateful day. Scientists and specialists are still having difficulty in assessing the consequences of the explosion at the Totskoye range. There is no original

information available about the yield of the charge, its nature, or the direction of the wind which carried the radioactive cloud. All this is still lying hidden in secret Ministry of Defense archives. According to some reports, no more than 1,000 of the 40,000 participants in the exercises are still alive today. At least in the Orenburg Oblast Committee for "Special Risk" Veterans, which numbers several hundred people, there are only about a dozen who have gone through the hell of Totskoye.

And now, exactly 40 years later, this same land will once again be the stage of extraordinary exercises, so to speak. Acute questions automatically spring to mind. What will be the consequences of these exercises? Why do the Americans need to conduct them specifically here? And many other questions.

A few days ago I happened to visit the Totskoye-2 military installation again. I did not manage to get to the site of the atom bomb explosion, the bad roads prevented me. In the settlement itself life was going on as normal. Some soldiers were tidying up the territory of the unit. Others were sitting in the study room, evidently studying the regulations. A newspaper file was lying in the Lenin Room (or what should one call it now?), and fish were swimming in an aquarium covering a whole wall. At the entrance to the division staff there was a row of busts of Heroes of the Soviet Union. Those who fell on the field of battle during the Afghan war.

Walking into his office, Division Commander A. Sidiyakin apologized for the delay in our meeting. As he put it, some veterans from the Totskoye rayon center were "forcing their way" through to him. They will not accept the idea of the exercises at all. The set of slogans and arguments is well-known. They are saying that the U.S. wolves have no business doing anything on Russian soil!

We have not yet joined NATO, they are saying, and therefore we should not trust a potential enemy to that extent. You never know what the Americans may have in mind.

"We are not such simpletons," the general said, "that we would allow ourselves to be twisted around someone's little finger. Believe me, we would not conduct these exercises to our own detriment...."

By and large the conversation with the general clarified the situation concerning the military's opinion. He refuted the Duma's statements about the participation of major forces in the exercises. From what he said, the preparation for them has already started (the exercises are due to be held 6-14 July). Their purpose is to rehearse joint measures to eliminate conflicts in "hot spots," in other words an action exclusively geared to peacemaking. Taking part in the joint war game on the Russian side will be the commands of the 27th Division, the 589th Motorized Rifle Regiment, and this regiment's 3d Motorized Rifle Battalion; as well as the 9th Motorized Rifle Company and two motorized rifle companies of 100 men each. Their task will be to identify [oboznacheniy] the "conflicting sides."

The Russian peacemakers' partners will be officers from the command of the U.S. 3d Infantry Division, this division's 1st Brigade, the 1st Battalion of the 15th Infantry Regiment, and this battalion's "C" Company—249 men and 50 pieces of wheeled equipment in all. Major General Leonard Donald Holder, commander of the 3d Infantry Division, will head the Americans. The general corrected the deputy defense minister, reporting that the Americans will spend the \$2 million on themselves. The Russian side will provide for itself. The Defense Ministry views these exercises as planned ones, and has already allocated the necessary funds for them.

Why was the Totskoye range chosen specifically as the site for the joint exercises? The answer is very simple—this is the "home" of the 27th Peacemaking Division. This division was originally withdrawn from Germany. It has experience of operations in conflict zones, in particular in the Dniester Region and South Ossetia. Incidentally, the U.S. 3d Infantry Division, whose representatives will be coming to Totskoye, has operated in Iraqi Kurdistan.

The commanders of both divisions know each other well personally from Germany, where this U.S. unit is still billeted. Major General A.M. Sidiyakin graduated from the Tashkent Higher Combined Arms Command School. Starting as platoon commander, in the course of his service he reached the level of battalion commander. Then he graduated from the Frunze Academy, and served as chief of staff of a regiment, and then a division. Since graduating from the Academy of the General Staff, he has been heading the present combined unit. He is married with two children. His counterpart, Gen. Holder, participated in the Vietnam war in the past. His father, who was a professional soldier and had fought in South Korea, died there. During the "Desert Storm" operation, Holder junior was commander of a regiment. He graduated from a technological institute and from military school. He is married with two children.

And so, very shortly the flag of a country about whose existence historians are still arguing will fly over the territory of the Totskoye range. The exercises are code-named Atlantis. A conflict which has flared up between two ethnic groups will require intervention by Russian and U.S. peacemaking forces.

#### **Roundtable Debates Military Cooperation**

PM0707102794 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 6 Jul 94 p 3

[Report by Gennadiy Miranovich: "CIS: You Cannot Build Defense Alone. That Is Conclusion Reached by Participants in 'Roundtable' Debate at Headquarters for Military Cooperation Coordination"]

[Text] In general politicians and the military of the majority of CIS countries reached this conclusion two years ago when at the 15 May 1992 Tashkent meeting the heads of six states—Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan—signed the collective security treaty. This was the first attempt by

the leaders of the newly formed states to lay the foundations to a common system of defense building.

Later, in 1993, Azerbaijan, Belarus, and Georgia acceded to the treaty. That is, having fixed our boundaries, having divided the USSR Armed Forces among ourselves, and having "carved out" borders, we suddenly saw that in practice not a single newfound state had the strength to safeguard its own security individually and independently. It turned out that true independence could be guaranteed only through the creation of a firm economic alliance and the joint, coordinated solution of defense problems. An intensive search began for options for integrating efforts in the military sphere.

Indeed, this "roundtable" debate with the participation of the leadership of the headquarters for the coordination of military cooperation, the CIS defense ministers council secretariat, representatives of the Russian Federation president's staff, the Federal Assembly, the CIS states' military departments, the center for international studies, and the national and international security fund, and military scientists was the latest attempt at this search.

And it is no accident that the debate focused on what we shall call an approximate model for a system of collective security proposed by the headquarters for the coordination of military cooperation. Now, together with collective military-political cooperation whose nucleus consists of the signatories of the collective security treaty, a process of multilevel military-political cooperation is under way. Of itself this is of course a good thing. But it is proceeding slowly, lagging behind the domestic and foreign military-political and other realities which have been taking shape in the post-Soviet space. There has been no marked headway in the practical implementation of the Tashkent treaty and as before only Russia is fully involved in peacekeeping practice.

Yes, Russia's role in the process of military building in the CIS and the solution of the problems arising in connection with the division of the unified armed forces should undoubtedly be determining. There are objective reasons for that—its incomparable military might, its production and military and scientific potential, and so forth. But it is no accident that the Russian president's speech at the reception in honor of military academy graduates cited as the priority task of our armed forces' foreign activity the formation of a collective security system in the CIS. Life itself now dictates the need for an effective and economically expedient security system within whose framework it would be possible to resolve defense problems common to all, from military legislation and technical equipment, the training of national armies and joint armed formations to the legal and social protection of servicemen and their families.

In the opinion of those taking part in the debate the most acceptable form of pooling the CIS countries' efforts in the military sphere right now could be a military or military-political alliance within whose framework the creation of coalition defense forces would be envisaged. In this case



the collective security council, the foreign ministers council, and the defense ministers council would act as the supreme political organ. The working organs would be a committee of chiefs of staff and a joint coalition defense forces staff. In this opinion a unified command is not envisaged. The question of such a command can arise only if the proposed system is transformed into joint armed forces.

At the same time the model provides for the presence of commands for the coalition defense forces in the region. For clarity's sake let me note that in this option for a collective security system it is planned to single out several regions where, in the opinion of experts, it is most expedient to have coalition defense forces subunits.

In general outlines that is the model for the collective security system proposed by those taking part in the debate. Time will tell whether it will be adopted or whether a different, more acceptable, concept will emerge. So far only one thing is clear: A concept is needed.

#### **Ivashov Reviews CIS Military Cooperation Concept**

944F0964A Moscow: NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 6 Jul 94 pp 1, 3

[“Abridged” report of speech of Leonid Ivashov, secretary of the CIS Council of Defense Ministers, to conference on problems of the collective security of the Commonwealth at CIS Military Cooperation Coordination Headquarters; date not given; by Colonel Nikolay Plotnikov, military observer of NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA: “From Disintegration to Unification: Collective Security of the Commonwealth”]

[Text] A conference on problems of the collective security of the Commonwealth was held in the CIS Military Cooperation Coordination Headquarters. A report on conceptual issues was presented by Lieutenant General Leonid Ivashov, secretary of the CIS Council of Defense Ministers. Marshal of Aviation Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov, representative of the president of the Russian Federation at the Rosvooruzheniye State Company, Sergey Yushenkov, chairman of the State Duma Defense Committee, representatives of the Office of the President of the Russian Federation and defense ministries of the CIS, and scientists took part in the debate. Opinions were exchanged on the system of collective security of the Commonwealth and the consolidation and integration of efforts in the military sphere. A number of speeches adduced the thought that Russia should, by virtue of many objective factors, play the part of a kind of unifying core in military cooperation. It would be the guarantor of security throughout the post-Soviet space.

In the opinion of the majority of conferees, the correct reference points in the elaboration of a concept of collective security were determined in the course of the debate.

An abridged version of the speech at the conference of Lt Gen Leonid Ivashov is presented for NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA readers' attention.

Inseparably connected with the problems of the political and economic integration of the countries of the Commonwealth is the problem of the military security of the states that were formed as a result of the disintegration of the USSR. The Collective Security Treaty signed on 15 May 1992 in the city of Tashkent was an attempt by the heads of state to put a legal barrier in the way of the complete collapse of the military system of the USSR (the defense space) and to preserve if only a minimum level of security for their countries. The treaty itself and the approximately 100 agreements adopted in its development have, indeed, arrested the process of military disintegration, but the problems of the safeguarding of the security of the Commonwealth have not been resolved, for all that. Realities of the present day are the breakup of the unified military system and the single defense space and the low combat capability of the armed forces of the states of the CIS.

The recognition by politicians and the leaders of military departments of the need for a unification of efforts in the assurance of elementary military security presented itself as a way out of the current situation.

Speaking at a reception in honor of the graduates of military academies on 28 June of this year, the president of the Russian Federation cited as a priority measure the creation of a system of collective security within the framework of the CIS and emphasized the particular responsibility of Russia to the other states of the Commonwealth.

The most suitable organizational forms of unification for our situation are:

1. In the form of a coalition of states (allied commitments for a particular period with the absence of unified coordinating bodies and a unified or joint command).
2. In the form of a military or military-political alliance (the formation of a system of permanent political and military authorities and unified or joint military structures and groupings of forces and resources and mutually coordinated operational plans and plans of the training of troops and staffs).
3. In the form of more extensive military integration with coalition structures possessing supranational powers, whose decisions are binding on the participating states, with a common (besides national) military budget and with unified armed forces under a unified coalition command.

In the opinion of specialists, the second form of military integration is the most acceptable for the present state of relations in the Commonwealth. We are passing through the first at this time.

The purposes of the defensive alliance: the creation of a field of trust and security between the participating states; economies in resources and the forestalling of aggressive aspirations and power pressure; the repulse of aggression by joint efforts.

The Collective Security Treaty does not prevent a choice of any of the forms, including the creation of a military-political defensive alliance, as the basis of an efficient system of collective military security in the Eurasian region. I would like to emphasize that we are talking about military security merely as one subspecies of general security.

The efficiency of the system of collective security will depend on a number of components, two of which, in our view, would be supporting or principal components. The first is the level of security of the participants in the system, the second, the state and functioning capability of the mechanisms linking the security potentials of the individual states into a system.

The creation of a system of collective military security is decided by a set of measures of a political, economic, and legal nature and by specific military-organizational measures.

We are entitled to maintain today that a theory of collective security of the CIS and its foundation—a defensive alliance—has not been devised.

Specialists of the Military Cooperation Coordination Headquarters have devised conceptual approaches to the creation of a system based on the development of the provisions of the Tashkent Collective Security Treaty, the charter of the Commonwealth, and other documents of the CIS.

Military integration derives from the degree and depth of integration in the political sphere and in the economy and from the establishment of truly allied, equal relations between states of the Commonwealth. Considering that not all states of the CIS are today ready to an equal extent for participation in a defensive alliance as a full-scale military-political regional organization, it would seem expedient to propose a flexible phased approach to the creation of this alliance, in which provision is made for the possibility of the involvement in it of each participant in accordance with his political, economic, and legislative possibilities. Closer cooperation within the framework of some groups of states and fragmentary cooperation within the framework of others are not ruled out here.

The collective security of the participants should be based on a number of principles, the main ones of which are: the indivisibility of security; aggression against one participant is regarded as aggression against all the participants; the equal responsibility of the participants for the assurance of security; noninterference in the internal affairs and consideration of the interests of one another; collective defense; the adoption of decisions on fundamental issues of the assurance of collective security based on consensus; the conformity of the composition and readiness of the forces and resources to the scale of the military threat; the possibility of the location of individual military bases and facilities of some participants on the territory of other participants.

In the opinion of headquarters' experts, the building of a system of collective security should be based on regional

subsystems with regard to the community of the territories, the nature of the threats, the groupings of the troops, the infrastructure, and other conditions and factors. Each subsystem has relatively independent political, economic, and military components and structures here interacting within the framework of the overall system of collective security of the Commonwealth, at the level of both horizontal and vertical relations. The military component of each subsystem should be Coalition Defense Forces with the corresponding organs of military command and control. A grouping of troops and forces should, essentially, be created in a military theater or operational sector. The Coalition Defense Forces constitute the basis of the Joint Armed Forces, which could also include reserves, unified systems for the entire Commonwealth, and coalition operational combined naval units, and other components.

The organs of command and control of the Coalition Defense Forces and the Joint Armed Forces should have supranational powers on a number of issues concerning combat readiness and the combat and operational training of the troops (forces) and their control in peacetime and in wartime. Supranational authority should be delegated to the coalition organs of military command and control by the Collective Security Council and enshrined in the national legislation of the participants.

Decisions on the fundamentals of military policy, military organizational development, the methods of repulsing aggression, and other important issues should be adopted by the highest political bodies of the system of collective security on the basis of consensus. Questions of the use of troop groupings in the corresponding operational sectors, the covering of borders, the stockpiling of material resources, the development of the infrastructure, and others may be decided at the regional level by the authorities of the states concerned.

Specific tasks of the combat readiness of the armed forces and their training, manning, and logistical support and of the maintenance of a stable situation on its borders pertain to the functions of each participant.

A possible version of the building of a system of collective security could be as follows:

East European region: Western European area of the Russian Federation, the territories of the Republic of Belarus and Kaliningrad Oblast.

Caucasus region: North Caucasus area of the Russian Federation, the territories of the Azerbaijan Republic, the Republic of Armenia, and the Republic of Georgia.

Central Asia region, territorially divided into western and eastern zones: Western zone of the territory of the Republic of Tajikistan and the Republic of Uzbekistan; Eastern zone, the Urals-Siberian area of the Russian Federation, territories of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Republic of Kyrgyzstan.

East Asian region: eastern area of the Russian Federation and the Eastern Oblast of the Republic of Kazakhstan.

A political-economic body (Defense Council) and a coalition command of the grouping of troops is formed for ensuring security and organizing the defenses in each of the said regions. In peacetime the council concentrates efforts on maintaining peace and stability in the region and settling contentious problems and crises exclusively by political conciliation means, at the same time maintaining the defense potential at the necessary level. In the event of aggression, the council is entrusted with responsibility for organizing the repulse of the aggression and defeating the enemy.

The participation in the regional subsystems of collective security of states that have not acceded to the Tashkent Treaty (Moldova, Ukraine, Turkmenistan) is not precluded but, rather, contemplated. The nature of this participation could be fragmentary, that is, in respect to individual issues (the guarding and opening of sections of borders that are the external borders of the Commonwealth, air defense, cooperation in military production, use of the infrastructure, and so forth).

The central coordinating bodies of the system of collective security of the CIS should be: the Collective Security Council, the defense and foreign ministers councils, the general secretary of the Collective Security Council, the Military-Economic Commission of the CIS, the Chiefs of Staff Committee, the Military Cooperation Coordination Headquarters.

The creation for wartime (in a period of threat) of a Supreme High Command of the defensive alliance and its working bodies, with it being accorded supranational powers for leadership of the repulse of the aggression, would seem expedient.

This is a highly schematic outline of the military structure of a system of collective security of the CIS. It will undoubtedly need to be made more specific and to be developed further. The creation of such a system in the Eurasian region is not a revival of bloc confrontation. It is a bearing along the route of the assurance of peace and stability corresponding to the interests of the peoples of the countries of the Commonwealth and the interests of the world community.

## STRATEGIC DETERRENT FORCES

### Scientist on Nuclear Weapons Development Programs

944D00744 Moscow *RABOTCHAYA TRIBUNA*  
in Russian 1 Jul 94 p 5

[Interview with Radv Ivanovich Ilkayev, doctor of physical and mathematical sciences and first deputy scientific adviser of Arzamas-16 Federal Nuclear Center, by Vladimir Gubarev, Nekos Studio: "Singed by the Nuclear Flame"; date and place not given]

[Text] During Russian President Boris Yeltsin's visit to Arzamas-16, a rather harsh discussion took place between him and the scientists. And, first and foremost, about the incompetence of certain Russian leaders who constantly talk

about nuclear disarmament, sometimes having a highly vague and distorted notion of atomic weapons. Yeltsin agreed that he needs an adviser on the nuclear complex. Named among the first ones recommended at Arzamas-16 was Doctor of Physical and Mathematical Sciences Radv Ivanovich Ilkayev. He is the very one who acquainted the president with the institute and was a unique tour guide around the museum where the nuclear munitions developed at Arzamas-16 are exhibited.

[Gubarev] Just what are nuclear weapons? What do you think about them as a designer and as a person who developed them with his own hands?

[Ilkayev] Our attitude toward them is complicated and, I would say, profound. As you very well understand, we are state people and we have always solved state problems and this is why we have this kind of attitude. This is our philosophy.

[Gubarev] Is the scope of your thinking like this?

[Ilkayev] Of course. Our philosophy is quite defined because it is impossible in principle to deal with items which are so terrible and which represent a colossal potential danger and not to have a corresponding philosophy. First-class, good specialists cannot work only because of wages, the best living conditions and the like.

We need to be convinced that our country—formerly the Soviet Union and now Russia—should have a strong defense. This is unambiguous since, without a strong defense, Russia will not exist as an integral state. And we believe that, without nuclear weapons, it is impossible to protect such an enormous country.

[Gubarev] In my opinion, this is a very clear-cut position.

[Ilkayev] I agree. This is why we react, negatively at times, to those unprofessional statements which appear in the press. There is a long chain: the state, the people, defense, the necessity of nuclear weapons, their production, testing, reduction and so on. In general, a quite complicated hierarchy and a unique technological structure. And when one link or part, sometimes a very minute one, breaks away from it completely arbitrarily and a so-called "broad public discussion" begins around it, this does not please us and we would prefer a different approach.

[Gubarev] Perhaps, it would make sense to illustrate this thesis with a specific example?

[Ilkayev] Let us take nuclear tests. Necessary or not, just how much do they harm the ecology and to what extent? Undoubtedly, these problems need to be discussed, but preferably in a general context. It must be understood: if you stop the tests, this is a very inexpensive way to inflict colossal losses on the defense nuclear complex. Then it is necessary to act in a normal fashion: to make a decision about the fact that, in 20 years, our nuclear weapons will be destroyed and stopping the tests is the first step in this direction. Then everything is clear.

Unfortunately, there is no such clarity today. On the one hand, we assert: yes, nuclear weapons are needed for



defense but, on the other hand, we are stopping the tests. The lack of an exclusive and integrated examination of the problem, of course, does not please us and is causing a protest. We know very well that a deformation in one part inevitably expands to the entire structure, in this instance, to Russia's defense policy.

Now, about the weapons themselves. There is, undoubtedly, an enormous cost—intellectual and, of course, material. The nuclear complexes are gigantic enterprises and there are enormous material resources. The people have spent a pretty penny on the development of the nuclear industry.

[Gubarev] There has been talk about nuclear terrorism, about the seizure of weapons and about their sale. How do you appraise the danger?

[Ilkayev] We, the developers and the specialists, need to remember this all the time. Previously, we concerned ourselves little about this, inasmuch as we believed that there are and would not be terrorists in the Soviet Union. But the scientists and politicians erred. Of course, no one expected that a situation like we have today would arise. And, even though the weapons are being shipped to Russia and, it would seem, security is increasing, all the same, we should consider the new situation. And we must devise a distinctive "defense against terrorism." This requires both organizational measures and technical ones.

[Gubarev] But the public has a right to know the situation with respect to nuclear weapons! We remember that the secrecy with respect to the operation of nuclear power plants led to Chernobyl. In my opinion, public monitoring only helps the physicists, as strange as this may sound. It increases the degree of responsibility. And, after all, the weapons and nuclear power plants are unique twin brothers, they have a common history, the one and the same parents and, finally, the same danger—radioactivity.

[Ilkayev] It is necessary to maintain a very clear-cut boundary—not to permit the use of nuclear physics in a way harmful to man. On the one hand, the people should know as much as possible, but, on the other hand, they should not permit the use of nuclear weapons as a means for terrorism, blackmail and imperial ambitions, as well as make them safe to the fullest extent.

Undoubtedly, the secrecy is a hinderance to some extent, but at the same time, it also makes it possible to maintain stability. However, the main thing is that it is necessary to trust those people who develop the weapons. Their competence, their concern for the fate of the world and their conscience and honesty. The people trusted us and believed in our ability not only to develop such terrible weapons, but also to exercise control over them. In my opinion, we have, as of yet, never abused this trust.

**It was on this optimistic note that our first talk with Radiy Ivanovich Ilkayev ended. But a new meeting took place not long before the "shooting" of the White House in Moscow, when the Supreme Soviet cut short its own existence. In the summer of 1993, a catastrophic situation arose at Russia's**

**federal nuclear centers. The weapons developers did not receive any money and, in point of fact, the funding of the nuclear weapons complex had been cut off.... Both centers' collectives began to talk about a "strike," although no one had any idea how it should proceed....**

**During this alarming time, Belugin, Ilkayev, Voronin and representatives from Chelyabinsk-70 went to Moscow. They met with the leaders of the committees of Russia's Supreme Soviet, in order to tell them about the situation in the closed cities. Radiy Ivanovich Ilkayev had already been appointed first deputy scientific adviser of VNIIEF [All-Union Experimental Physics Scientific Research Institute]. Our discussion was continued.... But quite recently, on the anniversary of Yu. B. Khariton, we finished our talk. It turned out that it had continued for 2 years....**

[Gubarev] Is the situation really so critical that a strike is necessary?

[Ilkayev] Imagine this situation: a scientific worker is conducting research in the interests of the country's defense. He receives such-and-such wages. And, at the same time, the state hires a person who guards this scientific worker, so that secrets do not wander off anywhere. Today, the scientific worker is receiving several times less than the person who is guarding him. An absurd situation, is it not?

Of course, as the administrators of the nuclear centers, we are responsible both for weapons development and for their safety and for ensuring that nuclear technologies do not spread across the planet. But when hundreds of people up to 40 years of age begin to quit, to leave and to go into other structures, it is simply impossible to keep track of them. A very serious problem arises with respect to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. It seems to me that we are underrating the situation which is arising. The talks on non-proliferation are becoming utopian.

**Nearly all the well-known scientists associated in one way or another with nuclear physics have worked at Arzamas-16 and Chelyabinsk-70. They laid the foundation for an essentially new scientific school. It is unique both for science and for public life because nowhere, even in the sternest years, had there been such freedom and audacity of expression on all political matters. And, as strange as it seems, the country's leadership looked at all this calmly because what was required of us, first of all, was the development of specific nuclear devices and nuclear munitions which would be in no way inferior to the American ones. And this is how it was with the hydrogen bomb.**

**But then began unilateral moratoria and we could not perform that task which had been set in recent years—sharply enhancing the safety of our weapons. It is needed not in order to increase the combat qualities of the weapons, but rather, first of all, to enhance reliability in their use, transportation and servicing, i.e., for safety in our everyday life. But, I reiterate, because of the unilateral moratoria, which had become the subject of political games, we lagged behind the Americans in this area.**



Now, about the other direction of the work. The functioning of a nuclear center in any country is impossible without basic and applied physical research and, usually, this is work on a world-class level. Otherwise, a federal center is converted into an ordinary office which is not capable of delivering the most advanced technology and the most advanced designs.

And we were always concerned about our scientific unit being maintained in good condition. And it is very, very grave at both federal centers. We have the world's largest nuclear reactors, excellent laser devices and test beds—in general, a serious technical base. If it is undermined, and this, unfortunately, is happening, then it will be simply impossible to maintain modern nuclear weapons at an adequately high level.

[Gubarev] Without basic research, you will simply perish?

[Ilkayev] Of course. Unfortunately, the present times are seriously undermining our basic science. It requires funds, and quite a few, which is perfectly natural. But they are not being allocated. I repeat once again: our special features are such that, without research, it is impossible to deal not only with the improvement of the weapons, but also even with their destruction. Just as there cannot be a house without a foundation, so is our work unthinkable without the constant conducting of research.

The problem is being aggravated by the fact that our customer, strictly speaking, can be no one other than the state—no enterprise, no kolkhoz and not even the largest firm. This is why we are engaged in specific and very large programs. The center alone may be used for the solving of such large problems. It is also possible to handle, in a trivial way, conversion problems, but then the potential will be dispersed rapidly and no kind of result can be expected.

The point is that our intellectual capabilities, scientific developments and technical base should be used in accordance with established traditions and control structures. The federal center was established in order to handle large programs: very science-intensive, very labor-intensive and very complicated ones. So let the center be used as intended! All the same, there are no similar forces in Russia, which are capable of doing what we can do.

[Gubarev] But do you have specific proposals?

[Ilkayev] Of course. In the next few years, the energy problem will become very acute for Russia. We propose that, together with the leading domestic institutes, we develop a national program for the development of the power engineering of the future, a program aimed at the development of safer technologies. We already have interesting ideas and this is precisely the kind of task which matches our potential and our capabilities. And really, does Russia not need safe power engineering?

We have large national-level programs for enhancing the nuclear power plants' safety. The problem is a pressing one for the entire world as well.

Of course, we have nothing against specific steps for conversion. We have a mass of technologies which can serve as the basis for the production of quite specific types of equipment: for medical, industrial and agricultural purposes. And we are already making such instruments and signing contracts. In my opinion, 15 percent of the institute's capacities can work on conversion, 50 percent can satisfy military needs and 40 percent can be used for basic research.

But there is one cardinal requirement which everyone should understand. Conversion, basic science and the work on military items require a state approach and serious state support. But we are not seeing this for the time being.

## GROUND FORCES

### Commander Burlakov on Final Pullout From FRG

MM2607133994 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA  
PRAVDA in Russian 20 Jul 94 p 3

[Interview with General Matvey Burlakov, commander in chief of the Western Group of Forces, by special correspondent Sergey Maslov in Wuensdorf and Moscow; date not given: "Eastward March"]

[Text] In the days of Gorbachev and Shevardnadze, it was often said that a line had been drawn under an entire era, known as the postwar period. In reality, that will only happen this summer, when our troops leave Germany. Fate has decreed that this man, Matvey Burlakov, a Russian soldier with three general's stars on his shoulder straps, should be the person to cross this historic line. He will be the last to leave. With what feelings? With what thoughts? We talked about this in an interview with him, commander in chief of the Western Group of Forces.

[Maslov] Matvey Prokopyevich, you can be congratulated: The Russian Army is leaving Germany with dignity. It will leave Berlin marching in ceremonial fashion—something which, it is no secret, was long opposed by the German side. Generals are usually congratulated on their victory. Is there reason to shy away from that word now?

[Burlakov] The best victories are those where there are no losers. That is what we have achieved: Political wisdom has gained the upper hand over emotions or considerations of a transient nature. Whatever else happened there, the war ended in the den of fascism: Berlin. Where else should the line be drawn under the consequences of World War II?

[Maslov] About drawing the line.... Is there time to think of history amidst all the present bustle? We are leaving ahead of schedule, after all....

[Burlakov] In any case, everyone in the group well understands that the task they are dealing with is far more important than a purely organizational exercise. But even if we take only the technical side, the scale is vast. After all, we have been here 49 years, almost half a century. We have never had such a powerful military group anywhere else

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abroad. Nevertheless, in three and a half years, 523,000 men and more than 120,000 units of equipment and weaponry have been withdrawn from Germany and 2.6 million tonnes of material supplies sent to Russia. Imagine, if all this were formed into a column, it would ring the globe.

[Maslov] There are people in our country and in Germany who are going to great lengths to establish the word "reconciliation" in our everyday international vocabulary. But if we take a sober view of the facts, the German Government's wrangling over the Russian troops' withdrawal, which seemed so petty, somehow did not inspire great confidence in the seriousness of the German side's desire for reconciliation. What, in your view, is reconciliation? Is it something that has already happened or does it still lie ahead?

[Burlakov] I already have experience of withdrawing our troops from Hungary. But even after that, when I arrived in Germany in December 1990, I wondered rather nervously what kind of relationship I would build with them, especially with the West Germans. Would we be able to work together? Now I smile when I think of my anxieties. The Germans are people with common sense who are trying to build relations with us as good neighbors, partners, and maybe even friends. I am convinced that 99 percent of Germans want this.

But reconciliation is something more. It still lies ahead. The freshness of change is still with us. But there is a cool edge to this freshness. It has been left by the Cold War and will not disappear overnight.

[Maslov] Even today, there are very many people in Germany who are far more inclined to see us as occupiers than as liberators from fascism. So who are we? Who were we when we arrived and who are we now as we leave?

[Burlakov] We were and still are victors. Not victors over the German people, but victors over fascism. What our Army and our people did in the name of our country's own interests and those of all Europe and the world was also for the good of the German people. I certainly do not see myself as an occupier, and nor do any of our troops. You only have to look around you here in Wuensdorf. The main headquarters of Germany's ground forces was here. During the war, 50 if not 90 percent of these buildings were destroyed and burnt to the ground. We raised all this from the ruins. We restored 31,000 buildings scattered across Germany and put them to use. We built 21,000 installations at the Soviet Union's expense, with Soviet money.... Occupiers arriving and suddenly starting to rebuild another country's shattered economy is something that does not [normally] happen.

And humanitarian aid? This concept is not new. I can give you a detailed account of the vast amounts of aid which the Soviet Union—itsself hungry and poor—gave to Germany immediately after the war: Hundreds of thousands of tonnes of wheat, flour, meat, and meat products.

There were other aspects, of course. There was looting and so forth. But, after all, if someone had lost everything,

friends and relatives, in the war, then, however good he may have been, he nevertheless seethed with resentment. I lost my father in the war in 1941. I well understood that fascism and fascist Germany had deprived me of my childhood, and I lived with that knowledge for many years. I spent my childhood working a lathe. Nevertheless, our people and our soldiers had the courage not only to rout fascism, but also to rise above their own personal tragedy. We arrived as victors and became partners and friends. That is how we are leaving now.

[Maslov] Let us be frank: We will nevertheless be given a second-rate send-off. If only because we were not allowed to take part in the joint celebrations of the former allies in the anti-Hitler coalition. It is understandable: They brought democracy to Germany, whereas we brought the yoke of the Stalinist regime. We organized a blockade of West Berlin, whereas the Americans set up an air bridge to supply the city with food. Finally, we initiated the building of the Berlin Wall. What I cannot understand, however, is why history seems to begin in 1945 for the majority of people who live in the west part of Berlin.

[Burlakov] To be frank, the Western allies were in no great hurry to bring democracy to Germany. They waited until the middle of 1944, preferring to fight fascism further away from Europe. Who knows what kind of regime there would be in Germany today if our soldiers had not entered Berlin in May 1945. We must not forget that we let the Americans, British, and French into Berlin. They played a considerable role in the war, of course. But not a decisive role.

The blockade is a complex page in history, of course. But the Cold War was in progress, which we were not alone in waging. What German now remembers the blockade of Leningrad? Who wants to remember? History is a single entity. It cannot be divided into the convenient and inconvenient.

We should all have left together, of course. But that did not happen and there is nothing we can do about it now. It does not offend me personally.

[Maslov] For decades, the Bundeswehr was a potential enemy to you. What is it to you now?

[Burlakov] Well, I will not say it is our friend. Could we really be in opposition to one another for so many years and suddenly change in two years or so? But relations are fine. Admittedly, I would like to see them even better. The Bundeswehr leaders are also inclined in this direction. I know them quite well: Minister Ruehe and Inspector General Naumann. I am expecting a visit from Secretary of State to the Defense Ministry Schoenbohm. An informal visit, I should say: We will try not to stick too rigidly to protocol. We will play tennis and meet in a family setting. We will talk, of course, but without tension. There is more trust now. Our specialists, for example, have instructed the Germans how to service MIG-29 fighter aircraft. About a dozen of our people have sat at the controls of their aircraft and tanks, flown and driven them, and fired their guns. I

think we can consider ourselves as partners now and develop relations even further in the future.

[Maslov] Is there anything we can learn from the Bundeswehr?

[Burlakov] There is. Its new training methods are interesting. Two battalions go out on an exercise, say. They put on electronic shields. They "fire" electronic beams. If they hit their opponent, a light comes on. If they "hit" a tank, the engine stops. The soldiers learn to think as if they were in a real battle: When they can make a run for it and when they should take cover. We have no such objective monitoring system. We fire at a target, but it does not fire back. Although I should say that the level of training in both our armies is roughly the same: They are better in some areas and we are better in others.

[Maslov] There are answers to the questions of how and as whom we are leaving. But a no less relevant question is: Where are we going? The German side assures us that the building of housing for servicemen in the Western Group of Forces is proceeding according to schedule and that more apartments are being built than originally planned. As far as I am aware, you treat these claims of fulfillment and overfulfillment with some caution.

[Burlakov] We are mainly going to the European part of Russia. Unfortunately, the Russian military infrastructure is so weak that there is virtually nowhere to go. In the past, this infrastructure was all situated along the state borders of the USSR: in the former Baltic republics, Belorussia, Ukraine, and the Transcaucasus. All this has now passed to others. In the majority of cases we are going to virgin land, where we have to fell trees and drain marshes....

It is certainly true that 10,000 more apartments are being built with German money than the original plan of 36,000, thanks to the fact that the contracts have been given to the cheapest foreign firms. But we certainly are not satisfied with the pace of construction. What is an organized, civilized withdrawal? You build a military camp and transfer a regiment and a division from another military camp. So far, however, 12-14,000 officers from the Western Group of Forces have found themselves in Russia without a roof over their heads. Fortunately, thank God, no one is living in tents—thanks to the military district commanders. But where are they living? In offices, medical centers, and barracks converted into temporary officer's quarters. But, like all normal people, officers have families. At the start of the withdrawal, there were 90,000 children in the Western Group of Forces. Enough for two armies!

I was in Chernaya Rechka, near Samara, this winter. A military camp is being built there. There should have been 3,500 workers on site. But there were only 900. Why? Because in winter productivity is less, but builders have to be paid more. Consequently, it is to the firm's advantage to slow down work in winter. But time is being wasted. Of course, I told the Germans, our workers, and the Turks exactly what I thought of them.

This winter, most firms fell three to six months or even 10 months behind schedule. Some of them even managed to go bankrupt. Consequently, every measure is now being taken by the Russian Defense Ministry and the German Economics Ministry; there is even the possibility of fines in order to force firms that have fallen behind to get a move on.

[Maslov] There is a lot of fuss in the German press about the damage we have done to the environment....

[Burlakov] Even the boldest of journalists somewhat moderate their tone when I suggest we talk about the environment in greater depth and review the situation from 1941 to 1994. Then it will immediately become clear who is in greater debt to whom. We must assume that the Wehrmacht did not have environmentally pure motives when it pursued its "scorched earth" policy and wiped tens of thousands of our population centers and 1,700 cities off the face of the earth.

We can also talk about the environment in a narrower sense. All our troops in Germany have been stationed at military camps which used to belong to the Wehrmacht. So it is very hard to know whose gasoline, for example, was spilt at an airfield—ours or theirs? We are not totally without blame, of course. There is no doubt that we have done some damage to the environment. But we have also taken every measure to repair the damage or at least reduce it. In the last two years, 20,000 of our servicemen and 800 units of road-building equipment have been used in work to recultivate land, clean up the environment, and so forth. Have we done everything? No, we have not. But we have done the maximum possible.

[Maslov] They say we are leaving the military camps in a terrible state....

[Burlakov] But, before our departure, we have painted our camps, carried out cosmetic repairs, and tried to increase the value of our installations while there is the opportunity to sell real estate. We have documents relating to the handover of the camps. The majority of assessments are good and satisfactory. We have video recordings showing the condition in which we have left these camps. We ask German journalists at press conferences which precisely they would like to see.

Most of these military camps are still unoccupied. I can see what has happened to them. You take up a helicopter—there is no time to travel around the country—and do a special circle to take a closer look below. The windows are smashed, the doors are gone, and the roofing is damaged....

We have now reached an agreement with the German leadership that all installations which they propose to demolish or dismantle because they are not needed can be dismantled by us instead and sent to Russia. I can tell you that we have already removed 37,000 concrete slabs from airfields. Enough for four runways! These slabs cost money. If only runways were all we needed. We are currently withdrawing the 10th Tank Division to Boguchary. What is Boguchary? A rural population center with



10,000 inhabitants, where, naturally, no one has made any preparations for our arrival. They have given us a field. So, after first clearing the soil, we laid concrete slabs for roads and airfields. We have now installed all our equipment. It is no longer in the mud and bog, but on a hard surface. This is quite a different job: Carrying out maintenance and repair is easier.

[Maslov] Tell me, Matvey Prokopyevich, is the Russian deserter roaming through Europe, through forest and dale, and through the pages of newspapers and journals just an illusion?

[Burlakov] The ruthlessness with which the local press has literally attacked us in this connection is in any case no illusion. We have had deserters. More than 250, in fact. But they are from an army of 500,000 men. The percentage is so insignificant that it is perhaps not even worth taking seriously. If you remember, previously people needed a whole armful of references and recommendations in order to enter the FRG. Then suddenly the FRG is just outside the unit gates. We have not lost anything because of these deserters, and the Germans and Americans have not gained anything. With one possible exception: A regiment commander defected to the West, taking secret missiles with him. In the end, the wave of deserters came to nothing. Thirteen have even returned, disappointed in their expectations.

Now the local press has found a new theme. It has alleged that large numbers of our servicemen are loitering in forests with weapons and ammunition, trying to sell them. However, from 1946 to the present day, we have only had to investigate 46 instances of weapons being lost or stolen. I will highlight one incident in particular: Last year, 15 pistols were stolen when one of our soldiers was the victim of an armed attack by former fellow servicemen. These are all losses. On the other hand, there used to be 50-60 attempts per week to get us to sell weapons! The German police can confirm this. We worked in close contact with them. It went like this: Someone would approach a checkpoint and say to the officer on duty: Sell me your pistol. Here's the money. He would reply: Okay, come back in the evening and we'll have a deal. In the evening the buyer would be given a package containing something heavy—a brick perhaps. He would pay up. Then the police would step in. Eventually the "business proposals" stopped coming.

[Maslov] Not all our soldiers will be leaving Germany. Thousands will remain forever in a foreign land. Will they not be lonely?

[Burlakov] Of course flowers will certainly no longer be brought to every grave. One comfort is that the Germans take very good care of the graves. The authorities respond instantly to any acts of vandalism. They immediately restore the graves and place them under guard. In this sense our soldiers will be at peace, albeit lonely.

[Maslov] You will be the last to leave on 31 August. How do you see this day?

[Burlakov] As a festive occasion. It is just a pity that it will be a week day, a Wednesday. Not all Germans who would like to see us off will be able to do so.

[Maslov] No doubt you will have a drink for the road: Will it be Russian vodka or German beer?

[Burlakov] Neither will be a crime on such a festive occasion. Nor will it deflect us from our path.

## AIR, AIR DEFENSE FORCES

### Votintsev: Space Control System

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[Conclusion to article by Colonel General (Retired) Yuri Vsevolodovich Votintsev under rubric "Memoirs and Essays": "Unknown Troops of an Extinct Superpower"; for previous parts see VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, Nos 8, 9 and 10, 1993]

[Text]

### Space Monitoring System

The creation of ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads in the late 1940's in the United States and then also in the USSR predetermined the possibility and even the necessity of using space as a new theater of warfare. The 1950's were the beginning of an intense rivalry between the USSR and United States that was constantly being forced in developing space, and those years were a struggle for supremacy there.

Following our first artificial Earth satellite, launched on 4 October 1957, the United States put its own into orbit. This happened on 1 February 1958. Yu. A. Gagarin made the first revolution about the Earth in the Vostok spacecraft on 12 April 1961, and U.S. astronaut J. Glenn did so in Mercury on 20 February 1962.

New, complex scientific-technical problems arose in connection with the precisely predicted rapid subsequent development of space.

First of all, as space became filled with objects that accompanied satellite launches (booster rockets, fairings, various fragments and so on), the threat to the safety of manned craft grew. This required creating a reliable space monitoring system which could ensure receiving prompt, precise information. It was extremely dangerous to postpone the solution to this problem to subsequent years, since the complexity of "inventorying" space was growing annually literally in geometric progression. Evidently the U.S. Defense Department also was guided by these same considerations; in the late 1950's and early 1960's it decided to set up a national space monitoring system. SPADATS, using radar and electro-optical equipment located both on U.S. territory as well as at certain military bases outside the United States.

Secondly, already at that time the need was being considered for developing and creating a space defense system

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capable of engaging military targets. In connection with this, demands on the space monitoring system arose for identifying and issuing to the space defense system precise target designations on probable enemy targets which could be assigned for engagement in space.

The idea of building a space monitoring system in our country was formalized once and for all in the summer of 1963. It was then that A. L. Gorelik,<sup>1</sup> chief of a department of SNII [Special Scientific Research Institute], and N. P. Buslenko, deputy chief of this Institute, headed up a team of specialists and developed a preliminary design of the space monitoring system. It was approved and specified as leading for the space monitoring system by decision of the VPK [Military Industrial Commission]. A new administration was formed, the first chief of which became Ye. M. Oshanin. Chiefs of the administration in subsequent years were O. A. Chembrovskiy, A. D. Kurlanov<sup>2</sup> and Yu. A. Didenko.

From the very beginning, the detection and tracking of space objects was accomplished by optical observation posts deployed by the ABM and Space Defense Troops and located in various regions of the country with consideration of the most favorable geophysical conditions for operation, especially at night. Under a coordinated plan, electro-optical stations of the USSR Academy of Sciences Astrosoviet [Astronomical Council] also were included in the work. Doctor of Technical Sciences V. I. Kuryshv,<sup>3</sup> head of a chair of Ryazan Pedagogic Institute, was one of the founders and enthusiasts of this work. His textbooks and methods are being used to this day for training data processing specialists.

A conceptual design of the space monitoring system was developed and approved in 1965. It was realized directly by the collective of the administration, which was directed from 1966 in the Special SRI by A. D. Kurlanov. Programs supporting the detection, tracking, and identification of satellites were created and the foundation of the Main Catalogue of Space Objects was laid down on the basis of the Institute's computer equipment.

The Dnestr radar in Kazakhstan became the first specialized radiotechnical station performing space monitoring missions. It was tested in 1967 by a commission chaired by Marshal of Artillery Yu. P. Bazhanov.<sup>4</sup>

In 1968 Lieutenant General I. P. Pisarev,<sup>5</sup> chief of staff of ABM and Space Defense Troops, successfully conducted tests of a space monitoring radar system consisting of eight Dnestr radars. They were situated in Kazakhstan and Siberia, forming a continuous "barrier" stretching for 5,000 km at altitudes up to 3,000 km. The DSP-1Yu satellite was launched especially for adjusting the radars and confirming the characteristics specified for them. Yu. V. Polyak was chief designer of this system and also of the Dnestr radar in its makeup.

The Space Monitoring Center was being created at accelerated rates from 1965 in one of the areas of Podmoskove. Three years later General Designer V. S. Burtsev's

5E-51 computer already was functioning there and a combat program developed in the Special SRI had been loaded into it.

But officers and warrant officers at the Space Monitoring Center were performing the bulk of calculations manually as if from inertia. It was necessary to meet with them several times in order to convince them and prove the need for automatic data processing. Gradually the work was adjusted. A deciding role was played by a team of young officers, recent graduates of the Kiev Higher Engineering Radiotechnical School of Air Defense, who underwent serious training on the space monitoring system in the Special SRI. Having been transferred to the Space Monitoring Center, it was they together with I. G. Sergeyev<sup>6</sup> who facilitated the introduction of scientifically substantiated methods of combat work and operation of the automated weapon system.

The first phase of the Space Monitoring Center was placed on alert duty in 1970.

By this time six U.S. military systems already were functioning permanently in space: intelligence (detailed photo-reconnaissance and radiotechnical and electro-optical reconnaissance), ballistic missile launch and nuclear explosion detection, navigational, weather, topogeodetic and communications. Each one consisted of several craft. In addition, there were research and commercial communications satellites, not to mention a large number of our own satellites.

There were literally thousands of fragments and pieces along with them at an altitude up to 2,000 km, right down to nuts and bolts of the final stages of booster rockets and broken-up satellites. The monitoring task was to reliably detect, identify and track with high accuracy in this chaos the domestic and foreign satellites with operating equipment.

The Space Monitoring Center became operational in 1972. The Center's program-algorithm system and its interface with data sources and consumers had been developed, introduced and tested by Special SRI scientists V. I. Mudrov, B. N. Ananyev, A. V. Krylov, A. I. Nazarenko, Yu. P. Gorokhov and G. A. Sokolov.

The situation in space continued to get more complicated. It became obvious that the radar field being created only by eight Dnestr radars was ineffective as an information means. In 1974 P. F. Batitskiy, CIC of National Air Defense Forces, made the proposal to assign further improvement of the space monitoring system to V. G. Repin, chief designer of the missile attack warning system, who already had positive experience behind him of interfacing the ABM defense system's Dunay-3 and Dunay-3U early warning radars with the missile attack warning system command post. This was approved by the Ministry of the Radio Industry, General Staff and Military Industrial Commission. V. I. Markov, deputy minister of the Radio Industry and general director of the giant Vympel OKB [Special Design Bureau], which possessed powerful

scientific-technical and production potentials, took up development of the space monitoring system.

Repin and his deputies A. A. Kuriksha<sup>7</sup> and Yu. S. Ochkasov<sup>8</sup> technically substantiated and made the proposal for connecting all radar complexes of the missile attack warning system and ABM defense to the Space Monitoring Center, which fundamentally influenced the effectiveness of information capacities of the space monitoring system using equipment already created.

But the Space Monitoring Center was operating in its own system of coordinates different from the missile attack warning system and ABM defense. Again the task arose of substantially modifying combat programs while fulfilling requirements of not removing radiotechnical complexes from a state of combat readiness. The reasons for such a situation already were mentioned, but I will repeat that one of the main ones was the monopolism of general and chief designers and also deviation of the Ministry of the Radio Industry from specifying rigid requirements for standardization and unification.

Connecting all radiotechnical complexes to the Space Monitoring Center led to where it literally got bogged down from the flow of information, which in a 24-hour period comprised tens of thousands of standard messages about space objects being tracked by them.

It was necessary to develop the supplementary Kosmos program, which allowed the Space Monitoring Center to issue target designations to each complex only on newly launched space objects or on those requiring updates in the Main Catalogue. Now the complexes began transmitting standard messages to the Space Monitoring Center only at its request. As a result the information flow was reduced to a reasonable minimum.

It took the complexes 2-3 minutes to fulfill target designations of the Space Monitoring Center, during which the detection of other space objects, including ballistic missiles, was disrupted throughout the radar coverage zone. B. A. Nazarkin and A. N. Nekrasov, officers of the National Air Defense Forces Main Staff, who regarded this circumstance as a planned disruption of combat readiness, submitted a report to the commander in chief with a categorical objection to introducing the Kosmos program.

National Air Defense Forces CIC A. I. Koldunov, Minister of the Radio Industry P. S. Pleshakov, his deputy V. I. Markov, who was responsible for this sector, and then also the General Staff and Military Industrial Commission deemed the program timely and necessary. Our conclusions were taken into account here that missile attack warning system and ABM defense radars were overlapping each other, were echeloned in depth, and missing ballistic missiles was precluded.

This episode told only about one of the many acute scientific-technical problems which occurred in the 1970's, but even it shows how responsibly people at the highest level at that time regarded the effectiveness and reliability of ABM and Space Defense Troops. Not one proposal or

adverse comment was left without objective evaluation and a corresponding decision.

We encountered great difficulties in solving the problem of identifying space objects, above all those of the probable enemy with a military purpose, and in singling them out against the background of the extremely complex overall space situation. A. L. Gorelik directed studies and developments in this direction in the Special SRI. Along with determining the possibility of having a radar and optical portrait of a space object, specialized technical means were being developed and created, including for use on our manned craft. Thus, during the flight of the Soyuz-14 craft in July 1974, P. R. Popovich detected the U.S. Skylab station in space from a target designation of the Space Monitoring Center with the help of the special Sokol optical device and performed necessary measurements. A special laboratory simulator complex was created in the Special SRI for training cosmonauts to perform such experiments. On it the cosmonauts rehearsed tasks of detecting space objects against the background of a starry sky and closing with and identifying them while using the Belka digital computer especially developed by the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences Institute of Cybernetics. Experiments also were conducted on detecting nuclear energy sources aboard the craft being inspected.

The experience acquired confirmed the need for creating specialized equipment for the space monitoring system, which subsequently was done.

The Space Monitoring Center together with information sources had to work in the presence of complicated emergency situations with our spacecraft.

Thus, Kosmos-954 with a nuclear power plant was launched in 1977. In connection with the emergency situation that arose a command was sent to the craft, at which point an impulse was supposed to be developed lifting it several hundreds of kilometers higher to a long-lived orbit. Because of a malfunction, instead of the necessary impulse another one was triggered, that of sharp deceleration, and the craft began to descend rapidly. Calculations showed that the nuclear power plant would not burn up on entering dense layers of the atmosphere and might fall on Earth in fragments, which would entail radioactive contamination. This was widely announced in the mass media of many countries.

Tracking of Kosmos-954 and forecasting of the time and area where the nuclear power plant would fall were done at the Space Monitoring Center from 20 December 1977. The Space Monitoring Center precisely determined the time of fall of fragments—at 1512 hours on 24 January 1978 in an uninhabited mountainous area on the territory of Canada, from where we removed them.

The very same situation later formed with Kosmos-1402, a similar type of craft launched 30 August 1982. The Space Monitoring Center determined that its fragments would fall in the Atlantic Ocean near Ascension Island at 1406 hours on 7 February 1983, and again it was not wrong. In both cases our forecast proved more accurate than that of the Americans.

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There also was occasion to work with manned craft in emergency situations. In the spring of 1985 the Salyut-7 craft was de-energized during flight in an automatic mode. It should be noted that in performing a launch, the Ministry of Defense Main Directorate of Space Assets (GLUKOS MO) would track spacecraft based on their active response. But if the craft was silent in orbit as a result of an accident or when its life was exhausted, the Main Directorate of Space Assets used its own predicted calculated data of the orbit and the Main Catalogue of the Space Monitoring Center.

Based on Space Monitoring Center data, Salyut-7, a multi-ton craft, had begun to descend rapidly and was certain to fall in large fragments on the Earth with unpredictable consequences. In late May Cosmonaut V. V. Ryumin, the mission controller of this craft, traveled to see me with a request to give assistance and support the guidance of the Sovuz T-13 transport spacecraft with V. A. Dzhanibekov and V. P. Savinykh aboard for docking with Salyut-7. Colonel General of Aviation I. M. Maltsev, chief of the National Air Defense Forces Main Staff, approved the plan for our joint work with the Main Directorate of Space Assets.

From 5 through 8 June, based on data of the Argun precise measurement system and other equipment, the Space Monitoring Center led the transport spacecraft to within 2.5 km of Salyut-7 and supported docking with manual control. Dzhanibekov and Savinykh revived Salyut-7, displaying courage and demonstrating an excellent knowledge of equipment. They succeeded in subsequently ensuring the craft's descent from orbit and its sinking in the Pacific Ocean. The Americans evaluated the capabilities of our space monitoring system on their merits.

In the U.S. assessment, military space systems (intelligence, navigational, topogeodetic, communications and so on) with their integrated use raised the effectiveness of combat employment both of strategic offensive forces as well as of tactical forces on the battlefield by 2-3 times. Convincing confirmation of this was the U.S. air-land operation in Desert Storm, the war against Iraq. Sixty military spacecraft were put in action in it. Desert Storm opened a new era in land wars—wide use of space.

Attaching special significance to survivability, invulnerability and covertness of its military space systems, in the 1980's the United States began to put new craft of these systems into orbits with an altitude of 20,000-40,000 km. The calculation was extremely simple. The main assets of military space systems were being moved beyond the reach of the space monitoring system radar equipment and combat capabilities of space defense assets.

This circumstance required that we in turn unfold work to create specialized space monitoring system complexes—radar, electro-optical and laser—capable of detecting and tracking spacecraft at altitudes up to 40,000 km.

The Krona complexes were deployed in the North Caucasus and Far East—the chief designers were V. P. Sosulnikov and N. D. Ustinov. The Okno complex, developed

by the Krasnogorsk plant design bureau (chief designer N. S. Chernov) was created in Tajikistan.

I will cite the following example to confirm the fact that our capabilities for monitoring space and affecting spacecraft had grown. The United States made the first launch of the Shuttle spacecraft in 1981. This naturally drew the attention of the government and heads of the Ministry of Defense. During launches from the U.S. Air Force Western Space and Missile Center (Vandenberg) the Columbia and also Challenger manned orbital stages passed from east to west over middle latitudes of the USSR, primarily in hours of daylight. These were 8 out of 14 revolutions in a 24-hour period, coinciding with our country's time zones. The orbital altitude was 300-400 km—total conformity with the sequence of passage of U.S. reconnaissance spacecraft.

The General Staff and Military Industrial Commission demanded that by the end of each 24-hour period there be a detailed report of what means were being used for tracking and also results of work of the space monitoring system. I had to prepare these reports.

Once in the fall of 1983 Minister of Defense D. F. Ustinov telephoned over the "Kremlin line": "Yuriy Vsevolodovich, hello! I have your report about work on the Shuttle in front of me. Tell me why the experimental laser system at the range has not been brought in?" I knew that this system was under the purview of General Designer N. D. Ustinov, the minister's son. A team of 300 specialists from organizations of the industry was making modifications on it. And I reported this to the Minister of Defense. "Talk it over with Nikolay Dmitriyevich on this score," said D. F. Ustinov. I phoned N. D. Ustinov. "No," he responded, "it is in no way possible now. We have periodic technical servicing going on. Some other time." On 10 October 1984, during the 13th flight of Challenger, when its orbital revolutions were passing in the vicinity of the National Air Defense Forces State Range near Lake Balkhash, the experiment took place with the laser unit operating in a detection mode with minimal emissive power. Orbital altitude of the Space Shuttle was 365 km. Slant range of detection and tracking was 400-800 km. Precise target designation for the laser unit was issued by General Designer G. V. Kisunko's Argun radar measurement system.

As the Challenger crew later reported, while flying over the Balkhash area communications suddenly shut down on the craft, malfunctions appeared in operation of gear, and the astronauts themselves did not feel quite well. The Americans immediately declared an official protest. The laser unit as well as a portion of the range's radiotechnical systems with high energy potential were not used subsequently for tracking the Shuttles.

An effective, completely automated space monitoring system gradually took shape with the creation of the Space Monitoring Center, with all information assets of the missile attack warning system and ABM defense connected to it, and with work unfolding in the 1980's on specialized space monitoring assets. If one views space as a potentially

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possible theater of warfare, then attainment of parity with the United States in this area as well unquestionably increased the country's defense capability.

Great credit goes to Special SRI military scientists and specialists who predicted and scientifically substantiated in a timely manner not only the need for creating the space monitoring system, but also requirements for its equipment. Scientists and designers, engineers and workers of enterprises of the Vympel Special Design Bureau of the Ministry of the Radio Industry created equipment for the space monitoring system responsibly and enthusiastically. The firm, day-to-day leadership of Vympel Special Design Bureau general directors V. I. Markov and, from 1981, O. A. Losev,<sup>9</sup> deputy ministers of the Radio Industry, deserves respect and gratitude. Constant, strict supervision of the work was accomplished by Military Industrial Commission Chairman L. V. Smirnov and his deputy L. I. Gorshkov.

It is difficult to overestimate the contribution of troop personnel who took a direct part in assembling and adjusting technological gear and special technical equipment and in modifying and debugging combat programs loaded into the computers. Many proposals of troop engineers were received by developers and introduced to production. The greatest increase in combat effectiveness and reliability of equipment and of the space monitoring system as a whole was achieved right in the course of operation.

Space Monitoring Center Chief Engineer V. V. Nikolskiy<sup>10</sup> with a team of specialists and with the participation of N. V. Kislyakov, chief engineer of ABM and Space Defense Troops, developed, received approval for, and introduced a so-called adaptive method of servicing equipment. Its essence reduced to the fact that very strict control was established over each computer unit. The actual mean time between failures, the normal operation in hours, was determined according to the statistics gathered. Using these data as a standard and without awaiting the appearance of a malfunction, the unit would be removed and sent to the repair and inspection facility in the adjacent room, where it was immediately replaced with a new unit from the set of spare parts, tools and accessories. As a result, under technical conditions of computer mean time between failures of 90 hours, faultless operation comprised 900-1,100 hours. V. S. Burtsev, general designer of the 5E-51 computer, took a direct part in this work and, together with the Main Ordering Directorate, legitimized the "adaptive" method in operating instructions. This would seem to be only one feature from operating experience, but it too became known, was approved by the Ministry of the Radio Industry and Military Industrial Commission and promptly introduced in all units and formations of ABM and Space Defense Troops for all kinds of technological gear and special technical equipment. This resulted in a substantial increase in combat readiness.

The Space Monitoring Center had a superb collective of officers and warrant officers and well trained NCO's and

privates. For a number of years the Center was recognized as one of the best units in the National Air Defense Forces and was the only collective in the ABM and Space Defense Troops awarded the USSR Minister of Defense Pennant for Courage and Military Valor. The commander, Colonel I. Yu. Yukhnovich,<sup>11</sup> was one of the first in the National Air Defense Forces to be decorated with the Order "For Service to the Motherland in the USSR Armed Forces" 2nd and 3rd class and the Labor Red Banner. Orders and medals were bestowed on many officers and warrant officers.

By the end of the 1980's the Space Monitoring Center had gotten its second wind, if it can be thus expressed. In compressed time periods military construction organizations together with subunits of Minmontazhspestroy [Ministry of Installation and Special Construction Work] placed a new technological building in operation in which the most advanced computer system (for that time), the Elbrus of General Designer V. S. Burtsev, was deployed. The system, with a speed of millions of operations per second, dictated the possibility of making fullest use of information from detection equipment of the missile attack warning system, ABM defense, and specialized space monitoring systems in an automatic mode for performing the wide range of tasks already assigned to the space monitoring system.

Everything positive in mastery and operation of space monitoring system equipment is the result of intelligent, strenuous work of initiative by I. Yu. Yukhnovich and also by I. G. Sergeyev, chief designer for this direction in the armament service of the directorate of the commander of ABM and Space Defense Troops; Space Monitoring Center Chief Engineer V. V. Nikolskiy; Chief of Staff A. P. Zaytsev;<sup>12</sup> L. K. Olyander<sup>13</sup> and many other commanders and engineers.

Now the space monitoring troops were deservedly consolidated as part of a separate corps.

It causes alarm that with the USSR's disintegration appropriations have been sharply reduced for completing work on specialized monitoring equipment. And the fate of a portion of it stationed in CIS countries is the very same as for missile attack warning system complexes.

#### Space Defense System

General Designer A. I. Savin had been working with the collective of the Kometa TsNII [Central Scientific Research Institute] since 1962 on the problem of destroying the probable enemy's military spacecraft. A unique automated space defense system was created toward the end of the 1960's together with V. N. Chelomey,<sup>14</sup> general designer of missile and space equipment. It consisted of a ground computer control and telemetry facility located in Podmoskovye, a special launch pad at the Baykonur Range, a booster rocket and a satellite interceptor vehicle.

Savin and his deputy K. A. Vlasko-Vlasov designed a compact radar with an original S&T concept for determining coordinates (of the target spacecraft and interceptor) and transmitting commands (corrections) to the

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interceptor (SOK [not further expanded] and PK [course correction]), and designed portable receiving posts. A combat program was loaded in the computer system and debugged.

Chelomey in turn determined the booster rocket from those already operational and designed a satellite interceptor vehicle with homing head and fragmentation warhead, and also a special target spacecraft with radio transmitters accommodated in it; termination of their operation at the moment of destruction permitted objectively determining both the fact of destruction and the degree to which the target was removed from a working status.

Military space defense collectives in Podmoskovye and at Baykonur mastered the equipment and combat operations of the system and with the developers' participation were capable of performing the mission of destroying a target vehicle.

In August 1970 for the first time in the world the space defense system hit a launched target vehicle based on a target designation of the Space Monitoring Center. A special receiver in Podmoskovye registered that at the moment of destruction the majority of radio transmitters of the target vehicle ceased to operate, and the degree of destruction was the total disabling of the target.

After modifications and experimental operation the space defense system was placed on alert duty from 1 June 1979. Work continued intensively to expand its combat capabilities and improve effectiveness.

The mission posed was that under certain conditions of the military-political situation, by decision of the Supreme High Command the Space Defense Troops and space monitoring system would be capable of destroying the main military space systems of the probable enemy in a short time and thereby substantially reducing the effectiveness of employment of strategic offensive forces and weapons on the battlefield. And this mission was performed very successfully.

I recall how at a conference with First Deputy Chief of the General Staff S. F. Akhromeyev<sup>15</sup> held in early August 1983 it was stated in particular that in one of his upcoming speeches Yu. V. Andropov<sup>16</sup> would announce our termination of tests of the space defense system on a unilateral basis. I categorically objected to this and said that we needed at least another 3-4 months to confirm experimentally the principles of modernization being realized for the system. Akhromeyev's answer was curt: "What were you thinking about earlier?"... And on 18 August 1983 the space defense system fell silent after the corresponding declaration by Andropov.

S. S. Martynov,<sup>17</sup> commander of the system, had to transfer many officers and warrant officers, superb professionals, to other units or recommend them for discharge to the reserve. All this was occurring specifically when technical and organizational unification of ABM defense, missile attack warning system, space monitoring system

and space defense had been completed and a unified missile-space defense system that functioned automatically under unified software and algorithmic support had formed. It had taken almost 20 years to fulfill D. F. Ustinov's instruction about the need to overcome separateness in creating this unique strategic defensive weapon system, which served as a guarantor against initiation of a nuclear missile war.

With respect to the space defense system, it is now out of work, as they say. Its interface with the Space Monitoring Center and creation of a unified command post there was unnecessary. Probably only Space Monitoring Center veterans will remember how much mental and physical labor was expended to compile, keep up and update hourly the special Catalogue with elements of orbits of military spacecraft of foreign states. A constant readiness for immediately issuing target designations to the space defense system for destruction was maintained based on them.

I will note that in accordance with the doctrine proclaimed by R. Reagan in 1983, the United States was carrying out accelerated creation of the ASAT antisatellite system based on the F-15 aircraft with SRAM-Altair air-space missiles, which could be used to engage space objects at altitudes up to 1,000 km. The complex was using homing missiles with non-nuclear warheads. The Americans successfully completed tests of the ASAT system in 1987 and evidently are not planning to part with it. The use of Shuttle manned spacecraft with the installation of various weapons including laser weapons in them was being viewed as a use of attack weapons in space.

It would be well if we did not have to regret the time lost and pay for the decisions made in 1983.

#### Arbitrator of Last Resort

Creation of the ABM and Space Defense Troops was dictated by S&T progress on the one hand and by the space arms race, into which the Soviet Union also had been drawn, on the other.

The presence of these troops as part of the Armed Forces of the USSR and now of Russia deterred U.S. military ambitions in the 1960's, 1970's and 1980's, and even now serves as a guarantee against delivery of a surprise, unpunished, unanswered nuclear missile strike against our country.

Without fearing to bring the wrath of my numerous opponents in my native land down on myself, I assert that the successful formation and development of the troops would have been impossible without the harshest of order and organization and even of totalitarianism in the corresponding, not corridors, but offices of power in the CPSU Central Committee, USSR Council of Ministers and the Ministry of Defense. And if our own history does not persuade us of this, I recommend taking the example from... the United States.

Had a similar situation formed 30 years ago we would not have succeeded in doing even a little bit of what was created under cold war conditions in the matter of

strengthening defense capability. And much was done—and it was no worse, and for determining positions even better, than in America. I will cite a specific example.

Literally from the very first days after I took over the position of commander of ABM and Space Defense Troops of National Air Defense Forces, I encountered the fact that all ABM defense and missile attack warning system facilities at which work was being done by that time were being created in execution of decrees of the CPSU Central Committee and Council of Ministers. Initially I assumed that these directive documents were being prepared in the apparatus of the Central Committee and Council of Ministers. Subsequently, when I had occasion to take a direct part in drawing up drafts of such documents together with other specialists, I realized how many-sided and creative this work was and what the CPSU Central Committee's role in it was.

Work on draft decrees for ABM and Space Defense Troops would begin in the SRI of the National Air Defense Forces. A special Directorate of Strategic Assessment and Forecasting of Offensive Weapon Development was established. Preliminary specifications would be drawn up for new weapons based on results of analysis, mathematical modeling and full-scale experiments. Time periods for development on the order of 5-6 years and subsequent operation for at least ten years were taken into account here.

The principal criteria were high effectiveness and reliability with a minimum permissible time period for creation and minimum permissible cost. I will note that before the beginning of the 1980's our present "wooden ruble" corresponded to 1.1 U.S. dollars in the defense industry. Tactical and technical requirements were examined at the level of the Main Ordering Directorate and my directorate and after approval of the commander in chief would be transmitted to the Military Industrial Commission. But it was necessary to withstand a lengthy, exhausting struggle with powerful general designers, since new, complex S&T problems were being posed for them. It was also necessary to overcome the stubborn resistance of monopolistic ministries. The fact is the Ministry of the Radio Industry, Ministry of the Aviation Industry and Ministry of the Electronics Industry as well as others had to restructure production, master a new element base and erect new plants.

Contradictions between the client and industrial organizations, which were insisting on a considerable reduction in the given requirements, often would lead to conflicts. The CPSU Central Committee Defense Industry Department, in which such major scientists and engineers as N. N. Detinov, V. F. Fedorov and G. S. Savasteyev worked, acted as the last resort in resolving issues. Coordinated drafts would be submitted for signature to the chairman of the Council of Ministers and sent to the Central Committee.

And here—and I confirm this with all responsibility—state interests, and by no means those of ministries and departments, always were in the foreground. Knowing this well,

the scientific-production, labor and military collectives would perform complex tasks with high quality in minimum time periods, keeping within very limited budgetary funds. Increasing the country's defense capability was truly a sacred job for the people taking a direct part in this.

#### Elite of the Military-Industrial Complex

The armament complexes and systems of the ABM and Space Defense Troops were created by talented scientist-designers, both military and civilian. Each was a uniquely individual personality. For example, there were most intelligent people and scientists with world names such as Yu. B. Khariton and A. L. Mints with their worthy pupils Yu. V. Polyak, V. M. Ivantsov and V. K. Sloka; the explosive G. V. Kisunko, who engaged in strongly-worded polemics, and the modest, very honest and industrious I. D. Omelchenko; the talented, strict, principled A. G. Basistov and the intelligent, charming M. G. Minosyan; V. G. Repin, loyal to his cop performers; even-tempered, self-restrained, self-critical A. I. Savin; temperamental, exacting V. M. Kovtunencko; P. D. Grushin, fair in assessing what had been achieved; determined and capable F. A. Kuzminskiy, A. N. Musatov, V. P. Sosulnikov and F. F. Yevstratov. But there was that common thing that united them all—high responsibility for protecting the multinational people of a great country by reliable means of the missile attack warning system, ABM defense, space defense and the space monitoring system.

And in the final account the difference in approaches to resolving fundamental S&T problems, the uncompromising struggle and the competing projects enabled determining the most rational directions in outfitting troops with armament.

I realize that I hardly have the right to evaluate the elite of our military-industrial complex, but many years of working together enable me to say what memory suggests about each of them.

The majority of scientists and designers went through Army service. G. V. Kisunko began it as a private of the Leningrad militia and R. A. Valiyev as a member of the militia in the battle of Moscow. V. I. Markov, deputy minister of the USSR Radio Industry and general director of the Vypel Special Design Bureau, who was directly responsible for armament of the ABM and Space Defense Troops, was a scout of a partisan detachment in Belorussia, and O. A. Losev, who replaced him in this post, commanded a reconnaissance battery of a gun artillery regiment in the 2nd Belorussian Front. Many finished military schools and academies. And all of them believed that it was the Army that determined their further destiny.

#### From the First Peg

Establishment of the Missile-Space Defense Troops began with the selection of sites for constructing weapon complexes. General and chief designers determined areas of the country where, if stationed there, the specifications and performance characteristics of systems would be realized most fully, minimum damage would be done to the

ecology, and reliable biological protection of the population was ensured. The Engineering Directorate of National Air Defense Forces—Chief K. V. Uryvin—determined the permissible amount of capital investments, took into account the unconditional consent of local authorities in site selection, and facilitated normal work conditions.

In the 1970's up to 100,000 military construction personnel worked to construct several Missile-Space Defense Troops sites simultaneously. In the period of completion of construction and installation work and of the broad work front of installing and adjusting technological gear at one site the builders numbered 30,000, Ministry of Installation and Special Construction Work specialists numbered 2,000-3,000, and specialists of industry 3,000-4,000. Military builders had to be provided with housing, messhalls and spaces for workshops and depots. And this incredibly difficult task was accomplished.

Of course, many problems arose. In the course of creating weapon systems, general and chief designers would make substantial changes to the layout of technological spaces and the distribution of cables and would stiffen requirements on the quality of water for cooling gear and on temperature and humidity conditions. Ministry of Installation and Special Construction Work representatives also made changes to the initial project. The ordering Engineering Directorate of the National Air Defense Forces supplied hardware of special technical equipment that was similar in characteristics but different from the project. It would happen that by the time of delivery the hardware envisaged by the project had been removed from production by industry and replaced by other hardware. As a result, alteration and additional costs and time were required.

Construction at Podmoskovye sites was conducted by the Center's Main Military Construction Directorate (Chief A. G. Karaoglanov). Its motto was: "Build well." Subordinate officers and personnel of military construction detachments were targeted specifically toward fulfilling this requirement. And to this day military units express gratitude to builders of the Main Directorate for the high quality and esthetics of facilities, such as of the early warning radar complex with the Dunay-3U radar which I already mentioned.

In border areas where natural conditions were more difficult, work was done by the Main Directorate of Special Construction, chief of which was K. M. Vertelov,<sup>18</sup> and from 1979 N. V. Chekov.<sup>19</sup> They constantly took a personal part in building facilities of the missile attack warning system and space monitoring system of Missile-Space Defense Troops. Thus, great credit goes to military builders for the fact that armament systems were created and are reliably performing a combat mission of state importance.

Vertelov, first deputy chief of USSR Ministry of Defense Construction and Troop Billeting—a competent, strong-willed, demanding person and brilliant organizer—generated the military builders' enthusiasm for performing

selfless labor and skillfully maneuvered forces and assets of military construction subunits, creating a reliable labor organization and achieving its increased quality. At the demand of designers, Vertelov had a team of planners from the Ministry of Defense TsPI-20 at each construction site without the right of departure for solving problems connected with alterations. They solved all problems that arose on the spot promptly with appropriate formalization.

In addition, Vertelov initiated the development of detailed "combined schedules." They specified what technological gear industry had to deliver to the construction site by what time period and the degree of readiness of spaces and special technical equipment for installation and adjustment of gear. Military builders and specialists of the Ministry of Installation and Special Construction Work did everything dependent on them to fulfill their portion of the work on time. There was a lag and disruptions in industry. When this became obvious, indiscriminate accusations against the military for disrupting intermediate and end time periods for creating weapon complexes ceased.

For several years the mass media have been sharply and fairly criticizing the state of military discipline and of educational work in military construction detachments. Yes, there was and is *dedovshchina* and crime there. The negative state of affairs in many military construction detachments is the result above all of their manpower acquisition of draftees who have had convictions, who have poor education and a poor knowledge of the Russian language. The majority of junior officers directly responsible for education of subordinates were from among those called up from the reserve for two years. The very difficult conditions of settling in and of life and routine already have been mentioned. But the fact is, specifically the military builders created very major facilities of the defense industry and the national economy.

Civilian specialists of the Ministry of Installation and Special Construction Work worked together with military builders under the very same conditions. They were directed by B. V. Bakin,<sup>20</sup> deputy minister of the Ministry of Installation and Special Construction Work, a very businesslike person with a detailed knowledge of the full diversity of complex systems of special technical equipment (special lathes) for technological gear, ventilation, air conditioning, fire extinguishing and so on. He strived for efficiency in the manufacture and delivery of metalwork. And being minister, Bakin did not forget our facilities.

Specialists of the leading production-technical enterprise of the Ministry of the Radio Industry, the general director of which was V. N. Kazantsev, skillfully and harmoniously installed and adjusted technological gear. Chiefs approved by the ministry were assigned from among leading employees of this enterprise to each facility. They, together with the commanders and chief engineers of military units, would organize the personnel's constant, direct involvement in installation and adjustment of technological equipment and in installation and adjustment of special



technical systems. Enterprise specialists trained the personnel and gave a test for authorization for independent operation of the equipment. After the facilities were turned over for operation these chiefs remained here and headed up integrated teams of industrial representatives performing warranty service.

#### **Directorate of the Commander and the Professional Missile-Space Defense Troops**

For the sake of truth I must mention the unquestionable services of generals, officers and employees of the directorate whose selfless, strenuous, creative labor largely contributed to creating a reliable antimissile and antispace shield for the USSR. During the period 1967-1986 the directorate makeup was rejuvenated by the best officers from the troops. But of special significance is the role of the first makeup of officers, trained and educated in the special-purpose SAM Army, primarily engineers who along with themselves introduced professionalism, high culture, morality and a responsible, decent, conscientious attitude toward the job. All worked with full exertion of spiritual and physical energies. It is hard to realize that V. V. Golubev, S. I. Goryushkin, K. I. Zikhanov, V. D. Rumyantsev, A. A. Ignatov, I. A. Aleshin and Yu. M. Gridnev died prematurely.

The directorate collective developed a concept of combat employment of Missile-Space Defense Troops in operational-strategic operations of the National Air Defense Forces together with scientists of the SRI's, of the Special SRI and of academies. Substantiation of the integrated combat employment of missile attack warning troops, ABM and Space Defense Troops and space monitoring troops with unified, centralized command and control from the National Air Defense Forces Central Command Post was fundamental to it. The main forces and assets were concentrated on performing the mission of prompt, reliable warning of a missile attack, and at the same time the effectiveness of ABM and space defense was improved. Realization of the concept required that general and chief designers work out a unified combat algorithm and introduce corresponding programs to computer equipment of command posts of fully automated weapon systems. As the weapon complexes and systems were developed and improved, the combat algorithm and programs were updated, as was the concept for combat employment of Missile-Space Defense Troops.

The concept was checked in exercises conducted under the direction of the commander in chief of National Air Defense Forces, chief of the General Staff and USSR minister of defense, and also in crisis and emergency situations.

The directorate planned to conduct together the measures for operational-tactical and combat training, logistic support, and strengthening of military discipline and moral atmosphere in military collectives, especially in the midst of junior officers, warrant officers, NCO's and privates, so the troops would be capable of performing the combat mission of state importance at any time and under any conditions.

Systematic work in formations and units by integrated directorate teams was subordinated specifically to this. In addition to scheduled inspections during the training period and the training year, surprise trips to the troops were made which were timed for the launch of our own and U.S. ballistic missiles and spacecraft. This permitted checking the degree of combat readiness against actual targets.

Directorate officers worked calmly and efficiently. In identifying shortcomings, they would find correct solutions for their elimination directly in the course of work. They taught by personal example.

Along with tactical-technical exercises, large-scale ground defense exercises also were conducted. The experience of these exercises even now has proved not to be superfluous, since many missile attack warning system and space monitoring system complexes are in CIS countries and some are in areas of military conflicts.

The headquarters of the Army, corps [plural] and divisions worked in the troops in the very same spirit.

The fundamental Army principle "Do as I do" has deep meaning. In far-off 1938 that was how, as a 19-year-old lieutenant, I was taught by Captain V. T. Bagdasaryan,<sup>21</sup> commander of 7th Battery, Tbilisi Mountain Artillery School. An outstanding person and a genuine professional, his high and at times harsh exactingness got along together with an attentive, solicitous attitude toward subordinates. He was truly a master in training and educating commanders of platoons and of our multinational collective of cadets.

Three years of duty under his command left an indelible trace on all my subsequent activity. In making particular decisions I always oriented myself on principles laid down by the unforgettable battery commander. How important it is that at the beginning of service every young officer have his own Bagdasaryan, an immediate commander deserving love and respect.

Fifty calendar years of service to the homeland give me the right to assert that high combat readiness is impossible without adequate professional training of commanders, officers and engineers of all degrees. They are determining in the process of training all subunit and unit personnel. New combat equipment and its continuous modernization and updating insistently demand a constant increase in one's professional level. Therefore I as well as the majority of leadership personnel of formations and units did not consider it disgraceful for ourselves to learn from specialists of industry and from engineers in units at each convenient opportunity, even at the expense of leave.

And it is not only a matter of not lagging behind development of equipment, but also of the ability to accumulate sensible, substantiated suggestions from the troops and strive for their introduction by industry. Literally thousands of such suggestions substantially improved the efficiency and reliability of equipment and its operating conditions.



Combat readiness is impossible without high morality of the people who support it. If it can be thus expressed, tens, hundreds, thousands of eyes are constantly focused on the commander, from which you will conceal neither falsity in behavior nor contradictoriness in actions. Only a highly conscientious, profoundly decent commander can fully implement the principle "Do as I do." Only then can he be considered a professional.

I will be frank—to become such and always remain such is a burden of which not everyone is capable. The oppressive atmosphere of monopolism, inaccessible bureaucracy, bribery, legitimized official boorishness and glossing over of truth at all levels is that fertile soil in which the misshapen phenomena of our existence sprout. And the Army is no exception.

At first, in the upper echelons of authority of the troops, I was reputed to be almost a "white crow," as they now say: I would pay for dinner in the enlisted mess, close so-called "Greek halls" in all units for receiving various inspectors and chiefs, not allow use of the familiar form in contact with enlisted men and officers, not use swear words and not have (nor do I have to this day) either a dacha or my own car. If this were a trifle, then I would have remained a "white crow," but in time this began to cause irritation in some and happy surprise and hope in others. Subordinates understood that it was not simply possible, but necessary that one should live and serve like their commander. I certify with great satisfaction that all leadership personnel of the Army, corps, divisions and units had a high moral level.

Units were being created anew in the Missile-Space Defense Troops. Many were in place of disbanded ones which had glorious combat traditions. And although everything became new, missions more responsible, and equipment and armament more complex, traditions and the Colors must remain inviolate, accumulating the will and honor of the Motherland's defender. That was why I repeatedly requested continuity of designations of disbanded units and formations from the General Staff, but I got neither understanding nor even a response there...

It is not superfluous to recall that in the 1960's the table of organization structure of Missile-Space Defense Troops was determined by the method of trial and error. The type structure of company, battalion and regiment imposed on us by the General Staff Main Organizational-Mobilization Directorate contradicted the experience of operation of fundamentally new and fully automated weapon systems.

In time it became obvious that the department [otdel] should be the basic subunit. This was 20-40 officers and several warrant officers and junior specialists. The department chief would receive gear and equipment on his personal responsibility and assign and train four shifts of the combat team from among officers, three shifts of junior specialists and a periodic technical servicing team. He was directly responsible for constant readiness and serviceability of all three sets of gear and equipment, having one in a "combat operation" mode, a second in a "ready for

combat operation" mode and a third in cold reserve or in periodic technical servicing or repair. Departments would be joined to make up a station, a center, and units.

The makeup of units included departments of combat algorithms and programs, repair-inspection facilities, communications and data transmission centers, security companies and support subunits.

Considering the importance of the combat mission being performed, the General Staff removed its objection and elevated the status of units to brigades. Units received designations of radiotechnical complexes [uzel], antismisile units, and command-computer centers and became part of divisions, corps and the Army. Approximately 60 percent of their numerical strength consisted of officers and warrant officers. That was how the foundation of a professional Army was laid down.

It was then, at the end of the 1960's, that a very acute problem arose of training cadres in specialties of the Missile-Space Defense Troops. At the suggestion of P. F. Batitskiy, supported by the General Staff, a special faculty was set up at the Military Command Academy of Air Defense imeni Marshal of the Soviet Union G. K. Zhukov—Chief P. F. Tushev, heads of chairs V. S. Prosvetov and I. S. Fedoseyenko. Three of the six faculties and some of the chairs in the Military Engineering Radiotechnical Academy of Air Defense were transferred to the new student training profile. The heads of faculties were P. K. Gritsak, E. Ya. Luss, and G. V. Yakubovskiy. Heads of chairs were scientists with world names Ya. D. Shirman, Ya. S. Shifrin, A. V. Kolosov and A. A. Meteshkin. The chiefs of academies, Marshal of Aviation G. V. Zimin<sup>22</sup> and Marshal of Artillery Yu. P. Bazhanov, regarded formation of faculties with their inherent sense of responsibility. The decisive support of G. F. Baydukov permitted establishing a superb training facility in Missile-Space Defense Troops armament in the academies. Two schools were transferred from the SAM Troops to the new profile and their status was elevated. These were the Pushkin Higher Command-Engineering School of Radioelectronics (Chief V. I. Gromadin) and the Zhitomir School of the very same kind (Chief Ye. Ye. Poluektov). Graduates of academies and schools in the missile-space defense profile had high authority. They were assigned not only to the troops, but also to units subordinate to the General Staff and the Main Directorate of Space Assets. Disintegration of the superpower led to where the Kharkov Engineering Academy and Zhitomir Higher School simply are no more. The loss for the Missile-Space Defense Troops of course is great, but a portion of the instructors and cadets were transferred from Zhitomir to Kubinka, where a branch of the Pushkin Higher School was deployed on the base of the 12th Training Center, which was training junior specialists.

The need for advancement of young, promising commanders to fill positions of the commander of Missile-Space Defense Troops, Army commander, corps and division commanders, and chiefs of operations staffs insistently demanded their training at the USSR Armed

Forces General Staff Military Academy imeni K. Ye. Voroshilov. Thus, V. K. Strelnikov, who completed this Academy in 1967 and was appointed commander of a separate missile attack warning division, proved to be a head taller than other senior officers in the combat arm in the level of his training, operational outlook and ability to command. My personal experience also confirms this. Nevertheless, it was necessary to overcome a multitude of cadre barriers. Only the support of Academy Chief General of the Army M. M. Kozlov and Lieutenant General N. A. Asriyev, head of the chair for the air defense profile, enabled sending one officer to this training institution annually. The USSR Armed Forces General Staff Military Academy was successfully completed by present Missile-Space Defense Troops Commander V. M. Smirnov, by Army Commander N. I. Rodionov, by Army Chief of Staff N. K. Sergeyev, and by separate corps commanders N. P. Kartashov and A. I. Suslov. Further development and improvement of the Missile-Space Defense Troops dictate the need not to interrupt, but to continue the training of worthy officers in this Academy.

The eliteness of Missile-Space Defense Troops units, now remaining only on Russian territory, is preserved. Traditions which were born and strengthened together with us also are being maintained. And this distinction is determined not by the uniqueness of equipment and armament, but above all by the people who master it.

Under conditions of economic chaos and legal boundlessness which have mercilessly lashed the country, they remain so thanks to their high professionalism, patriotism, and honest execution of filial duty to the Motherland. I became convinced of this when in June 1993 I was present at a meeting with essentially already the third generation of leadership of the separate missile attack warning army, a generation capable not only of preserving, but also multiplying the grand traditions of Missile-Space Defense Troops.

In 1978, thanks to the decisive support of Commander in Chief A. I. Koldunov, the reform itch of highly placed officials of the National Air Defense Forces Main Staff and the GOU [Operations Main Directorate] of the General Staff succeeded in being stopped and disintegration of the directorate and Missile-Space Defense Troops was not allowed. But now the directorate has been pulled apart to services of the main commissariat. The future will show how justified this is and what the fate of the troops will be.

#### **In Place of a Conclusion**

Well then, under conditions of a strict regime of secrecy, the missile-space shield of a great country was forged, which precluded the possibility of a surprise, unanswered nuclear missile strike on the part of any aggressor whomsoever. During the lengthy cold war period the U.S. and NATO military-political leadership could not help but take into account the constant combat readiness of the Missile-Space Defense Troops and the powerful nuclear missile potential of the USSR.

There are neither winners nor losers in our constant competition with the Americans in armament systems of Missile-Space Defense Troops. The presence of these systems on both sides cautioned previously, as well as now, against a suicidal temptation to resolve arising problems with the help of the "club."

Difficult as it may be, it must be admitted that the political and economic disintegration of the Soviet Union led to a substantial disruption of the grouping of Missile-Space Defense Troops and their combat capabilities dropped, including also for the defense of Russia. It is vexing and bitter to realize that the almost 30 years of strenuous labor of scientists, the defense industry, and the military to a certain extent turns out to be unnecessary.

Let us turn to the facts. The bulk of radiotechnical complexes for detecting ballistic missiles on flight trajectories now has ended up on the territory of Latvia, Belarus, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. From the mid-1980's large-scale work was carried on at the positions of all these complexes for replacing obsolete stations and creating new ones such as Daryal-U and Volga. In prices of that time the overall cost of expenditures was on the order of R2.5 billion. As of January 1990 around R1.5 billion had been used. At the present time financing has stopped. Work essentially is not being carried on. The electro-optical space monitoring systems also ended up in the very same situation in the near abroad. It may end up where in the next few years the CIS will remain without the most reliable and accurate means of the missile attack warning system on the Northwestern, Western and Southwestern avenues of likely missile approach, and also without the assets of the space monitoring system at altitudes up to 40,000 km.

What can be done under the circumstances at hand? I think above all to be attentive to proposals of Kazakhstan President N. A. Nazarbayev. Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan could conclude a collective security treaty in which, along with other questions, conditions would be determined for the stationing, support of operations and organization of alert duty of complexes of Missile-Space Defense Troops and also financing of work to complete the creation of new stations. Missile attack and space situation warning information would be issued to state command and control posts and CP's of ministries of defense for the appropriate payment. Subsequently other CIS countries could join this treaty or conclude a bilateral treaty with the Russian Federation, assuming obligations under which complexes of over-the-horizon radar of the missile attack warning system and electro-optical complexes of the space monitoring system remain Russian bases on coordinated and precisely specified terms of lease, without the right of their seizure and discrimination against attendant personnel. Russia's right to complete the creation of new stations should be stipulated especially.

If the political and military leadership of CIS countries understands their responsibility for security of their peoples, then the proposed treaties are a specific path to preserving and upgrading the Missile-Space Defense

Troops. A very important condition which invariably must be specified in the treaties is preservation of the Vypel Interstate Corporation, whose design organizations and plants have ended up not only on the territory of Russia, but also in Ukraine and Belarus.

Now it is customary to assert that we have no enemy and that friendly, partnership relations have been established with the United States and NATO. But reliable partnership relations can exist only with those equal in strength. They speak the language of diktat and impose their will on the weak. And Russia has been weakened substantially. One great power, the United States, remains, and now specifically it dictates its terms to the world.

Establishment of the Missile-Space Defense Troops demanded a solution to complex scientific-technical problems. The truly cosmic height of the goal set determined the choice of people capable of creating and controlling weapon complexes and systems. Before my eyes young engineers and officers, representatives of various nationalities, grew into major scientists, designers and military leaders.

We were able to give far from all of them their due for their selfless, devoted labor at the limit of human capabilities. Perhaps specifically that self-sacrifice dramatically predetermined the early, irreplaceable departure of many of them.

P.S. V. P. Barmin, N. I. Savinkin, M. I. Nenashev, R. A. Valiyev, M. G. Minosyan and Yu. V. Polyak departed from life during the time the manuscript was being prepared for publication.

#### Footnotes

1. Gorelik, Aleksandr Leopoldovich (b. 1923), Engineer-Colonel. In 1968 deputy chief of an administration of the Special SRI. Chief theorist and developer of systems for identifying space objects in solving problems of the space monitoring system and space defense. Doctor of technical sciences, professor. State Prize laureate.

2. Kurlanov, Aleksandr Dmitriyevich (b. 1924), Major General. In 1967 chief of an administration of the Special SRI. In 1982 chairman of NTK [Scientific-Technical Committee] of Main Directorate of Space Assets. Doctor of technical sciences, professor. State Prize laureate. Honored Man of Science and Engineering of RSFSR. Member of Academy of Cosmonautics imeni E. K. Tsiolkovskiy.

3. Kuryshv, Vasilii Ivanovich (b. 1913), chief of a chair of Ryazan Pedagogic Institute. Doctor of technical sciences, professor. Honored member of Astrogeodetic Society of Russian Academy of Sciences, laureate of Cosmonaut Training Center Diploma imeni Yuriy Gagarin.

4. Bazhanov, Yuriy Pavlovich (1905-1975), Marshal of Artillery. In 1949 commander of artillery of Maritime Military District. In 1955 chief of Military Engineering Radiotechnical Academy of Air Defense. Doctor of military sciences, professor.

5. Pisarev, Ivan Parfenovich (b. 1922), Lieutenant General. In 1953 commander of SAM regiment. In 1959 chief of operations department. In 1965 chief of staff of special-purpose SAM army. In 1970 chief of staff of ABM and Space Defense Troops of National Air Defense Forces.

6. Sergeyev, Ivan Gordeyevich (b. 1937), Colonel. In 1965 senior engineer in the Special SRI. In 1968 chief of a department of the Space Monitoring Center. In 1980 chief engineer of a sector of the missile engineering service in the headquarters of ABM and Space Defense Troops.

7. Kuriksha, Aleksandr Aleksandrovich (b. 1933), scientist in field of radar and radionavigation. In 1971 chief of scientific research section in Vypel Interstate Corporation. Doctor of technical sciences. State Prize laureate.

8. Ochkasov, Yuriy Semenovich (b. 1934), Colonel. In 1976 deputy chief designer of Space Monitoring Center. Candidate of technical sciences.

9. Losev, Oleg Andreyevich (1923-1993), Lieutenant General. Hero of Socialist Labor. In 1952 SAM regiment commander. In 1958 chief of a department, in 1973 deputy, in 1979 first deputy chief of Main Directorate of Armament of National Air Defense Forces. In 1981 deputy minister of the Radio Industry. State Prize laureate.

10. Nikolskiy, Viktor Vladimirovich (b. 1942), Colonel. In 1978 chief of coordination computer post. In 1980 deputy commander of Space Monitoring Center for weapons. From 1988 to the present time deputy commander of a separate corps for armament.

11. Yukhnovich, Ippolit Yulyanovich (b. 1932), Colonel. In 1960 commander of a SAM battalion. In 1966 deputy commander of space defense system. From 1973 through 1986 commander of Space Monitoring Center.

12. Zaytsev, Aleksandr Petrovich (b. 1941), Major General. In 1984 deputy commander and in 1986 commander of Space Monitoring Center. From 1988 to the present time chief of staff of a separate corps.

13. Olyander, Leforg Konstantinovich (b. 1934), Colonel. In 1971 deputy chief of staff for battle management. In 1974 chief of a department of Space Monitoring Center.

14. Chelomey, Vladimir Nikolayevich (b. 1914), scientist and designer in the field of aircraft, missile and space equipment. Twice-Honored Hero of Socialist Labor, Academician of Russian Academy of Sciences. Lenin Prize laureate and laureate of two State prizes.

15. Akhromeyev, Sergey Fedorovich (1923-1991), Marshal of the Soviet Union. Hero of the Soviet Union. During 1984-1988 chief of USSR Armed Forces General Staff. Lenin Prize laureate.

16. Andropov, Yuriy Vladimirovich (1914-1984), General of the Army. Soviet Party and state figure. Hero of Socialist Labor. From November 1982 CPSU CC General Secretary and simultaneously from 1983 chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium and chairman of the Defense Council.

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17. Martynov, Sergey Sergeyevich (b. 1946), Major General. In 1984 commander of space defense system. In 1992 commander of a missile attack warning division.

18. Vertelov, Konstantin Mikhaylovich (b. 1923), Colonel General. Hero of Socialist Labor. In 1951 chief of construction of atomic production in the Urals. In 1971 chief of Ministry of Defense Main Directorate of Special Construction. In 1979 first deputy chief of Ministry of Defense Construction and Troop Billeting. In 1985 chief of State Expert Examination and Inspection of the Ministry of Defense. Lenin and State prize laureate. Honored Builder of RSFSR.

19. Chekov, Nikolay Vasilyevich (b. 1931), Colonel General. In 1979 chief of Ministry of Defense Main Directorate of Special Construction. In 1988 deputy minister of defense for Construction and Troop Billeting. State Prize laureate.

20. Bakin, Boris Vladimirovich (b. 1912), Hero of Socialist Labor. In 1967 deputy minister and in 1975 minister of Installation and Special Construction Work. Lenin and State prize laureate.

21. Bagdasaryan, Vartan Tatevosovich (b. 1907), Lieutenant Colonel. In 1937 commander of a cadet battery of Transcaucasus Joint Military School. In 1941 commander of a battalion, 80th Artillery Regiment, 76th Mountain Rifle Division. From 1943 through 1955 commanded artillery training units.

22. Zimin, Georgiy Vasilyevich (b. 1912), Marshal of Aviation. Hero of the Soviet Union. In 1960 first deputy commander in chief of National Air Defense Forces. In 1966 chief of Military Academy of Air Defense. Doctor of military sciences, professor.

## NAVAL FORCES

### Participants Assess Baltops Exercise

PM0707140994 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 5 Jul 94 p 2

[Report by Captain First Class Valeriy Gromak: "Seventh Position—in the Line of the Ships Participating in the Baltops '94 NATO Exercises It Proved Lucky for the Russian Escort Ship Neustrashimyy"]

[Text] Peter I chose the right people to teach him about sailing. You can see that for yourself even these days. This thought came to mind more than once as I watched the skillful actions of the crew of the small Dutch launch which delivered me through a storm onto the Dutch guided missile frigate Kortenaer, and then watching the actions of the frigate's sailors. Particularly when Commander (captain 2d class) Bruin allowed me to visit virtually all the combat positions. Two years ago on board the Dutch frigate Bloys van Treslong I was only allowed to cross the threshold of the central command post: "Sorry, no further." But now Commander Bruin has quite a different view: "If we want to trust each other, we should have as few secrets as possible."

But even the Russians are not that naive. In the first phase of the "Baltops '94" exercises, which are being held for the 23d time in the region of the Baltic straits, the ship flying the flag of St. Andrew was given seventh position in the line. The Neustrashimyy is the second Russian ship to take part in these NATO exercises. Last year the crew of the escort ship Bditelnyy were also given seventh position, which turned out to be "lucky." Number seven also brought good luck to the Neustrashimyy in these exercises.

But, whereas last year our escort ship played a secondary part, which it handled successfully, this year number seven was a substantial step forward for the Neustrashimyy. After all, a year ago there were 11 ships rehearsing their missions at sea, this year there are more than 40. The number of participating countries with an interest in the safety of shipping in the Baltic has expanded as well.

The Russian sailors took part in tracking airborne targets, where the group's air-defense center was the American guided missile cruiser Gettysburg, and rehearsed elements of a towing exercise and ship-to-ship transfers of men and cargo. An American sabotage squad duplicating likely enemy operations parachuted onto the Neustrashimyy from a C-130 aircraft. The only area where the ship could not participate was target practice—the ship's ammunition stores contained only live shells.

Subsequently, at the German Navy's main base at Kiel and in the Polish port of Gdynia Swedish Defense Minister Anders Bjorck; Admiral Sten Swedlund, commander of the Swedish Navy; and Rear Admiral Hans Lyussov [surname as transliterated], chief of staff of the German Navy, not only admitted that it was the first time they had been aboard a Russian ship at sea, but also made their own assessments of what they had seen.

"To my mind, Russian naval seamen should make their contribution to strengthening stability in the Baltic region," Anders Bjorck noted, for instance. "We need to create a situation in which our countries can live in prosperity, for many important trade routes have run through this area since time immemorial, and the region is unique from the geopolitical standpoint."

"It was very important for me to visit your ship. You sail superbly and you are excellent hosts as well," Adm. Lyussov told your correspondent. "I was also the first German naval officer to fly over the sea in a Russian military helicopter and to see from above how the missions were carried out. So I confirm yet again my excellent assessment."

This was not the only assessment of the actions of the Baltic Fleet airmen, who are only beginning after a long interval to learn how to land on deck. During the exercises the crews led by Lieutenant Colonels Aleksandr Zherebtsov and Aleksandr Petrov constantly demonstrated their high level of training. The landing made by a Russian helicopter on the deck of the Hayler, a USN guided missile destroyer, even delighted the American professionals.



The five-day exercises, full of real combat training, flew by. "Over the past few days our ship has been very popular," Captain 2d Class Igor Ryzhkov, commander of the Neustrashimyy, believes, "and the exercises themselves have been a good schooling for the crew."

In other words, they measured themselves against others and proved their worth. Above all, they started operating on an equal footing in the—for them—new job of cooperating with the NATO navies. It is gratifying that this year the NATO leaders who planned the exercises saw the Russian seamen as equals. "People's diplomacy" also worked to a certain extent. During the parade of ships, for instance, the organizers of the exercises—the Americans—were more restrained than they had been a year ago, when they hoisted a huge, 20-30-meter American flag over their ship. In order, apparently, to let everyone see who is in charge in the Baltic.

Although the "Baltops '94" exercises were staged and financed by the United States this time too, the U.S. sailors did not "thumb their noses" any more at their colleagues from other countries. Exercise leader Captain Edward Hunter, commander of the U.S. Navy's 14th Squadron, noted that the spending on these exercises will be recouped in the shape of the observance of U.S. national interests: "If there is peace and stability in Europe, that will benefit the United States too."

On the whole, however, it is my view that the exercises, in which ships of countries that do not belong to the NATO bloc are participating, are, rather, a political action aimed at expanding contacts, allowing sailors to get acquainted, and creating an atmosphere of trust and respectfulness among peoples. If exercises in the Baltic continue to be organized not on the bloc principle but on the regional principle, then the need for Russia's participation and its role in such maneuvers will increase, and U.S. mediation with attempts to impose its own view of the world will give way to equitable cooperation.

### Submarine Builders' Achievements Defended

MM2607091194 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 21 Jul 94 First Edition p 3

[Article by Sergey Ptichkin: "Nets for Steel 'Sharks.' Does Russia Need a Submarine Fleet?"]

[Text] Less has always been said in our country about hero-submariners than, for example, about hero-pilots, and in general few people knew anything about the founders of Russia's submarine fleet. After the loss of the nuclear submarine "Komsomolets" society was forced to turn its attention to our submarine fleet's problems. How has the press responded to public interest? Unfortunately, in a very one-sided, primitive, and vulgar fashion. Armchair "experts" contrived in a short time to sling so much mud at their own state's submarine fleet that even if you plastered the best aircraft carrier in the world, the "Nimitz," with it, the ship would not be able to take it and would sink.

In the opinion of some journalists, our submarines are the least battleworthy ships in the Navy; what is more, they are plagued by accidents. There are loads of problems with these steel "sharks" and we cannot get to grips with them....

Indeed, our submarine fleet has more than enough problems, but they are not in those areas which gutter publications are exposing. But this hostile attitude toward submariners in particular and toward the Navy in general has its roots in history going back to the years of the revolutionary upheavals at the beginning of the century.

The first people to understand the true value of submarines were the Germans. Admiral Doenitz' "wolf packs" showed graphically who ruled the waves and who was going to determine victory in the naval battle of the future. However, the war's outcome was decided on dry land, and the main heroes were those who fought on land or in the air. In spite of the fact that Soviet submariners had quite a few exploits to their name, few people knew about them. A lengthy military encyclopedia was published in 1984 and mentions the names of only a handful of submariners, for instance.

In the West an aura of exclusivity emerged around the submarine fleet after the war, and the prestige of the lords of the depths was blown out of all proportions. In the United States every dive made by a nuclear submarine was presented as an event of national importance and the commanders of nuclear-powered missile submarines were elevated to the status of national heroes.

But in our country a taboo was placed on the nuclear submarine fleet.

But was there anything to be proud of? Today many people are sure that there was not. MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS, for example, considers that "the quality of our nuclear submarines is no better than that of our automobiles." This is a lumpen logic: If they water down vodka, then they'll never in a lifetime be able to make a ship! Incidentally, on the subject of Russian automobiles. If a "Volga" does not hold a candle to a Mercedes, then, forgive me, but no German armored personnel carrier (which is also an automobile) can hold a candle to another GAZ product, the BTR-80.

Of course, the initial materials our shipbuilders could count on when setting about new projects were certainly worse than those used at the shipyards in Norfolk. The conditions in which specialists worked on the "Rubin," "Lazurit," and "Malakhit" cannot be compared with those of their American colleagues.

Just 25 years ago there were nuclear submarines in the Soviet Navy which were so quick that no torpedo could catch them. They were the famous and mysterious "Alfas," which to this day are shrouded in secrecy worthy almost of a mystery story.

When multipurpose nuclear submarines of the "Oscar-2" class go out on alert duty this causes panic among those who have the task of tracking the movements of Russian

submarines. The Cold War has ended, but the Pentagon nevertheless continues to watch all our nuclear submarines attentively when they leave their bases. Right, the Americans lose the "Oscar-2" immediately after the submarine puts out into the ocean! But this submarine cruiser (this is how the vessel is classified) is capable of keeping a vast area of water in its sights and monitor the depths sensitively, guaranteeing that it will not meet any submarine hunters. The cruise missiles with which the "Oscars" are armed do not give any surface targets a chance of survival, however well protected they might be.

There is a submarine in our Navy which has gotten itself into the Guinness Book of Records as the largest nuclear submarine in the world. This is the "Akula," which is unique in every respect and better known by the name "Typhoon." On its own this submarine can guarantee that Russia has peaceful skies overhead as it is capable of delivering a devastating strike against any aggressor at any point on the globe. On top of this the enormous "Akula" is one of the quietest submarines in the world. Even the Americans admit this with a considerable degree of surprise.

Only Russia has been able to design and build the most powerful nuclear submarines at the same time as excellent diesel ones. Western specialists have given the "Varshavyanka" diesel submarine a most individual name, "Kilo"—"killer" [as published]—because of its deadly combat capabilities. Many countries thinking about defending their territorial waters want to buy this craft. The "Varshavyanka" is the only submarine in the world capable of maneuvering on the surface in a small bay without the assistance of a tugboat.

The Americans do not like talking about accidents aboard their nuclear submarines, though all manner of emergencies happen there. The figures for accidents in the U.S. Navy's nuclear fleet five years ago were recently made public. There were 34 serious incidents in 1989 on board U.S. nuclear-powered vessels: 12 fires, two accidents involving nuclear power units, six accidents involving weapons, one explosion, and one flooded section. But most surprising were the three occasions on which nuclear submarines ran aground and the nine collisions between them and surface ships. This was in spite of their having brilliant equipment, all-hearing sonar, and wonderfully trained crews. At the end of May this year a strike nuclear submarine of the "Los Angeles" class rammed into a sandbank at more or less full speed and was so seriously damaged that the Navy's command decided to dispatch the vessel for serious repairs in dry dock. The submarine's commander was removed from his post for professional incompetence.

In February 1992 in the Barents Sea there was a collision between a Russian "Sierra" class nuclear submarine and a U.S. nuclear submarine, the "Baton Rouge." Publications like MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS blamed the collision on the Russian vessel as its sonar is allegedly capable only of hearing the sound of its own propellers and cannot "see" an alien submarine even at point-blank range. Of

course, the accusers did not mention the fact that the collision occurred right next to the Russian coastline, not in Alaska. We will not try to guess the purpose of the "Baton Rouge's" incursion into our state's territorial waters or which submarine had the better "vision" at the moment of collision. It is another aspect of the accident that is interesting. The Russian "Sierra" only "bumped into" the uninvited guest, yet the latter almost fell apart. Our nuclear submarine returned to base and is still afloat today. The "Baton Rouge" barely made it to its native shores and was soon scrapped as its hull was beyond repair due to the damage it had sustained.

We could go on quoting facts from the history of our submarine fleet. Facts which the "expert" accusers studiously ignore and which are evidence that Russian submarines having superior features alongside their deficiencies. What is the history of hatred toward the Russian submarine fleet?

After the October Revolution the Bolshevik Government required devoted fighters capable of fighting on dry land and not under water. The image of the revolutionary seaman was none other than a dashing fellow with crossed cartridge belts, an enormous Mauser at his side, and grenades on his belt. A marine machinegunner with grenades to boot; what could be less natural? But this really happened.... While seamen on surface ships could always step ashore and become marines at the request of the new authorities, there was no room for the few submarine crews in the revolutionary throng.

The Bolshevik Russian Government made the "wise" decision to halt construction of Soviet submarines; the Red Army has no need of a submarine fleet—its goals are all terrestrial. All design bureaus involved in submarine design were disbanded. The most advanced submarine building school in the world at the time, which was in Russia, was artificially "retired from the game" for exactly 10 years. It was only in 1927 that submarine building recommenced in Russia. But the break of 10 years even at the beginning of the century did not pass without loss. Many of the old craftsmen's secrets were lost. It seems that today, as 70 years ago, the "wise" decision that Russia does not need a submarine fleet is being made again: "Nobody is going to fight the United States," therefore, they say, we do not need submarines. However, leaving aside the United States, there are other countries which are very unfriendly toward Russia, and there are peaceful as well as military goals to be considered. The experience which our shipbuilding industry has amassed can be regarded as invaluable since at the end of the 20th century there are only two countries throughout the world which are capable independently of beginning to open up the world's oceans on an industrial basis, namely Russia and the United States.

The United States understands full well that the Earth's future is linked not so much with faraway outer space but with the oceans. Moreover, it can be claimed that whoever is first to fully exploit the depths of the oceans will have real power over the world. Today we have the same

opportunities as the Americans to begin the "dialogue" with the oceans on a basis of equal partnership. But what about tomorrow? If a 10-year gap at the beginning of the century put submarine building back for many decades to come, then 10 years' marking time at the the end of this century will simply bring on a collapse. Who will benefit from that?

## REAR SERVICES, SUPPORT ISSUES

### Defense Collegium Considers Formation of Strategic Reserves

94UM0513C Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 15 Jul 94 p 1

[Press release from the Russian Ministry of Defense Directorate for Information and the Press: "Meeting of the Board of the RF Ministry of Defense"]

[Text] Problems of forming and preparing strategic reserves in the face of Armed Forces reductions were examined at a regular meeting of the board of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense. A report was given by Colonel-General V. Semenov, commander-in-chief of the ground forces.

RF Security Council Secretary O. Lobov took part in the work of the board.

### Grachev Signs Civilian Employees' Pay Raise Order

94UM0513A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
14 Jul 94 p 1

[Article: "Pay Raise for Civilian Army and Navy Personnel"]

[Text] On 12 July 1994 Russian Federation Defense Minister General of the Army Pavel Grachev signed Order No. 215 raising the salaries of civilian personnel of military administrative bodies of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense as of 1 July 1994. This order raises the salaries of workers of the central apparatus of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense, the armed services, and the administrations of districts, groups of forces, fleets, armies and flotillas by a factor of 1.4. Workers of agencies of the military procuracies, military courts, and field institutions of the Russian Central Bank will receive the same raise. The amount paid in foreign currency to civilian personnel working in the indicated military administrative bodies in the groups of forces will not change.

The pay rates and salaries of civilian personnel of military units, services, military educational institutions, and budget-supported enterprises and organizations of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense will also be increased as of 1 July 1994 by amounts foreseen by Decree No 759, 30 June 1994 of the Government of the Russian Federation "On Raising the Pay Rates (Salaries) of the Unified Tariff Scale for Wages of Workers of Budget-Supported Entities."

As of 1 July 1994 grade 1 pay under the Unified Tariff Scale is 22,400 rubles, and in addition, the rates (pay) for grades 1 through 4 are to be increased by amounts from R16,000 to R3,000 respectively.

Because application of the indicated decree with regard for the particular features of the wages of army and navy civilian personnel would violate the pay ratios of the low-paid categories of workers receiving grades 1 through 6 pay, the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense submitted a proposal to the Russian Ministry of Labor to increase by 10-20 percent the previously established raises in the pay rates (pay) of these workers.

According to information received at the Directorate for Labor and Wages of Civilian Personnel of the Russian Federation Armed Forces, a draft order of the Russian Federation Minister of Defense raising the wages of civilian personnel of military units, services, military educational institutions, and budget-supported enterprises and organizations of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense as of 1 July 1994 will be prepared in the immediate future with regard for the decision of the Russian Ministry of Labor.

### Need for Military Legal Reform Cited

94UM0513B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 14 Jul 94 p 2

[Interview with Col Just Anatoliy Rybchinskiy, member of the Commission to Develop the Concept of Military Legal Reform in the RF Armed Forces; place and date of interview not given: "New Laws on the Threshold"]

[Text]

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Anatoliy Ivanovich, what makes the military legal reform necessary?

[Rybchinskiy] The reforming army needs a new legal base like man needs air. One of the main goals of military legal reform in the RF Armed Forces is in fact creation of such a base. Let me emphasize—a base oriented on the real conditions under which the armed forces operate and on the possibilities of the state, chiefly economical. It is precisely by understatement of these factors that the ineffectiveness of the laws of the "military package" can be explained.

Another major area of military legal reform has to do with improving the activity of all agencies involved in law enforcement, application of the law, legal education, and legal information to servicemen and their families, and in providing legal assistance to them.

The armed forces will play the role of "general contractor" in military legal reform. But all interested parties—other ministries and departments possessing military formations—will doubtlessly have to join the dialogue, and the search for optimum solutions.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Drafting of what legal acts is presently being discussed?

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[Rybchinskiy] Laws on military courts, on improving the system of disciplinary units in the RF Armed Forces and on disciplinary courts are in their "final stretch." Practically all of them are ready. As far as I know, the law on military police (or militia—the name hasn't been determined exactly yet) has already been submitted to committees and commissions of the State Duma for familiarization. Such that now the time framework of military legal reform depends chiefly on the legislators.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] What do you see as the military procuracy's place in the future?

[Rybchinskiy] I feel that it would be impermissible to separate it out of the armed forces. The military procuracy is an organic element of the army structure, and another formation that would be able to fill the resulting vacuum and exercise due supervision over observance of lawfulness in the armed forces would not be found.

### **Progress, Difficulties in Improving Education Explored**

#### **Radionov Interviewed on Transition to New Standards**

94UM0514A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
19 Jul 94 p 2

[Interview with Lt Gen Gennadiy Anatolyevich Radionov, chief, Directorate for Personnel Training and Military Educational Institutions, by Nikolay Poroskov; place and date of interview not given: "Military School Goes Over to New Standards"]

[Text] On 23 June of this year KRASNAYA ZVEZDA published an interview with Deputy Defense Minister Colonel-General Valeriy Mironov. The principal changes occurring in the system of military education were discussed. Our readers have been wondering what is new in the Statute on Higher Military Educational Institutions of the RF Ministry of Defense from the standpoint of life inside the VUZ, and what made the changes necessary. Our correspondent discussed this with Lieutenant-General Gennadiy Radionov, chief of the Directorate for Personnel Training and Military Educational Institutions.

[Poroskov] Gennadiy Anatolyevich, the Military Education Directorate was established in the Ministry of Defense in early June by an edict of the President of the Russian Federation. It is the successor to the Main Directorate for Institutions of Higher Education, and it inherits that organization's principal responsibilities. What are they?

[Radionov] The main thing today is to continue the reform of military education: pursuing a unified state policy, and implementing unified requirements on officer training in accordance with state educational standards. The range of responsibilities of the directorate has widened significantly. To the job of providing scientific and methodological leadership to the VUZes, we have added leadership in humanizing military education and the schools of general education of the Ministry of Defense (in closed and remote

garrisons and outside the country), coordinating preparatory military training for young people, and other tasks.

[Poroskov] Please explain the meaning of the expression "state educational standards," particularly because their structure and content aren't presented in the statute.

[Radionov] There will be two components to state educational standards. So far, they are only in draft form. The federal component determines the general requirements on the system of higher education—its levels, time of training, study load standards, names of specialties, and orientations of training. Departmental components determine the requirements on the content and level of training in specific specialties.

[Poroskov] Will state educational standards help to improve specialist training in a time when the prestige of education is obviously falling and training quality is decreasing?

[Radionov] Whatever the case, state standards make it impossible to reduce requirements on graduates. A state accreditation service currently being established in the country and able to deprive VUZes of the right to issue state diplomas will make sure of this.

On our part we have done much to raise the prestige of conscientious training by introducing advantages and privileges for students and cadets who do well.

Besides going over to personal training plans, they may be permitted to take their examinations early, and thus increase their vacation time. They may be released from taking examinations by a decision of the department. Greater possibilities are afforded for studying elective disciplines (those of the student's choosing). Early graduation from the VUZ or parallel study of another specialty and issuance of a second diploma may be permitted. Those who exhibit an interest in scientific creativity could be transferred to an undergraduate sponsorship program, while those graduating from a VUZ with a gold medal will be granted the right to do graduate work at a military college immediately after graduating from the VUZ.

[Poroskov] Privileges are of course a good thing. But are requirements on failing students and cadets to be stiffened?

[Radionov] At the request of many VUZes we have equated the graded test to an examination when dismissal from a VUZ is being considered: A student receiving three two's in the course of a semester is subject to dismissal. The permissible number of repeat examinations taken to make up academic deficiencies has been reduced—not more than two unsatisfactory grades in disciplines in which the student has fallen behind.

[Poroskov] Are there no exceptions to this rule?

[Radionov] The academic council examines the question of dismissing each student, so as not to make determination of the individual's fate just a formality.



[Poroskov] An officer's social security depends, among other things, on whether he is able to obtain a civilian specialty in school....

[Radionov] We have gone over to teaching all cadets a civilian specialty that is kindred to their military specialty. It will be the one stated on the diploma. The list of such specialties has been established by the Russian State Committee for Higher Education.

[Poroskov] The issue of repealing entrance examinations in military academies has been raised on several occasions.

[Radionov] Entrance examinations are not only the basis for selecting the most capable, but also the sole possibility for encouraging the officer to refresh his knowledge, and to prepare himself to master new knowledge. There was good reason why up to 15 examinations had to be taken for the Academy of the General Staff a hundred years ago. And even in recent times, immediately following the Great Patriotic War, frontline officers dripping with medals still had to take from 6 to 10 examinations when entering the academy. This is why it is written into the new statute that "VUZes shall be provided with students and cadets on a competitive basis, according to the results of occupational selection and entrance examinations."

By the way, competition in obtaining a higher education is also foreseen by the Constitution of the Russian Federation.

[Poroskov] Are any changes occurring in the organization of the educational process? Introduction of democratic elements into VUZ life and growth of the independence of VUZes and departments presuppose greater possibilities for creative enquiry, and for educational experiments. At the same time we need protection against methodological extremism on the part of experimenters who are not entirely responsible.

[Radionov] An article granting instructors the right to select their own methods and resources of training has been supplemented by the directive that they may be examined at a conference or a commission on subjects and instruction methods, or at a department meeting. Moreover, it will now be the business of the academic community to state its conclusions regarding particular innovations.

It was suggested during discussion of the draft statute that everything that has been developed by innovative educators should be included in the list of types of training lessons. For example, lessons based on Shatalov's "reference summaries." That is something we didn't go for. Even if we "canonize" a series of lessons existing today, tomorrow this list will once again become incomplete owing to the efforts of enthusiasts. This is why the statute includes only the principal types of training that have undergone the test of educational experience. All other types of training may be introduced by the VUZ if so decided by the training council.

[Poroskov] State educational standards will be laid at the basis of planning the training process for the first time, but

the training plan and program will remain the principal documents directly regulating VUZ training. Does this mean that everything will be as it was before?

[Radionov] Only the training plan, and not the program, will be coordinated with the Directorate for Military Education. Military institutes and military faculties at civilian VUZes will be granted the right to draw up their own training plans and programs, just like the academies. The minimum time of general military training for cadets in their first year has been reduced from 2 months to 1 month, and restrictions on the time of troop apprenticeship and practice have been lifted. Other changes have been made as well.

[Poroskov] In recent years many VUZes have started to reduce the number of examinations in the race for auditorium hours, substituting them by rating systems and other testing methods. The term "rating examination" has even appeared.

[Radionov] We feel that the classical examination and preparation for it are irreplaceable today, and an effective means of final testing, serving as the concluding stage of the study of a discipline. While we do not object to rating as a means of current testing and evaluation of educational work, we wrote it into the statute that "every training discipline must end with an examination, and a test may be foreseen in place of an examination only for disciplines with a volume of less than 100 hours."

[Poroskov] Considering limited funding and formation of market relations, it would be logical to give VUZes the possibility for disposing of their own intellectual property themselves—for obtaining additional nonbudgetary funding through educational, scientific, innovative and production activity. Major strides have been made in this direction in the civilian higher school.

[Radionov] Many proposals have been submitted in this regard, but for practical purposes not one of them fits with the statute. First of all, these measures require changes in laws or particular decisions of the government. Second, even if the corresponding decisions are made, they will affect not only VUZes but also scientific and other organizations of the armed forces, and so they will appear not in our statute but in documents regulating financial and economic activity. However, the Directorate for Military Education does not feel this to be a closed issue. We have asked the leadership of the Ministry of Defense to reexamine the economic mechanism of VUZes under the new conditions once again. The Russian State Committee for Higher Education supports us.

[Poroskov] Could it happen that in the future, people will have to pay for their military education?

[Radionov] No. The law of the Russian Federation "On Education" foresees free education, if a student is receiving one of the three levels of education for the first time.

[Poroskov] But the military academy gives a second higher education.

[Radionov] It is something the Ministry of Defense requires, and therefore it is free. I'm certain that this is the way things will be in the future as well. It may be that civilian specialists will be trained in some new, just recently created directions at military academies and institutes, chiefly engineering institutes, on a contract basis—that is, for a fee. In this case the fee will be collected either from individuals or from organizations sending them.

Let me say one other thing that is hypothetical and tentative, considering that this issue hasn't yet been thoroughly studied. An officer studying in an academy may obtain a second, military specialty in parallel—on his own time and for the corresponding fee.

[Poroskov] Gennadiy Anatolyevich, will the Statute on VUZes be followed by other documents?

[Radionov] Absolutely. The entire legal standards base of the system of military education requires fundamental reworking in application to the new conditions. The directorate is working on statutes on special undergraduate programs, on final state certification of VUZ graduates, on secondary military educational institutions, and a large number of other questions.

In this interview we have touched upon only a small fraction of the changes occurring in the system of military education, and we are counting on interested assistance from the VUZ public and from readers of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in the discussion of the drafts of these documents.

### Difficulties in Providing Education

94UM0514B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 16 Jul 94 p 3

[Article by Stanislav Telegin: "What Are the 'Hot Spots' Teaching the Schools?"]

[Text] Much has been said and written about the extreme conditions of serving in "hot spots." We are also aware of the difficulties experienced by families of servicemen living there. But there is also a certain unique problem in their life that many don't even think about. It's the fact that the children of servicemen and civilian personnel in these same "hot spots" have to be given the possibility, guaranteed by the Constitution by the way, for obtaining a complete secondary education free of charge. And this is not very easy to do.

In this respect, garrisons situated outside of Russia and remote garrisons could easily be included among such "hot spots." The contingent of their students is huge. This year 3,282 pupils completed their studies just in schools listed on the balance sheet of the RF Ministry of Defense. It was extremely difficult to provide for such a large graduating class, chiefly due to the shortage of monetary resources. The amounts required are considerable: As an example, 453 million rubles are needed just in the Transcaucasus to pay the wages of school personnel through the end of the year; however, the Ministry of Defense does not receive

money for these purposes as a separate item. The Ministry of Education doesn't have sufficient funds for this either.

Also troubling today is the low level of education in most Russian-language schools abroad, which is where the children of military servicemen get their education as well. For example, while we have been able to find a common language with the authorities in Crimea and in the Dnestr region, in Kazakhstan the situation has recently worsened dramatically: The local authorities do not wish to fund these schools out of their own budget.

The personnel problem is a misfortune common to all. Despite the fact that around 60 percent of officers' wives are teachers, we aren't able to solve this problem just with this source alone. As an example a school in the settlement of Stepnoy in Kazakhstan has a teacher shortage of 24 staff positions. In such cases officers are recruited to do the teaching. And in the meantime new "hot spots" are arising where there aren't even schools like this. In short, today's realities are such that 52,000 officers and warrant officers and 15,000 civilian personnel of the armed services are deprived of the possibility for providing their children with a full-fledged secondary education.

The Russian Ministry of Defense believes the solution to be establishment of around 15 new schools on its own balance sheet—just the 201st Division (Tajikistan) requires three of them. The question of opening two boarding schools in Chita and Khabarovsk is also being raised. Suggestions have been made to introduce a system for hiring teachers on a contract basis. And without a doubt, the work can't go on without strengthening the training material base of the schools. Clearly everything once again rests on funding, which is nonexistent. It can be found only at the government level.

Additional measures to create conditions under which the children of military servicemen serving in special conditions, abroad, in regions under a state of emergency, in remote garrisons and at border posts could obtain a secondary (complete) general education were examined this week by the Interdepartmental Commission on Social Problems of Servicemen and Their Families under the guidance of Deputy Chairman of Government Yuriy Yarov. Colonel-General Valeriy Mironov, deputy RF minister of defense, gave a report on this issue. The commission examined the situation in detail. The decisions it adopted foresee full support to schoolchildren in terms of textbooks, instructor training for educational staff, funding, premises, and other things. The Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Finance, the State Committee for the Management of State Property, municipal authorities, and other departments will take part in implementing these decisions. But it is already clear today that achieving what has been planned will require considerable efforts under the conditions of budgetary starvation. However, there is no other way. After all, what we are talking about is nothing more and nothing less than the fate of many thousands of young citizens of Russia finding themselves in "hot spots" through no fault of their own.

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**Efforts To Retain More Crane Operators***94UM0513D Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 15 Jul 94 p 2*

[Article by Feliks Semyanovskiy: "The Best Truck Crane Operator Is a Contractor"]

[Text] One of the most complex specialties in the engineering troops is that of the truck crane operator. Unfortunately during his time of compulsory service a soldier doesn't have the time to achieve perfect mastery in this occupation. This is why the engineer service of the Ministry of Defense has put its hopes on contractors in the training of truck crane operators. As an experiment, 12 of 34 persons called up for regular four-month training were contractors. They successfully completed their training and received their certificates.

**Military Medical Chief on Recruitment Policy***94UM0498A Moscow TRUD in Russian 17 Jun 94 p 2*

[Interview with Lieutenant General Yuriy Nikolayevich Savvin, deputy chief of Main Military Medical Directorate, doctor of medical sciences, by Viktor Badurkin, date, place and occasion not specified: "Will the Sick Be Taken Into the Army?: This Question Naturally Generates Especially Acute Alarm in Parents of Draftees"]

[Text] Agitated parents phone the editors: "Is it true that sick boys now will taken into the Army?" The statement by Russian Minister of Defense Pavel Grachev at a ministry collegium that we have very great medical restrictions on draftees' health and that it is necessary "to examine this question" generated serious alarm in this connection. Anxious mothers and fathers naturally want to know what awaits their sons! We asked Lieutenant General Yuriy Savvin, deputy chief of the Main Military Medical Directorate, to explain the situation.

[Savvin] Right off I wish to reassure parents that no serious changes are expected in existing standards. It is a question of unifying two orders presently in force into a single document, a government decree. Leniency toward state of health has been "laid down" in its draft only for vision—from minus six to minus eight diopters, as for the Americans. All other requirements remain rather rigid. Moreover, I would say they are the most rigid among foreign armies.

[Badurkin] Still, sick boys are ending up in the Army. Why?

[Savvin] The main reason lies in poor work by local military medical boards. Private Igor Sukhanov now lies in the Hospital imeni Vishnevskiy. He was called up from the city of Valuyki, Belgorod Oblast. After a month of service it was learned that the soldier has congenital heart disease. I would like to look into the eyes of the physician who allowed him to serve. And there are many such persons. Last fall we were forced to return 1,800 sick soldiers to their homes.

Can you imagine what their mothers went through? I am not even talking about our troubles and expenses.

We are not interested in having sick draftees end up in the Army. Therefore now we are setting up authorized military medical boards made up of our physicians under kray and republic military commissariats. They are the ones who will give consultation to and inspect rayon military medical boards. In addition, similar structures already have begun operating in military districts. Such a triple "sieve" already permitted reducing the number of sick draftees ending up in units by 2.5 times.

[Badurkin] I think that responsibility also should not be removed from the military commissariats attempting to fulfill the plan for the draft at any cost...

[Savvin] Without question. Rather often we have to "clarify relations" with military commissariats which attempt to justify flaws in their work as being the exactingness of military medical personnel. Although, to be frank, I do not envy them. It is becoming a case where there is no one to draft. I do not wish to touch on legislative problems; I will touch only on medical aspects.

The health and gene pool of the nation are in more than a critical state. Judge for yourself: in five years in Russia the number of sick draftees subject to being released from service doubled and those with diseases of the nervous system, surgical pathology, and skin diseases tripled.

The fact that today we release every fourth draftee from service for state of health and five percent have received deferments eloquently indicates the state of our public health. That is the first time in my memory. Even according to official data, 53 percent of schoolchildren have weakened health and 75-80 percent of our children become ill by final exams. Long-running illnesses are observed in a third of juveniles, especially in higher classes, and morphologic or functional deviations in two thirds. By the end of schooling the number of schoolchildren with chronic pathology increases by one and a half times, and it forms for every other person as a result of poor medical supervision and medical sanitation. Now every third draftee has insufficient intellectual development and 40 percent are not physically fit, to put it mildly.

I do not know how these figures affect the lawmakers and government, but they frighten me, a medical man. A state medical program is needed urgently before everything is lost.

[Badurkin] But the fact is, heavy stresses, both physical and psychological, await these boys in the Army. Do you help them in some way?

[Savvin] Yes, the Army is an area of heightened risk and serious stresses. Not everyone is up to this, especially now, when troops are at half strength and one has to serve for yourself and that other lad, as they say. Therefore we try to do everything possible to maintain and even strengthen the soldiers' health. They undergo a medical examination twice a year. We provide treatment and medicine to all who need it.

Recently a new problem appeared for us—new recruits coming into the troops with body weight deficiency. Last

year there were more than 4,500 such boys. A supplementary diet of one and a half rations is prescribed for them. Unfortunately, this food often does not reach the soldiers. It is not so simple to eradicate the notorious dedovshchina and the irresponsibility of some commanders, but this is not a matter for medical personnel.

**[Badurkin]** But it is for these reasons that thousands of soldiers die in the Army each year; I am not speaking of those discharged for state of health.

**[Savvin]** Alas, loss statistics are "classified," as is the number of those "boarded." I do not have the right to give a specific figure. I can say only that last year several tens of thousands were discharged from the Army for state of health, but that is together with officers, warrant officers and those wounded in "hot" spots. It also includes those who received ordinary, everyday injuries. In addition, there also are occult and purely age-related genetic diseases. For example, it is often asserted that soldiers die in the Army from acute leukosis, which means they are irradiated, although specialists know that in the majority of cases this disease is transmitted by heredity and appears specifically at draft age. Not any more soldiers suffer from acute leukosis than their contemporaries in civilian life.

**[Badurkin]** By the way, about treatment. Yuriy Nikolayevich, mothers often complain that it is difficult for a soldier to get into a hospital.

**[Savvin]** One has to look into each such case specifically. Of course, there are violations and mistakes, but with respect to our capabilities, we are practically fully supplied with hospitals. Depending on the illness, our soldiers are treated in garrison, base, district or central hospitals without any kind of restrictions. Take our Main Hospital imeni Burdenko, for example. Every fourth patient there is from the troops, districts and fleets. All receive the most skilled assistance.

Outbreaks of "children's" diseases—scarlet fever, measles, diphtheria—have become more frequent in the Army now, as they have throughout the country. Therefore we inoculate everyone without exception. And we have gotten by without tragedies; there have been only a few cases of a light form of measles.

**[Badurkin]** Speaking of mass illnesses, it is impossible not to recall events on Russkiy Island...

**[Savvin]** Military medical personnel long ago sounded the alarm, predicting a tragedy, but we were not heeded in time. The fact is, the situation is difficult and dangerous not just on this island, but also in many Far Eastern garrisons and even such large ones as Khabarovsk and Vladivostok. Flooded basements, unsanitary conditions in messhalls, baths and laundries...

Military medical personnel warn the corresponding commanders about each such instance, and when the latter do not react we turn to the procuracy. Last year 132 criminal cases were instituted based on our materials; true, no reaction at all followed in 51 instances. But we insist and

will continue to insist on our requirements, because the main thing for us is the health of officers and men.

## PEACEKEEPING FORCES

### Russian Forces' Pro-Georgian Feelings Noted

MM2607100194 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA  
in Russian 26 Jul 94 p 2

[Article by Sergey Turchenko: "Don't Shoot Your Own Men"]

[Text] It has become known from a trustworthy source at the General Staff that Colonel General Yevgeniy Podkolzin, recently commander of the Russian Airborne Troops, has prepared an alarming report for the Russian Federation defense minister on the situation in the zone of the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict.

We were told that the report voices particular alarm over the fact that openly pro-Georgian feelings have formed among the command and personnel of the Russian Federation peacekeeping forces in the southern zone (Zugdidskiy Rayon—the group of Russian troops in the Transcaucasus). The command is under great pressure from the Georgian leadership and is boasting of its participation in military operations against the Zviadists and in training Georgian Armed Forces and is stating its readiness to render Georgia military aid. Some officers of the southern zone openly accuse the Russian Federation Airborne Troops of a pro-Abkhazian stance and are generating an unhealthy attitude toward the airborne troops. Thus there is an intensifying danger of conflicts between subunits of the Russian Federation Airborne Troops and the Group of Russian Troops in the Transcaucasus, which is to the advantage of the Georgian side and could be provoked by it.

The Georgian side's desire to accelerate the process of the refugees' return is no less dangerous, as it could make that return uncontrolled and uncontrollable. Under these conditions it is easy to predict the loss of power and the eruption of internecine warfare in Galskiy Rayon, which would lead to the disruption of the peacekeeping operation. A large proportion of the mass media will put the blame for this on the Airborne Troops and the propaganda campaign aimed at removing Russia from the peacekeeping mission in the region will thus receive new impetus.

If it really is all as the General Staff source has reported (and there are few grounds to doubt it) then the political fuss behind the scenes all over the world around the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict acquires a definitive logical form.

As we know, during his visit to the United States Shevardnadze, having enlisted Clinton's support, steered a course toward the internationalization of the conflict. He is making attempts to get the UN Security Council to introduce international (U.S.) peacekeeping forces. And not to

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the line dividing the warring sides but throughout the territory of Abkhazia, including along the river Psou, which borders on Russia.

This plan from the best friend of Gorbachev and Yeltsin was rejected by the Russian and Abkhazian sides and by influential sociopolitical forces of the North Caucasus.

Reports reaching the editorial office from various sources attest to the fact that the opportunity for compromising Russia's peacekeeping lies in the very way its peacekeeping forces were staffed. That section of the Russian peacekeeping forces which is situated in the Southern zone (the left bank of the river Inguri) is staffed from the military formations of the Group of Russian Forces in the Transcaucasus based in Georgia. These are the military formations which for the entire five years after the April (1989) events in Tbilisi have been subjected to psychological persecution and physical violence as "occupiers" and "punitive troops." Over these years many dozens of officers and soldiers from these formations have died at the hands of gunmen encouraged by the authorities. Cases are known of direct attacks on individual Russian garrisons by groups of Georgian regular troops to gain possession of weapons and ammunition. As a result of the fact that the Georgian authorities are not bringing criminal charges against anyone for these crimes and the Russian side, despite numerous statements of the kind made in such cases, is taking no appropriate steps to protect its own servicemen, some representatives of the Group of Russian Forces in the Transcaucasus have developed a timidity and servility with regard to the Georgian authorities.

The command of the southern zone of peacekeeping forces periodically states via the mass media that it will not put obstacles in the way of refugees' attempts to penetrate uncontrolled into Abkhazia thus provoking such attempts, although in accordance with the agreements which have been reached this process, to avoid complications, should be organized and controlled.

All the above creates the impression that the opponents of our peacekeeping role in Abkhazia are preparing a major act of provocation which will be blown up in the world mass media and very likely become the subject for a noisy discussion in the UN Security Council to justify the idea that Russia is unable to fulfill the lofty and responsible mission it has taken on. Then for these opponents of Russia their strategic aim will become feasible—removing Russia from the peacekeeping process in Abkhazia or if they do not manage that then minimizing its role, calling in peacekeeping forces from those Western countries which are pursuing their own interests, opposite to Russian interests, in the conflict zone and throughout the Caucasus.

Some military and diplomatic experts recommend immediately staffing the Southern group of peacekeeping forces on the left bank of the river Inguri with military units deployed on the territory of the Russian Federation, releasing the Group of Russian Forces in the Transcaucasus units from these duties beyond their power. The legal shaping of the mechanism for the refugees' return should be completed very rapidly and the population should be notified of it.

## INTERREGIONAL MILITARY ISSUES

### Problems for Russian Units Protecting Turkmenistan Border

94UM0497A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 12 Jul 94  
p 5

[Article from Ashkhabad by Vladimir Kuleshov, IZVESTIYA: "The Russian Military in Turkmenia: Moscow Is to the Rear, But There Is Nothing To Fall Back On"]

[Text] "...We were told: your experience and knowledge are needed here for organizational development of the Republic Armed Forces and for Russia's fulfillment of treaty obligations. But today, totally deprived of an opportunity to realize our specialized skills, we feel only that we are unneeded and unclaimed..."

These are lines from a letter delivered to the IZVESTIYA correspondents' post a month after the departure from Ashkhabad of a special Russian Federation Ministry of Defense commission which was checking the validity of an article in the newspaper entitled "Russian Officers in Turkmenistan Intend To Complain to the United Nations." The people who signed it have grounds for this.

They did not try to avoid the problems in the headquarters of the operations group of Russian troops in Turkmenistan:

"There are many resentments, and the majority are just. Yes, tanks stand around without spare parts and storage batteries, aircraft and helicopters are not flying, nothing has been done despite repeated directives of President S. Niyazov for an exchange of currency for Russian servicemen, and there is a lack of Turkmen officers in the national Armed Forces. But it is impossible to leave here. A wave of criminal acts, terrorism and drugs is pouring into Russia and countries of the Commonwealth, for borders here are transparent."

"If border security by Russian lads departs this life," I recall the words of N. Reznichenko, chief of the Takhta-Bazar detachment, "Turkmenia may cease to exist as an independent state..."

That was said exactly two years ago, in times not yet so excessive, when there was light and water at all zastavas [border outposts] of Turkmenia, necessary means of signaling and communications functioned and there were no systematically insolent violations such as today.

Border guard personnel are detaining illegal border crossers no longer in the dozens, as before, but in the hundreds. They come here from Iran and Afghanistan. Some carry weapons, others drugs, and still others drag bags of dollars and gold and silver articles. But a new breed of violators has appeared, the operatives told us: an affiliation with special agencies has been noted in the behavior of certain Afghan and Iranian citizens. They display an interest in Border Guard Troops subunits and servicemen and attempt to draw Turkmen border guards

into illegal activity. More and more often, officers involved in operations register examples of illegal contacts by local border guards with civilians of contiguous states on a smuggling basis.

But if "there is nothing to fall back on," in that case who will finance Russian troops in Turkmenistan? How much money (no, not in manats and not even in rubles, which change their rate each day, but in dollars) is provided for in the budget of Turkmenistan and Russia for upkeep of borders? And if such calculations have been made, then it would be interesting to learn whether or not they are included in the budget. Such questions would not arise if it were possible to receive a specific answer to them in conversations with representatives of the military-political leadership of Turkmenia and of the Russian command element.

"No, we do not know. We are not in the picture," is what one has occasion to hear from those who head up the Army of Turkmenistan and Russian troops here.

Just how is the border to be secured? How are we to fight if, God forbid, it becomes necessary, when alert duty and combat training in fact have been stopped in units of the Air Force, Air Defense, Navy and Signal Troops, and when aircraft, tanks, helicopters and APC's stand around without necessary spare parts, storage batteries, POL and attendant specialists? A large portion of them is just begging to be recycled, since it is ownerless. But the fact is, two or three years ago all this was in complete combat readiness, as were the training fields, ranges and the airfield network. Today they are completely idle.

"Tanks, guns and aircraft can wait," I was told by officers of Military Unit 61413 in Kyzyl-Arvat. "There are larger problems."

The problems are ammunition dumps plunked down on and under the ground in abundance in Turkmenia, near cities and within cities; dumps for all kinds of ammunition, ammunition for arms which do not and never did exist in Turkmenistan and long ago requiring urgent inspection and precautions, not to mention security.

Around 5,000 carloads of stores of artillery armament, a great portion of which needs urgent monitoring, have piled up in military depots of Turkmenia today. Should something happen, it would go off with such a bang that the explosion near Vladivostok would seem to be a child's prank. I believe this, since I myself saw a train with large-caliber projectiles disappear into the gaping mouth of one such storage area near Bezmein.

Meanwhile, it is not such a difficult task to penetrate into that same depot. Just four years ago I had occasion to tell in IZVESTIYA about young boys who were making their way freely into one of these depots. In attempting to determine the location of assault rifles, grenades and cartridges, they were lighting their way with home-made torches. When they were finally caught after the third or fourth trip, the lieutenant colonel who took part in the

investigation let drop to me: "Generally we were all lucky, but especially the city of Bezmein."

I recall there was a lot of noise and at that time serious strictness was imposed in installation security, but I repeat that this happened four years ago. Today no one is worried: just think, they took 5-6 assault rifles and a box of grenades—with luck they will be found...

Who will guarantee that misfortune will not occur if the total irresponsibility of soldiers not trained to discipline, who look on service in the Army as an obligation and not military duty, also is mixed in with an acute personnel shortage?

"Desertion has become the norm," I heard from officers. "The number of deserters has gone over 5,000 just for the Republic Armed Forces. It happens where there is no one but an officer to assign to a [sentry] post..."

"When we came here," they say, "we thought we were needed here for Russia's strategic interests in Central Asia and were confident that the Motherland would not forget us. But today we are convinced of the opposite: there are no conditions in Turkmenia for our service. Pay in Turkmen manats is \$8-12 per month according to the actual rate. There are no food rations or annual one-time allowances and also no opportunity to sell, exchange or lease your privatized apartment. Are we really not needed by anyone?"

Recently there was a fight in one sector of a border zastava of the Takhta-Bazar detachment. "The zastava," said the official report, "was alerted and border guard personnel set out for the site of the violation, when bursts of automatic fire from assault rifles rang out against them from a small hill in the rear."

"During the battle Private 1st Class Sh. Shadurdyev received a perforating bullet wound, but the violators did not succeed in carrying out a major smuggling deal..."

There was not a word in the report about the fact that after the battle two Turkmen border guard personnel departed for Afghanistan together with the Mujahideen. They departed on their own...

One should not be surprised if "happy" Turkmenia soon becomes a second Tajikistan.

### Difficulties Facing Russian Border Guards in Turkmenistan

94UM0503A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 12 Jul 94 p. 5

[Article by IZVESTIYA writer Vladimir Kuleshov, (Ashkhabad [Ashgabat]): "The Russian Military in Turkmenia: Moscow Is Behind, but There Is Nothing With Which To Retreat"]

[Text] "...We were told: Your experience and knowledge are needed here to build up the republic's armed forces and fulfill Russia's contractual obligations. But today we have no

opportunity whatsoever to take advantage of our special skills; all we feel is that we are unneeded and unwanted...."

These lines are from a letter to the Uzbekistan correspondence bureau, delivered a month after the special commission of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, which verified the article in the newspaper entitled "Russian Officers in Turkmenistan Intend To Complain to UN," had left Ashkhabad [Ashgabat].

The staff of the operations group of Russian forces in Turkmenistan did not decide to escape the problems:

"There were many grievances, and the majority were justified. Yes, the tanks are standing there without spare parts and batteries, the airplanes and helicopters are not flying, nothing has been done, in spite of the repeated orders from President S. Niyazov, to exchange currency for Russian military servicemen, and there are not enough Turkmen officers in the national armed forces. But we cannot leave here. The wave of crime, terrorism, and drugs is engulfing Russia and the CIS countries. After all the borders are transparent here."

"If the guarding of the border by Russian chaps is to last long," I recall the words of N. Reznichenio, chief of the Takhta-Bazarskiy detachment, "Turkmenia [Turkmenistan] might cease to exist as an independent state...."

That was said exactly two years ago—during times that were not yet so extreme, when all the outposts of Turkmenia had light and water, the necessary means of signalization and communication were operational, and there were none of the regular blatant violations that there are today.

The border guards arrest no longer dozens, as before, but hundreds of violators. They come here from Iran and Afghanistan. Some steal weapons, others—drugs, still others drag out sacks full of dollars and items made of gold and silver. But, the operations workers say, a new breed violators has appeared. One could see in the behavior of certain Afghans and Iranians their connections with special organs. They have shown an interest in subdivisions and military servicemen of border forces and try to enlist Turkmen border guards in illegal activity. Operations workers more and more frequently register cases of illegal communications between local border guards and citizens of bordering states regarding contraband.

But if they "cannot escape," who then will finance the Russian troops in Turkmenistan? How much money—no, not manats or even rubles, whose exchange rates change each day, but dollars—is included in the budgets of Turkmenistan and Russia for maintaining the borders? And if these calculations have been made, one wonders if they have been included in the budgets. Such questions would not arise if in discussions with representatives of the military-political leaders of Turkmenistan the Russian command could obtain concrete answers to them.

"No. We do not know. We are not in the know"—this is what one hears from those in charge of the Army of Turkmenistan and the Russian forces here.

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But how can they guard the border? How can they fight if, God forbid, they have to, when combat alert and combat training have actually been suspended in units of the air force, air defense, navy, and signal forces, when aircraft, tanks, helicopters, and APC's are standing there without the necessary spare parts, batteries, fuel and lubricants, and specialists to service them. A large share of them are ready to be junked. Because nobody is in charge of it. And yet only two or three years ago it was completely combat-ready, as were the training fields, testing grounds, and network of airfields. Today they are absolutely inoperative.

"Tanks, machine guns, airplanes—they will come," the officers of the military unit 61413 in Kyzyl-Arvat told me. "We have more pressing problems."

The problems include the ammunition dumps abundantly stuck everywhere throughout Turkmenia—on land, underground, near cities, inside them. There are all kinds of ammunition, even for weapons that Turkmenistan does not have and never did have, which have long required emergency inspection and preventive work, not to mention storage.

About 5,000 carloads of reserve artillery weapons have accumulated in the military warehouses of Turkmenia, a large share of which need to be accounted for immediately. If anything were to happen, it would make the explosion near Vladivostok seem like a childish prank. I believe that because I have seen for myself how a trainload of large-caliber missiles came out of the open jaws of one of these storage facilities.

And yet it is no big thing to get into one of these warehouses. Four years ago, I wrote in IZVESTIYA about some boys who freely made their way into one of these warehouses. Trying to find out the location of the automatic rifles, grenades, shells, and cartridges, the lads lit their way with homemade torches. When they were finally caught after their third or fourth trip, a lieutenant colonel who participated in the investigation remarked to me: "In general, we were all lucky, but the city of Bezmein—especially."

I recall that there was a lot of fuss, and they heavily reinforced the guard of the facilities at that time. But, I repeat, that happened four years ago. Nobody is worried today: Just think, they filched five or six automatic rifles, a box of grenades—perhaps they will find....

Who can guarantee that there will be no tragedy if to the critical shortage of personnel is added the complete irresponsibility of the soldiers, who are not accustomed to discipline and regard service in the army as a chore and not military duty.

"Desertion," I heard from the officers, "has become the norm. Just in the republic armed forces, there are more than 5,000 who have gone over the hill. It happens that there is nobody to appoint to a post except officers...."

"When we came here," they say, "we thought: We are needed here because of Russia's strategic interest in Central Asia, and we were confident that the Motherland

would not forget us. But today we are convinced of the opposite: The conditions in Turkmenia are not suitable for our service. Our monetary compensation in Turkmen manats at the actual exchange rate amounts to \$8-\$12 per month. We have no food allowances or one-time annual stipends, or the possibility of selling, exchanging, or leasing our privatized apartment, either. Can it be that nobody needs us?"

A couple of days ago in one of the sections of the border guarded by the Takhta-Bazarskiy detachment, there was a skirmish. "The outpost," it says in the official report, "was put on alert. The border guards went to the place of the violation when rounds from automatic weapons were aimed at them from knoll in the rear area."

"During the skirmish, Lance Corporal Sh. Shadurdyev sustained a perforating wound, but the violators were kept from carrying out a large contraband transaction...."

The report did not say a word about the fact that after the skirmish two Turkmen border guards left with the mujahidin. Of their own accord....

It will be no surprise if soon "felicitous" Turkmenia becomes another Tajikistan.

## UKRAINE

### Defense-Security Subcommittee Heads Named

94UM0488B Kiev *NARODNA ARMIYA* in Ukrainian  
18 Jun 94 p 1

[Unattributed article—special to *NARODNA ARMIYA*: "The Commission Is Beginning Its Work"]

[Text] The Ukrainian Supreme Council recently created the Commission for Defense and State Security Issues consisting of 26 people's deputies. Deputy V. Mukhin was elected chairman of the commission.

A meeting of the commission was held at which its structure was determined and the leadership was elected. In terms of its structure the commission consists of five subcommissions:

- for military issues;
- for issues of state security;
- for border and customs duty issues and the National Guard of Ukraine;
- for issues of the military-industrial complex, conversion, and military science;
- for issues of social protection of servicemen.

People's Deputy A. Chykal was elected deputy chairman of the commission and chairman of the subcommission for military issues, and People's Deputy O. Chornousenko—deputy chairman of the commission and chairman of the subcommission for issues of state security.

The following were elected subcommission chairmen:

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- for border and customs duty issues and the National Guard of Ukraine—People's Deputy Yu. Kryzskyy;
- for issues of the military-industrial complex, conversion, and military science—B. Kozhevnykov;
- for issues of social protection of servicemen—People's Deputy G. Samofalov.

Priority measures for developing draft legislative acts in the sphere of defense and state security were determined at the meeting of the commissions.

First of all it is envisioned, in keeping with instructions from the Ukrainian Supreme Council, to study jointly with the Commission for Issues of Nuclear Policy and Nuclear Safety the state of affairs concerning execution of the disarmament agreement with regard to the liquidation of strategic missiles by Ukraine and to submit the conclusions to the parliament for consideration.

### **Maj-Gen Martyrosyan Calls for Civilian Defense Minister**

94UM0488A Kiev *VECHIRNIY KYIV* in Ukrainian  
17 Jun 94 p 2

[Article by Major General Vilen Martyrosyan under the rubric "Military Affairs: A Viewpoint": "What Kind of Minister Do We Need: In Uniform or Not?"]

[Text] As a member of the Interregional Group of Deputies which was headed by Academician A. Sakharov, I happened to participate in 1991 in developing an alternative version of the draft military reform. Its primary essence was, first, in codifying effective parliamentary control over the Armed Forces and, second, making the administrative staff of the Ministry of Defense less costly.

We assumed that from a military administration organ, the Ministry of Defense should become an organ for military-policy leadership. This would have made it possible to considerably reduce the central staff and secure perceptible financial economies due to staffing the ministry with civilian professions. The funds that used to be received as rank-based pay, privileges, and food rations could have been allocated to carry out social programs.

Our version of military reform assumed that the Ministry of Defense would exercise administrative control over the Armed Forces, carry out military policy, supply the Army with financing, armaments, and materiel, draw up the budget, and implement conversion of the defense industry.

We must say that at present such a model is being developed in Russia and will soon be accepted in its Armed Forces. However, as I see it, the Ukrainian Armed Forces since the moment of their formation have embarked on the path of blindly copying the obsolete structures of the former Soviet Army, which is a dead end. Further militarization of our society continues; a most powerful system of enforcement ministries and departments has been created. At present there is one person in uniform per 25 taxpayers in Ukraine. The actual strength of military formations has remained here at the same level

as of the moment of disintegration of the USSR. Are the working people capable of feeding such a number of their defenders?

The experience of modern wars has indicated that a large army does not solve large problems. Therefore, reductions in armed forces are underway in a number of Western countries in combination with their qualitative improvement and the adoption of precision weapons. In the process they first of all want to cut back the administrative structure of the Ministry of Defense and make it less costly and more mobile.

In our country, the process of the restoration of Ministry of Defense leading organs with the former staff organization designed for an army of many millions is picking up steam. This is easy to explain. It is impossible to reduce the army as long as military men who are directly interested in keeping up personnel strength in order to justify the existence of a certain number of generals are leaders of the Ministry of Defense. In turn, civilian officials would have a vested interest in making the Ministry of Defense less costly because ranks are of no interest to them and the size of their salaries does not depend on the number of personnel.

In the United States, England, France, and other developed countries of the world the Ministries of Defense are headed by civilians. This rule ensures effective parliamentary control over the armed forces because the civilian officials that head military departments are not tied to the interests of supreme army echelons. Thus, in the United States, where not a single military coup has been attempted throughout its history, the general staff is under the dual control of the President and the secretary of defense. As far as the servicemen are concerned, they perform only one function—to serve, getting additional pay for risk and combat readiness.

The presence of a civilian in a leadership position at the Ministry of Defense would make it possible to root out the churlishness which seeps into every crack, career ambitions in the worst meaning of the word, and boorishness. Respectable experienced generals use the choicest foul language in the presence of youthful soldiers and denigrate the dignity of officers in front of the ranks. This may be our woe rather than our fault. Our officers, who have been brought up on the principle "I am the boss, you are the fool," rely on repressive forms of relations with their subordinates rather than on behavior norms accepted in normal societies. I still hope that a civilian minister of defense will be a very cultured person who will lead by example in introducing the spirit of democratism, kindness, and a fatherly attitude toward the soldiers in our military collectives. This may be the first step toward rooting out *dedovshchina* [recruit hazing] which, I am convinced, originates in high offices rather than in barracks.

A civilian minister of defense could take a new look at the procedures that prevail in our army and have become part

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and parcel of what we do to such a degree that we no longer notice their pernicious influence on the moral climate in collectives.

For example, why should an officer stay in the barracks around the clock? After all, he has a family and children, for whose upbringing he is also responsible to the state. Is this always required by the needs of service, or is this to obscure the inability to organize the actions of subordinates?

I am certain that the minister of defense can and should play an essential role in this. After all, he is the most vivid example for emulation. If nothing else, recall a recent visit of the U.S. secretary of defense to Ukraine, how naturally and amicably our American guest behaved during the negotiations and how straightforward and constrained his Ukrainian colleague was.

A few years ago, a general of the Polish Armed Forces who came to my regiment stated in an unguarded moment that in the Soviet Army he could tell a commander from his subordinates even from a great distance based on the manner of behavior, gesticulation, and even gait. I think that little has changed for the better in our army, either.

Expectations of democratization in the Army will be in vain for as long as the Ministry of Defense is headed by a general. The dictatorship of power is so great and the generals have been steeled in cadre games to such a degree that all attempts to change are in vain. This system prevents a person from being himself and forces him to give up his principles. Order may be instilled in the Army by dictatorial methods, threats, and churlishness, but this will be a temporary and frail order. In China, they say that "one cannot stand on tiptoes very long." A collective based on such an order will fall apart in the very first trial.

The Ukrainian Supreme Council has already resolved that the minister of defense may be a civilian. This is very correct. I see this as the main step toward effective reform in the Army. It is time to understand that the generals are not interested in either cutbacks in the Army or major reforms. The president should heed the voice of reason—people who are not indifferent to the fate of our Armed Forces.

I am certain that the new membership of the Ukrainian Supreme Council Commission for Defense and State Security Issues will undertake to really carry out military reform without leaving this difficult task solely in the hands of the Ministry of Defense military collegium.

The times call for a minister to come to the Ministry of Defense who is prepared to accept this most difficult mission not for the sake of a higher rank or a leather coat, not for the sake of a ruby star or another rung in his service career. The ability to click one's heels and even combat experience should not be the main criterion in this instance. The Ministry of Defense should be headed by a politician with new thinking who clearly sees the prospects for the organizational development of the Armed Forces of Ukraine under the conditions of a rule-of-law democratic state.

### **Kobzar Cites Impediments, Calls for New Approaches to Discipline**

94UM0485A Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian  
15 Jun 94 p 1

[Article by Lieutenant-General Anatoliy Kobzar, chief of the Main Directorate for Indoctrination Work of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, under the rubric "Discipline: Problems, Inquiries, Solutions": "A Systematic Approach Must Be Instituted—How To Overcome Non-regulation Relations"]

[Text] The incident that occurred in the motorized-rifle regiment commended by Lieutenant-Colonel V. Husarenko cannot be called anything but wild. A group of soldiers headed by Junior Sergeant V. Usenko brutally beat Private V. Yarovyv. The youth was taken to the hospital with many wounds...

How do the commanders and comrades-in-arms look to the parents and relatives of Yarovyv now? He went off to the army, after all, healthy and cheerful, with faith that the experienced servicemen would help him overcome all difficulties on his path of emergence.

There are unfortunately many such examples of nonregulation relations and other gross violations of military discipline. The so-called "elders" in the military unit commanded by Colonel V. Antsupov in particular repeatedly tormented young soldiers. Four servicemen, after imbibing, roused young soldiers from their beds at night and beat them harshly at the end of winter.

The number of desertions has increased in that same regiment, and the number of violations of the Temporary Statute for Garrison and Guard Duty has increased considerably.

This naturally cannot help but be disturbing. It should be pointed out that various measures to improve the state of military discipline have unfortunately not proved to be very effective. Or rather, not effective at all, since they do not correspond to the complex situation in the ranks. The greatest uneasiness is evoked by nonregulation relations, so-called barracks hooliganism and evasions of military service.

We will try to answer the questions of where the stereotype of behavior is formed that permits a soldier willingly to submit to the "elders" and facilitate the nonregulation relations; who is continuing these "traditions"; why the sergeants do not act and why the younger officers do not react to this; and, why the "contract people," the commanders of subunits, senior officers and commanders of companies and battalions, do not concern themselves with these issues.

Why (on a broad plane) do these nonregulation relations persist? Is it a tradition, a requirement of military life, a stereotype of thinking or something else?

Who (on a broad plane) is instilling these traditions in the armed forces of Ukraine? Society? The supervisory personnel? Or is this a consequence of the difficult economic

situation, the economic dependence of the officers, their fear of "exactingness," for their own future?

Why is the number of incidents of absence without leave from the units increasing? Perhaps because there is not proper regulation order? Because legal "boundlessness" exists, the commanders have a bad attitude toward the soldiers, they do not see their subordinates as people with a sense of their own worth, with all of their cares, desires and feelings?

I think that the reasons are both in the nonregulation relations and in an unwillingness to serve. Doubtless also the overall attitude toward the army. Not everything is in order with the legislation—shall we analyze who is being drafted? Responsibility and a patriotic attitude toward army service are lacking in society. All of this cannot fail to arouse serious anxiety among the leaders of the armed forces of Ukraine.

In speaking of absence without leave from units and nonregulation relations, it would be an undoubted mistake to feel that morale and spirit can be formed over a very brief period. You cannot proceed by "cavalry charge" here. It may be recalled that the task was outlined quite strictly in the armed forces of the Union: "eliminate nonregulation relations by the end of the month," "instill regulation order by the end of the year" etc. Time passed, however, and the results were not very considerable. Why? The fact is that this negative phenomenon is more than strictly an army problem.

The primary cause of nonregulation relations, in my opinion, is a national character deformed by Stalinist camps and criminal "zones," hunger and violence, and scorned by soldiers. The lack of spirit, the cruelty, the lack of moral norms, the attempts at self-affirmation at the expense of the weak, have long been elements of public consciousness and have set the agenda for a considerable portion of the young people.

Thus, some 88.5 percent of conscript servicemen indicated in a poll conducted in the armed forces that they have personally experienced physical or moral violence on the part of their fellows, relatives or even parents. Many of them feel violence is a constituent element of human interaction, and were inwardly ready for it to be manifested during their service.

The research also showed that 76 percent of those polled did not see any effective measures to counter violence and humiliation, even though they felt hatred toward those who oppress them. Ninety percent of the servicemen with three or four terms of service are convinced that they have a moral right to impose moral and physical terror in the barracks. This category of servicemen moreover feels violence to be a means of compensation for the humiliations they suffered at the beginning of their service, and a means of gaining authority and personal prestige. There are grounds to feel that way—violence is perceived by some of the army youth, at both the conscious and subconscious levels, as the norm for behavior and interaction.

The erosion of moral points of reference in the officer environment has social roots as well. And as sociological and psychological research shows (and what is most unacceptable), the officers at the platoon and company levels, without knowing how (owing to a lack of experience) to arrange mutual relations with their subordinates, often rely in their work on those who have the authority of force. The barracks hooliganism and physical injustice thus gain, as regrettable as it may be, a semi-official status.

Very troubling is the fact that a considerable portion of the young officers come to the army effectively by force, without any desire to fulfill their constitutional duty. Some 39.4 percent of those polled, research shows, would like to serve under contract, while 30.3 percent of them indicated that they had no personal wish to serve, but "there's nothing you can do." And only 6.4 percent are ready to fulfill their service obligation without hesitation.

More than 60 percent of the young men of draft age, according to the data of the military commissariats, have posture problems by the time they complete their schooling, close to 35 percent have disorders in their cardiovascular system, and close to 30 percent have nervous-psychological disorders. Military practice and special research show that it is precisely the representatives of these categories who get to military units who become the victims of nonregulation relations, are absent without leave from their units and make attempts to take their own lives.

Those convicted of absence without leave explain that among the principal reasons that led them to it were a reluctance to serve in the army, physical injustices and humiliations on the part of their service comrades, and conflicts in the military collective. To these should be added the bad living conditions in some of the units.

Summarizing all of this, one comes to the conclusion that what is required to solve these problems is, **first**, a rise in the vested interest of young people in military service. That could be achieved both through an optimization of service activity and the possibility of selecting the type of service (contract, alternative, term), and through active propaganda work. The propaganda work has to be directed at creating an image for the armed forces of Ukraine as a school of life, and a place where a young person can be physically and morally tempered.

**Second**, the element of criminal liability for absence without leave, which should be in force at any price, could be effective in the future as well.

**Third**, the purposeful formation of a system of interpersonal interaction, with the aim of uniting military collectives and creating an atmosphere of friendship and mutual assistance, has great significance in raising military discipline.

**Fourth**, servicemen must be given broad opportunities to master fields that are useful in the transition to market relations under contemporary conditions during their time in the service.

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And one more thing. It is necessary to create suitable service conditions.

An analysis of some of the socioeconomic problems of nonregulation relations and evasions of military service testifies that we are dealing with persistent stereotypes that have been formed in the public consciousness. There is a direct link between the spiritual decline of society and the spiritual decline of the armed forces.

The spiritual resurrection of the armed forces could occur, however, and I am sure at a rapid rate. The armed forces could moreover become one of the principal sources for the formation of the morality and spirituality of society. That is precisely why a profound investigation of our own shortcomings in moral, military and legal indoctrination is essential. It is important that we do everything in our power, under any conditions, so as to destroy the prevailing stereotypes.

One must unfortunately often see dilettantism, carelessness, irresponsibility and attempts to replace painstaking, everyday work with loud shouts and "blow-ups."

A certain portion of the officer corps today has poor knowledge of the requirements of the Ministry of Defense, and they are not guided by them in their activity. This is proved by the low level of knowledge displayed during the inspections in some of the units and formations of the Carpathian and Odessa military districts. It is also proved by the frivolous resolutions of commanders in documents that define the nature and substance of the activity pertaining to strengthening military discipline and preventing offenses.

Some commanders and senior officers moreover feel that the bodies for indoctrination work bear responsibility for the state of military discipline. They are thus trying to become removed from it. The style and methods of activity of some officers remains at the level of yesterday's notions, and do not conform to the new situation. A superficial analysis of work, a reliance on administrative measures alone, a shallow knowledge of sociopsychological processes that occur in the military collectives—all of this does not permit systematic work with anticipation, or the achievement of position results.

Many plans are developed in the units to strengthen military discipline, but most of them, as practice shows, are not carried out.

The bodies for indoctrination work are having difficulty finding their place in the activity to strengthen military discipline and prevent violations. They lack energy and purpose, as well as any orientation toward the specific person. The level of professional activity by the officers in indoctrination work is too low, and the commanders are virtually not trained at all in working with the personnel.

The bodies for indoctrination work must become the organizers of effective interaction of officers with units and formations, and the coordinators of their efforts to prevent violations and ensure a high level of the moral-psychological state of the personnel.

The practice of summarizing results regarding the state of military discipline and the service of the troops also requires considerable improvement, since the results of verifications testify that a striving to analyze crime statistics and express their emotional attitude toward them and define nonconcrete tasks is at best the principal one among commanders. The personal service activity of specific officers, personal participation in indoctrination work of every senior officer, responsibility for his actions and behavior according to the norms of morality and the law of Ukraine should be analyzed instead. This is topical precisely because shortcomings in the official activity of those to whom the state has entrusted the training and indoctrination of servicemen are at the heart of some of our problems, and acute contemporary problems could be resolved by improving that work alone.

It has become noticeable lately that the command personnel of certain units do not want to take part in indoctrination work, and do not perceive it as a mandatory norm of service.

And more. It must be understood that military discipline is based on the level of the moral-psychological state of the personnel, their attitude toward the fulfillment of their service obligation, and the abilities of the commander to supervise the personnel. And if a commander commits criminal actions for the sake of order, so as to have an effect in the servicemen by force, when other methods have been exhausted, he cannot be blamed for it. That occurs in the armed forces of all civilized countries.

One of the primary measures for the formation of a high spirituality among the personnel, state patriotism and cohesion of the servicemen around the idea of the independence of Ukraine is undoubtedly humanitarian training. It would be expedient to make maximum use of it to establish close ties between the army and the people of Ukraine and their spirituality, morality and culture. It is essential to rely here not only on the commanders of the platoons who conduct the exercises, but also the great scientific potential of the higher educational institutions, enlisting scientists, historians and cultural figures. We have quite a few museums and theaters. Only initiative and a desire to utilize these rich opportunities are lacking.

The demand for classes in humanitarian training is growing, since they will not require any particular expenditures, while the impact on the corresponding organization in strengthening the moral-psychological state of the personnel can be considerable.

I would also like to direct attention to the fact that we are entering into a serious battle with instances of the concealment of offenses, especially barracks hooliganism and evasions of military service. It was ascertained, in a unit of the Carpathian Military District during an inspection, that a third of the officially reported cases of gross violations were covered up. And the discussion concerns not being late to the formation, but absence without leave from the units, the use of alcoholic beverages, or undignified behavior by servicemen during leaves or in discharge.



The fundamental study of this problem of course requires urgent state resolutions, but we should not have a calm attitude toward such things in the local areas either.

It would be expedient to count among the most important areas of the activity of commanders, staffs and bodies for indoctrination work the creation of an integral system aimed at the formation of respect for the laws of Ukraine, a feeling of personal responsibility for the armed defense of the Fatherland, the necessity of the conscious upholding of the requirements of regulations and executive discipline, and unconditional subordination to commanders and senior officers among all categories of servicemen.

The forms and methods of work that used to be employed, and to which the development of the armed forces should be actively linked today, require more active incorporation.

The effective search, development and expansion of new technologies for the management of the social and sociopsychological processes that lie at the heart of the optimal level of military discipline are required. The bodies for indoctrination work should assume the organization and adoption of scientific approaches to the study of the reasons for offenses, predicting the possible development of processes in military discipline and devising immediate and long-term preventive measures.

The institution of conscious regulation order, a rise in exactingness toward oneself and one's subordinates, an improvement in monitoring, a combination of approaches in indoctrination, including ideological work, and sociopsychological support for the vital activity of the troops within a system that also formulates discipline among the personnel are necessary.

I am certain that the aforementioned tasks can be accomplished to the full extent only with the active participation of all structural elements of military administration and the effective interaction of commanders, staffs and the bodies for indoctrination work.

#### **Hudym Stresses Advantages of Education at Military Establishments**

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9 Jun 94 p 1

[Interview with Ministry of Defense of Ukraine Main Directorate for Military Education Chief Major-General Viktor Mykolayovych Hudym by Lieutenant-Colonel Valeriy Korol under the rubric "Perspective": "Military Education: A Table of Ranks for the Schools, Converted Diplomas for the Graduates"]

[Text] *The question of the further improvement of training of cadres at military educational institutions is a very topical one, since "the cadres resolve everything." What prospects in this area are seen by the chief of the Main Directorate for Military Education of the MO [Ministry of Defense] of Ukraine, Major-General Viktor Hudym?*

[Valeriy Korol] Viktor Mykolayovych, rumors have been swirling around the reform of military education for a long time. Many spears have been broken, and many answers have not yet been received. How do you assess the changes that have occurred over the last two years in military education?

[Viktor Hudym] I have become convinced, even over my brief time in my position, that the strategic direction for creating a system of military education has been chosen correctly. Quite a bit has been done over the two years. Serious errors have also been made.

The requirements of the armed forces in some fields were unfortunately not taken into account for a time. The system of military education did not envisage the full coverage of the shortfall of personnel that could take shape in 1997-98. The capacity of some higher educational institutions was not taken into account. The Kiev and Odessa institutes of the ground forces thus ended up "overloaded" with cadets and attendees. The Sevastopol Naval Institute is "underutilized."

The spaces in the military schools, training centers and compounds were allocated to the other ministries and departments in a poorly thought-out manner. At least the most essential—if not all—of them must now be changed.

[Korol] A wave of protests, especially from the local areas, was elicited at one time by the haste with which the military schools were being eliminated. Some of them were unique in their own way, after all. Say, the Zhytomyr Radio Engineering School...

[Hudym] It possessed a strong educational material base, the only one in the former Union.

Today, when the national space program has been adopted and space troops are being created, we have an extreme need for specialists in just that field. We are thus planning to begin training specialists in information processing and flight control of spacecraft, based on the school, starting in the new academic year. The selection for the first year will be this year. The spaces in the second and third years will obviously have to be filled by the transfer of cadets from other higher educational institutions in allied fields to the military-space division.

A new decision is also needed with regard to the Sumy Higher Artillery Command School. The creation of a military-artillery department, with its subsequent conversion into an artillery institute, at Sumy State University is still being planned.

[Korol] Viktor Mykolayovych, the restoration of some of the former educational institutions will nonetheless not provide any opportunity to train armed forces personnel in all of the necessary fields.

[Hudym] I would like to point out that only 55 percent of the required specialists are trained in Ukraine. The training of the personnel who are lacking will be starting from square one. The creation of some new higher educational institutions is thus expected. A military institute for

rear support and transport, for example, based on the Dnipropetrovsk VZRKU. The "matériel" people and specialists in food, fuels and lubricants will be trained there. The institute will also obviously have a department for the railway troops.

The military training departments of Kiev and Lviv universities will in the future become military institutes under those universities.

Instructor personnel are being trained, and their periodic retraining is conducted, at a recently created institute for the humanities.

[Korol] The restoration of old higher educational institutions and the creation of new ones can be done by willful decision. But will they be able to train the personnel at the necessary level?

[Hudym] Our higher educational institutions have to pass difficult tests. I have in mind the accreditation of the military educational institutions, which will make it possible to ascertain the true capabilities of each specific higher educational institution. The educational institutions will be ranked at certain levels in accordance with that, from first to fourth.

The first level of accreditation gives the right to train young specialists, the second baccalaureates, the third specialists and, finally, the fourth—masters along with candidates and doctors of sciences.

All of the higher educational institutions will undergo licensing this year (this is the first stage in accreditation and registration in the state register of Ukraine).

The Accreditation Center of the Ministry of Defense is being created by decision of the Intersector Accreditation Commission and the Collegium of the Ministry of Education. The order for it has been signed by the Minister of Defense.

[Korol] Viktor Mykolayovych, will all of the military higher educational institutions be able to attain accreditation? What is your prediction?

[Hudym] One of the primary requirements pertaining to accreditation is the qualitative features of the professors and instructors. A higher educational institution, for example, needs to have no less than 70 percent of the total number of instructors with academic degrees in order to be accredited at level four—that is, to train masters of sciences. That is perhaps the most difficult problem for us.

Only three higher educational institutions today have the possibility of being accredited—the Kharkiv Military University, the Kiev Institute of the Air Forces, and the Military Institute for Command, Control and Communications.

[Korol] But isn't the gap in the time frames for the training of military specialists who are enlisted men, warrant officers or sergeants, at one half to one year, and officers, at 5–6 years, too large?

[Hudym] It only seems that way at first glance. We are planning to revive the intermediate technical training of military specialists; that is 2–3 years. The category of "junior specialist" is also appearing here. They are trained on the basis of full secondary education. Two problems have yet to be solved for this purpose—the development of the list of positions to which the young specialists may be assigned, and the definition of their service status among the troops: military rank, service under contract, the appropriate remuneration, future prospects in the service, the possibility of continuing their training...

The replacement of some officer positions with warrant officers with a certain level of training is also expected.

[Korol] So what will the size of the system of military education be, in that case?

[Hudym] It will be approximately 12 percent of the size of the armed forces. It should be taken into account, however, that the military higher educational institutions do not train specialists only for the armed forces, but also for the National Guard, the Security Service, the Civil Defense, the State Border Committee and others.

[Korol] The fight to resubordinate the higher educational institutions has been going on for some time. Who will be supervising them now—the educational directorate or the commands of the branches of the armed forces?

[Hudym] The system of military education that is taking shape in Ukraine is fundamentally different from both the traditional system of the former USSR and the contemporary systems that have been adopted in other countries. Almost all of the higher educational institutions in particular cover many fields, and are of an inter-branch nature. They all have structures for post-graduate education—command and staff departments, departments for supervisory engineering personnel—that provide training analogous to that of the former branch academies. It is not economically advantageous to create higher educational institutions along the lines of the branches of service or fields in Ukraine.

The military collegium of the Ministry of Defense that met recently considered the question of the reform of military education, and also discussed the subordination of the higher educational institutions. It is expected that all of the educational institutions—the military university, institutes, divisions, departments, subunits for the military training of the students and the military lycees—will be directly subordinate to the commanders of the branches of the armed forces, the military districts and the chiefs of the directorates in the central apparatus of the Ministry of Defense. The Main Directorate for Military Education is being given the task of overall supervision of the system of military education.

#### **Air Forces Leaders at Vinnytsya Meeting**

94UM0486C Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian  
14 Jun 94 p 1

[Article from press service of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine: "The Fliers Tally the Results"]

[Text] An expanded session of the military council of the Air Forces of Ukraine was held on June 6 in Vinnytsya. The results of combat training of the Air Forces over the winter training period were summarized.

The deputy chief of the combat training department, Colonel S. Onyshchenko, Air Forces Chief of Staff Major-General Yu. Petrov, Deputy Commander for Weaponry Colonel V. Voloshanovskyy and others spoke candidly in their reports on the objective and subjective difficulties that the personnel of the Air Forces encountered in the course of building this branch of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

Deputy General Procurator of Ukraine Major-General of Justice Volodymyr Lelnyk also participated, and spoke at the session of the military council.

The tasks for the summer training period were assigned by Air Forces of Ukraine Commander Lieutenant-General Volodymyr Antonets.

#### **Air Defense Chief Lopatin Comments on Winter Training Results**

94UM0486A Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian 17 Jun 94 p 1

[Interview with Air-Defense Forces of Ukraine Commander Lieutenant-General Mykhaylo Oleksiyovych Lopatin by Lieutenant-Colonel Viktor Korobkov under the rubric "Topical Interview": "The PPO Forces. Responsibility for the Skies of Ukraine"]

[Text] *The results of the winter training period were recently summarized at a military council of the Air-Defense Forces [PPO] of Ukraine. How did the PPO soldiers complete it, what problems and tasks do they face? Our correspondent discussed this with Air-Defense Forces of Ukraine Commander Lieutenant-General Mykhaylo Lopatin.*

[Mykhaylo Lopatin] I think it would be interesting for the readers of NARODNA ARMIYA to find out about the results with which the troops completed the training period. I reviewed the central PPO area, and the chief of the General Staff reviewed one of the SAM [surface-to-air missile] units in accordance with the plan. Certain elements of the SAM and electronics units stationed in the area of Kiev were reviewed by the Minister of Defense under the plan. The review was headed by Chief of the Main Directorate of the PPO Forces Lieutenant-General V. Tkachov.

The missile troops of the unit commanded by Colonel L. Paliy should be singled out. They took a solid "four." Solid regulation order reigns there, there were no violations or crimes this year, normal living conditions have been created and the personnel have been provided with everything. Some 52 percent of the other units were evaluated as "good," and 46 percent as "satisfactory," according to the results of the final review. One unit—a detached airfield technical support battalion commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel S. Bezzemennyy—unfortunately received an unsatisfactory rating. The primary reasons for such a poor

result were the lack of logistical reserves and the unsatisfactory state of routine duty activities of the troops.

The SAM battalions headed by Lieutenant-Colonel V. Yevpak and Major Yu. Nalyvayko also received a "two" owing to poor military discipline. The technical battery commanded by Major Yu. Naboko and two radar companies also received "unsatisfactory" ratings, owing to the state of the hardware and the level of training of the personnel.

The units of the Western Air-Defense District handled the tasks of the winter training period very well.

I would like to single out the competent actions of the alert duty forces in assisting an An-2 aircraft that had lost its bearings while flying from Rivne to Rumania. A helicopter went up from the Mukachevo airfield and led the aircraft to the area of the Uzhhorod airfield, where it was able to land. I think that this incident is worthy of a separate feature.

[Viktor Korobkov] The results are clear. Please tell us, if you can, about the tasks of the summer training period.

[Lopatin] The Minister of Defense has approved a statute on the organization of combat alert duty and a plan of action for the alert duty forces that has been coordinated with everyone who takes part in the combat alert duty of the PPO. The primary efforts will therefore be concentrated on instilling order in our service with regard to the requirements of the guiding documents. The most important task is the organization of command-and-control and the interaction of the PPO manpower and assets with the other branches of the armed forces that are involved in combat alert duty with the PPO.

Problem areas that require resolution undoubtedly include adjustments to our plan. It was not fulfilled over the last period for a number of objective reasons. It must now be refined, and the training of the flight personnel must be organized with a regard for the limits on fuels and lubricants.

We will be devoting the principal attention in the training of the air-defense missile and electronics troops, as in the winter training period, to crew exercises, first and foremost at the training and simulation center [NTTs] of the Air-Defense Forces. Our NTTs, by the way, is unique. None of the states of the former Union has anything like it. Considering that the units are not going out to the practice range today, we are planning to increase the quantity of monitored performance evaluations, giving evaluations of the special training according to the results that are demonstrated at that training and simulation center.

One key problem today is preserving the cadres of young officers. The building of the armed forces of Ukraine loses its prospects without that. The commanders and training officers at all levels should diligently and comprehensively prepare to receive the graduates of the military schools. The lieutenants must be assigned to posts that conform to their specialties, and be assisted in every way possible in accomplishing their everyday problems and finding jobs

for their wives. Today's young officers are the future of our army. I thus personally consider a lieutenant's submission of a request for discharge to be an extraordinary event.

We will also undoubtedly be unable to resolve any issue without a further strengthening of military discipline.

There is one more important task—that of preparing all of the facilities and barracks and housing stock for winter conditions. The funds that have been allocated for that, to our great dismay, are clearly insufficient.

[Korobkov] Mykhaylo Oleksiyovych, a unified PPO system existed at one time in the Soviet Union that also interacted closely with the PPO of the member nations of the Warsaw Pact. I recall that colleagues from the socialist countries were on duty alongside us at the command posts. Does collaboration exist today?

[Lopatin] That is an issue that requires resolution at the international level, and has now virtually been resolved. Documents have been coordinated and signed pertaining to interaction with Poland, Hungary and Belarus. Analogous treaties are now being prepared with the Russian Federation and Rumania.

The presence of direct channels of communication makes it possible to ascertain the purpose of the flight of this or that aircraft in the direction of a state border, and thereby conserve the service life of radar hardware and reduce considerably the number of scrambled takeoffs of fighter aircraft.

By exchanging visits, we have become familiar with the system of training for PPO specialists in neighboring nations and are sharing our experience. The training and simulation center, by the way, has been very highly regarded by the specialists. I repeat that it has no analogue in any of the neighboring nations in its sophistication and extent of approximation of actual conditions. The one that is being created in Russia today is still in the stage of emergence. Ours is operating. We are trying to "run" all of the leading specialists of the ZRV [surface-to-air missile troops] and RTV [electronics troops] through it.

We are constantly exchanging radar information and assisting each other in unforeseen—or, as we say, *force-majeure*—circumstances, as occurred with the An-2 aircraft I was talking about, for example.

Improvement of interaction in the technical realm, relative to the repair of hardware and the acquisition of spare parts, is a special issue. That and, naturally, familiarization and an exchange of models of the hardware that is in service in this or that nation. I think that such contacts will be expanded. We are already performing joint repairs with Poland on MiG-23 aircraft at our enterprises, with the involvement of Polish specialists. We have a vested interest in broader collaboration with Poland, Hungary and Rumania, as well as with Russia. There is a good base for the repair and operation of passive detection gear in the Czech Republic. The future includes the mutual training of specialists. All of the nations are studying this question. I think that it will also be resolved in the near future.

We have reached agreements with neighboring states with regard to joint meetings, during which we will exchange information on the creation of PPO structures, training of specialists and the organization of combat alert duty.

[Korobkov] So it is possible to speak of a unified PPO system?

[Lopatin] One does not exist. Ukraine has created its own PPO system, which is in constant operation and is able to perform all tasks pertaining to detecting means of aerial attack from various directions and, accordingly, activating all measures to repel violations of the state border and the sovereignty of the country.

[Korobkov] What do you see as the prospects for the development of interaction with the neighboring countries?

[Lopatin] We must move as quickly as possible from the signing of papers to true collaboration, first and foremost in the realm of the training of specialists and the maintenance of hardware in a combat-ready state.

Taking into account the fact that our missile attack warning centers are operating in a unified loop in the interests of Russia and Ukraine, joint financing of the expenditures for the maintenance of those facilities is essential.

It is now time, in general, to summarize everything that has been done over the last two and a half years, and to devise a clear-cut plan of interaction with this or that state. The areas of that interaction are not identical, and each has its own specific nature. We would like to collaborate with Hungary, for example, on a program of automating command-and-control processes. They do that better than us.

We must calculate in general how much this or that information costs, and compare it with the cost of maintaining the corresponding facilities. We have two facilities, for example, that are operating in the interests of the Russian Federation and partly for Ukraine. They are unprofitable today, since we do not have all of the information with regard to the monitoring of outer space. We need an automated system for the receipt and processing of that information (from Russia and other nations). Its use is very important to us, since Ukraine wants to be—and will be—a space power.

It should be pointed out, most unfortunately, that Russia still does not want to collaborate very much with Ukraine on many issues. That pertains especially to the realm of space and questions of the further upgrading and procurement of weaponry.

There are other examples as well. We are developing proposals in conjunction with Hungary and Poland to organize interaction among the neighboring electronics battalions. Say a battalion is on alert duty on the Polish side—it will then inform us of the aerial situation as well. We will provide them with such information as well. By instituting this program, we would resolve many other issues as well; an economic plan on a bilateral basis is being



discussed in particular. I would point out that the border with Poland is more than five hundred kilometers, so the impact will be large.

[Korobkov] Will we be able to talk about an open airspace between neighboring countries?

[Lepatov] Yes indeed. That would conform entirely to the position of open skies. Not in the sense of anybody flying wherever they want, of course. Open skies are when one side informs the other that it is planning a flight, what is threatened what is now in the air. It is easier to prevent possible PPO actions that way. I would say also that such interaction with all of the neighboring states would not only strengthen the position of Ukraine, but would also facilitate a lessening of tensions that arise in the use of the airspace.

Such then are the problems that face our PPO Forces today, and these are the tasks that we are resolving.

[Lepatov] That you for the interesting discussion, Mr. Korobkov, thank you very much.

#### 14th Air Force Flight Training Problems Noted

94H M0486 Kiev VEROODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian  
[Article in Russian]

[Editorial] VEROODNA ARMIYA special correspondent Lieutenant Colonel Nykyfor Lysytsya. "A Military Council Is Conducting a 'Flight Investigation'"

[Text] The truth is that there were very few actual flights in the air of the 14th Air Army over the winter training period. This was noted at a session of the Military Council of the army that was held at the end of last week in Lviv. It was attended by summarizing the results of training over the winter period. The report cited quite a few concrete numbers pertaining to the fulfillment of the plan for 1993, and in particular, flight training. I will not quote them here, but will rather just point out that for the most part they did not exceed 20 percent. This indicator is of course not the best. The reason for this situation is well known—the scarcity of fuels and lubricants.

The negative consequences that arise as a consequence of the reduced level of combat training were also discussed. These include the partial—or even complete—loss of flight procedures and qualifications among the pilots, which has a distinctly undesirable effect on the fighting ability of the air units. The ground specialists are also losing their professional skills, since they are not engaged in flight control or support.

There is another negative phenomenon that arises when the rhythm of aviator training is disrupted. Eminent military figures had long since pointed out that when an army is not occupied with its business, it is transformed into a bureaucratic system, and its levels of organization and discipline fall. It self-destructs. This conclusion is unfortunately finding confirmation in our armed forces as well, and especially in the Air Forces. Quite a few examples were cited at the session of the Military Council of gross

violations of the requirements of regulations and laws. The problem of strengthening military discipline in the air units is thus a very acute one today. The commanders of the air army see increased exactingness toward commanders at all levels, the institution of regulation order and the strict punishment of both the perpetrators themselves and their commanders as the way of improving matters. Time will tell what results those measures will have.

## BALTIC STATES

### Lithuania's Armed Forces Profiled

94H 10604 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 16 Jul 94 p 2

[Article by Nikolay Plotnikov, NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA military correspondent, under the heading "Details": "The Armed Forces of the Republic of Lithuania: NG Continues Introducing Armies in the Former Republics of the USSR to Its Readers"]

[Text] Components: infantry, air force and naval forces. The core of the infantry consists of the Gelezinis Vilkas [Iron Wolf] Brigade, which is comprised of eight battalions with a total force of approximately 6,000. There are plans to create several more battalions of this type. Their structure is based on the principles of rapid deployment: relatively light weaponry, effective means of transporting units to any region, mobility and a high level of training. The air force has four L-39 aircraft manufactured in former Czechoslovakia, one transport plane contributed by the FRG, An-2 aircraft and helicopters. The navy has two frigates and two torpedo boats acquired from Russia's Baltic Fleet, as well as several support vessels. The president of the republic is commander-in-chief of Lithuania's armed forces. All the most important defense-related issues are reviewed and coordinated by the State Defense Council. Leadership: the minister of national defense, Linas Linkevicius, born 1961, by training an electrical engineer. Commander of the Lithuanian Army, Gen Jonas Andriskevicius, born 1944. Andriskevicius is a 1967 graduate of the Leningrad Higher General Military Command School and a 1976 graduate of the Military Academy imeni M. V. Frunze. He served in various posts in the Soviet Army. Air force commander is Col Zenonas Vegelevicius. In command of the navy is Commander Raimondas Baltuska. The duties of chief of the General Staff are performed by Col Gintaras Tamulaitis, a candidate of military sciences who trained at the Military Academy imeni M. V. Frunze. Officer training is conducted at a school operated by the Ministry of National Defense and in a number of Western European countries. By decision of the Council of Baltic Heads of State a battalion of peacekeeping forces called the "Baltbat" is now being created and will be stationed in Alitus. The battalion will be comprised of one company from the army of each Baltic state. In the near future there are plans to send one platoon from the Lithuanian company to Bosnia for training on observer status alongside Danish peacekeeping forces.

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## CAUCASIAN STATES

### Cadre Problems Key Issue for Military

944K1719B Baku AZERBAJDZHAN in Russian  
9 Jul 94 p 3

[Report by KHABAR-SERVIS correspondent E. Makhmudov: "According to State Adviser, the Time Has Come To Search for Peaceful Settlement of the Conflict Instead of Propagandistic War"]

[Text] Ambassador Vafa Guluzade, the foreign policy state adviser, delivered a report on the organizational development of the National Army of Azerbaijan at the conference "Military Support for Democratization in Europe," organized by the headquarters of the U.S. Armed Forces in Europe. The Azerbaijani diplomat told a KHABAR-SERVIS agency correspondent that this gathering discussed such issues as the military's relation to politics, its role in providing humanitarian help, and the use of the military in the hot spots of the planet.

In his report, V. Guluzade told of the difficulties in the development of Azerbaijan's Armed Forces, where the main problem, by fault of the former USSR leadership, is the shortage of skilled military cadres, since most servicemen of Azerbaijani origin served in noncombatant units.

The state adviser also voiced support for the NATO Partnership for Peace program, which Azerbaijan has joined. "While in the past, peace and stability were based on the confrontation of two camps—socialist and capitalist—after the disintegration of the USSR the world order must be based on cooperation among developed countries and the states that have formed as a result of this disintegration, and the countries of the former Warsaw Pact. In this connection, cooperation between the military will play an important role," said the state adviser.

### Improved Social Services for Military

944K1781B Yerevan RESPUBLIKA ARMENIYA  
in Russian 13 Jul 94 p 1

[Unattributed article: "The President Has Issued an Edict"]

[Text] On 11 July 1994, Republic of Armenia President Levon Ter-Petrosyan signed the Edict "On Additional Measures To Improve Social Support for Servicemen and Their Family Members." The edict exempts from the payment of fees for instruction in schools and preschool facilities the children of servicemen and freedom fighters who have died defending the Republic of Armenia or became disabled as a result of combat actions. The Republic of Armenia Government has been instructed to provide in the draft state budget, effective in 1995, funds for repaying the interest on credit extended to the families of fallen servicemen for individual apartment construction, as well as to provide funds for the relatives of servicemen to take care of the tombs of the fallen, buried outside of the Yeralbur pantheon.

### Military Firearms Banned in Baku

944K1788B Baku BAKINSKIY RABOCHIIY in Russian  
15 Jul 94 p 2

[AZERTADZH report: "In the Name of the Citizens' Tranquillity"]

[Text] To prevent negative phenomena connected with the bearing and use of firearms and bladed weapons and explosives and to ensure the safety of the peaceful population and also to prevent the appearance on the streets and in public places of Baku of servicemen without the appropriate papers and civilians, the chief of the Baku Garrison, Colonel R. Amirov, first deputy chief of the General Staff of the Azerbaijan Republic Armed Forces, has issued orders banning the carrying of weapons and regulating the wearing of military uniform on the territory of the garrison.

Wearing field service dress outside of the units in the Baku Garrison is henceforward prohibited. The appearance of servicemen in the city shall be limited to the minimum.

## CENTRAL ASIAN STATES

### Altynbayev Reviews Armed Forces Readiness

944K1807A Almaty KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA  
in Russian 15 Jul 94 p 2

[Article by Aybas Syzdykov, KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA: "Air Force Is the Target...of Journalists"]

[Text] A press conference conducted in Aktyubinsk by General Lieutenant M.K. Altynbayev, commander of the Kazakhstan Air Force, was dedicated to the formation of the Kazakhstan Air Force, a difficult accomplishment.

The Kazakhstan Air Force is today outfitted with fairly sophisticated aircraft and aviation equipment. The aircraft comprise fourth-generation supersonic fighter-bombers, ground-attack planes, helicopters, and military transport aircraft. The Kazakhstan Air Force is fully handling its entrusted mission—to defend the borders and airspace of Kazakhstan. When necessary, 90 percent of aviation assets can become airborne to accomplish the mission. At the present time, however, these assets are basically standing idle on the airfields. There are many reasons for this. First of all, the lack of funds is having a critical effect. Matters are reaching the point where every flight training mission is personally approved by the Air Force commander. There is a shortage of petroleum, oil, lubricants, and spare parts.

The personnel problem is especially acute. Air Force units are manned to the 50-70 percent strength level, and the exodus of people continues. Military specialists are being discharged and are leaving for Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus. In order to replenish the ranks of Air Force units with competent, qualified specialists, the Kazakhstan Air Force School was opened as part of the Aktyubinsk Civil Aviation Higher Flight Training Academy. The school will train aircraft and helicopter pilots, airspace management specialists, engineers, and other technical specialists. The

Air Force School was established without any additional investment of monetary assets. Already existing large-scale production bases, major training and laboratory facilities, highly qualified flight instructor personnel, engineers, technicians, instructors, and professors—all were set in motion to accomplish this.

Responding to a question concerning interaction between the Kazakhstan Air Force and Russia, M.K. Altynbayev noted that Russia and Kazakhstan advocate a unified defense space, unified operational planning, and proceeding from this—the prospect of unified defensive armament, joint combat patrolling, and mutual assistance. He stated that no one today will be able to confront an enemy in isolation.

Many questions were posed to the commander of the Kazakhstan Air Force at this press conference—on the combat capabilities of aircraft and helicopter assets, cooperation with the republic's civil aviation department, contacts with NATO, and the housing and everyday living conditions of servicemen. After all, none of us can be indifferent to the fate of the Air Force of sovereign Kazakhstan.

#### **Defense Industry Conversion Decree Noted**

944K1750A Almaty *PANORAMA* in Russian No 27, 9 Jul 94 p 9

[Unattributed report: "The Cabinet of Ministers Has Adopted the Decree: "Measures for Realization of the Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on Conversion of the Defense Industry"]

[Text] The Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Kazakhstan recently adopted the decree "Measures for Realization of the Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on Conversion of the Defense Industry."

The decree provides for a number of priority administrative measures of the government that it has been forced to adopt in connection with the progress of conversion.

The Ministry of Economics is prior to 30 November 1994 in conjunction with the Ministry of Industry, the Ministry of Science and New Technology, the Ministry of Energy, and other interested departments to have made an analysis of the actual state of all enterprises and institutions that it is now customary to rank in the conversion category.

After full information on the state of the defense industry has been obtained, a republic program of conversion, which will be prepared by the Ministry of Economics in conjunction with the Ministry of Industry and other interested departments, is to appear within three months' time.

Similar programs are to be presented, for their part, by the chiefs of the oblast administrations and also of the cities of Almaty and Leninsk.

One further program, which will be handled by the State Property Committee in conjunction with the Ministry of Economics, is to determine the conditions of the privatization of "individual units of the property complex of the

converted enterprises with the funds thus obtained being channeled into the financing of conversion programs." It is also to determine "the procedure of the conservation of unique narrowly specialized equipment freed up as a result of conversion."

The decree is prior to the adoption of global programs to afford defense industry a number of advantages, which will include the allocation, as a priority, of foreign currency loans for the preparation and organization of civilian processes, and the Kazkontrakt Corporation has been ordered "as a priority, to help the conversion enterprises to acquire resources." The decree also promises an absence of problems with the transfer to the books of the local administrations of defense industry's general amenities and welfare facilities and funds "for the retraining of the personnel of the conversion enterprises."

Understandably, such a prospect is none too reassuring for the personnel itself. Such decisions illustrate, rather, the impotence of the government, which does not know how it should handle the industrial potential that has come totally unexpectedly into its hands. There is no guarantee that even the modest priorities that have been determined in the decree will not remain merely paper priorities.

#### **Labor Protests Defense Plant Conditions**

944K1665A Almaty *KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA* in Russian 30 Jun 94 p 1

[Article by Konstantin Kim, *KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA*: "Word of Honor Has Lost Value"]

[Text] The collective of one of the largest enterprises in the oblast—the Kazakkumulyator joint-stock company—has decided to begin a strike in the early days of July and to picket the city and oblast administrations. The workers intend to resort to this extreme measure unless their demands are met as set forth in the petition sent to the local authorities.

An enterprise that at one time was progressive and worked for defense has today found itself in a critical situation. Whereas two or three years ago the primary cause was thought to be the decline of production because of the reduction of military orders and the severing of business ties, mutual nonpayment has now been added to that. This is an especially local problem. The AO [joint-stock company] owes 5.4 million tenge just for electric power. But in late May the power was cut off altogether, so that the shops and boiler rooms were shut down. As of 1 July water was also turned off to the alkaline battery plant, because it has an unpaid water bill of more than 2 million tenge. At the same time, Oblteplokommunenergo and the city of Taldykorgan went into debt almost 18 million tenge for water. The trouble is that more than half of the housing stock, enterprises, and organizations in the oblast center use hot water and heat from its boiler room. You cannot count on the city, this is the second summer the public has had no hot water. There is every reason to believe that the city will freeze this winter. Work in the boiler room to prepare for the heating season came to a halt because there

was no money. The AO cannot pay bills for supplies and spare parts. The coal that is arriving is not being unloaded. The enterprise's work force has itself been without work for two months.

As a matter of fact, throughout the entire last heating season, the plant supplied the city and hot water gratis, on the word of honor of the leaders of the local administration. When the time came to settle up, the collective was confronted with the fact that the treasury is empty. The workers responded to this by asking the leaders of the city and oblast the sensible question: Why then are the people who write the budget regularly receiving their salaries, when they themselves are hardly able to make ends meet?

In its petition, the Kazakkumulyator collective demanded that the enterprise be allowed to collect the debt from Oblteplokommunenergo and other debtors unconditionally. That money would be more than enough to pay off the debts to the electric power distributor and the oblast water and sewer department, to pay wages, and to resume operation.

The motor pools of the Taldykorganavtokolik joint-stock company have also been carrying freight on a word of honor—without advance payment. They have worked themselves into a loss. The enterprise's debt amounts to 24 million tenge. More than half of the fleet is idle because of

the grave financial situation. They have nothing with which to buy fuel, lubricants, spare parts, tires. The drivers have not been paid for months.

The truckers were putting great stock in the clearing of delinquent debt conducted by decree of the president of the Republic. But in the end they received, as Yermek Yesbatyrov, the company's general manager, put it, 'the hole in the bagel,' although the company is operating in the black. They have more than 18 million tenge on the plus side. But that money is frozen in a special account in a branch of the National Bank. Somehow they managed to free up 4.5 million tenge. That was barely enough to pay part wages to the drivers. The other 14 million are not being unfrozen. So far, appeals to the oblast administration and the government have not helped.

"In that case, we do not understand why the clearing was done," Ye. Yesbatyrov said in surprise. "Enterprises are still in a vicious circle of nonpayment, just as they were before. We cannot obtain the money we have earned from customers. Which means that we have nothing with which to pay for gasoline, diesel fuel, and lubricants. Neftesnab in turn has nothing with which to obtain fuel. The time is coming when the harvest has to be hauled, a new cycle will start all over again. Again they will force us to work for a word of honor."



## ARMS TRADE

### Legislation on Aviation Technology Export Controls

944D0071A Moscow PRAVO I EKONOMIKA  
in Russian No 9, 26 Apr 94 (Signed to press 25 Apr 94)  
p. 3

[“Decree of the Russian Federation Government No. 189, 9 March 1994, ‘On Confirmation of the Statute on Procedure for the Manufacture of Avionics and Dual-Use Technologies and Export Versions of Military Aviation Technology and Equipment For It With the Use of Investments’”]

[Text] The Russian Federation Government decrees:

1. To confirm the attached Statute on Procedure for the Manufacture of Avionics and Dual-Use Technologies and Export Versions of Military Aviation Technology and Equipment For It With the Use of Investments, elaborated by the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense and coordinated with the Russian Federation State Committee for Defense Sectors of Industry.

2. That the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense shall present to the Russian Federation Government, during the second quarter of 1994, a draft federal investment program for the manufacture of avionics and dual-use technologies and export versions of military aviation technology and equipment for it for the period prior to the year 2000. The draft program shall have been coordinated with concerned ministries and departments and provide for the inclusion of investment projects developed by the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense (Air Force) and the all-Russian association Russian Aviation Fund out of non-budget funds obtained from sales of aviation equipment in 1992-1993.

[Signed] Chairman of the Russian Federation Government  
V. Chernomyrdin

#### Statute on Procedure for the Manufacture of Avionics and Dual-Use Technologies and Export Versions of Military Aviation Technology and Equipment For It With the Use of Investments

1. This statute is developed in accordance with Directive of the Council of Ministers—Government of the Russian Federation No. 1392-r, dated 9 August 1993, and determines the activity conditions, as well as the basic functions and rights of participants, in projects to manufacture avionics and dual-use technologies and export versions of military aviation technology and equipment for it with the use of investments (henceforth referred to as avionics and dual-use technologies).

2. Participants in investment activity include the investor (general investor), general client, and developer (main developer) of the project

The investor (general investor) in a project to manufacture avionics and dual-use technologies may be a physical or juridical person, including foreigners

The main developer is responsible for the cooperative effort of all developers participating in the implementation of individual investment projects and the federal investment program for manufacturing avionics and dual-use technologies and export versions of military aviation technology and equipment for it for the period prior to the year 2000, as well as for series production output.

3. The legal relationships among investment activity participants are established on a contract basis between the investor (general investor), the general client, and the developer (main developer).

4. Investment activity entities include newly built and modernized aircraft, including series production aircraft, their component and spare parts, outfitting and equipment used in aircraft, scientific-technical production output and technological processes used in aircraft manufacture, consumer goods produced with the use of aviation technologies, materials, and production capacities, as well as modernized airfields and airfield structures, housing, and production infrastructure.

Transport and sporting aircraft (helicopters), scientific-technical production output, and dual-use aviation equipment and other property may be sold to the investor as compensation for funds invested.

Export combat and training aircraft (helicopters), airfields, airfield structures, as well as certain types of equipment, scientific-technical production output, and technological processes specially stipulated by contract do not constitute entities investment in the development of which entails acquisition by the investor of right of ownership to them. In these instances, the contract envisages the possibility of subsequent investor participation in income obtained from the sale and use of such entities.

5. The general client for a project to manufacture avionics and dual-use technologies is the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense (Air Force), which ensures compliance with a unified scientific-technical policy and protection of the scientific and technological achievements of the state

The Russian Federation Ministry of Defense (Air Force) makes decisions on the expansion of specific investment programs, determines the investor (general investor), places orders on a contract basis jointly with the investor (general investor) at industrial enterprises for development and production of specific types of aviation equipment, provides investors payment documents with respect to payment for work performed and output manufactured, and engages in the presentation of complaints and filing of claims on behalf of investors through the requisition system of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense (Air Force) in accordance with normative acts on procedure for the manufacture of military avionics

6. The Russian Federation Ministry of Defense (Air Force) shall ensure:

—conformance of the tactical and technical characteristics and qualities of manufactured avionics to the tactical

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and technical mission, and to the requirements of state (sector) standards and other normative acts;

- accomplishment of the volume of work, testing, and acceptance of finished production output as prescribed by technical documentation within the time frame determined in the contract, along with registration of the necessary official documents (licenses) on acceptance (certification).

## DEFENSE INDUSTRY

### Institute Head on Problems in Defense Conversion

94UM0501A Moscow DELOVOY MIR in Russian  
5 Jun 94 p 8

[Interview with Aleksey Nikolayevich Shulunov, director of Central Radiotechnical Scientific Research Institute, president of the League for Assistance to Defense Enterprises, by DELOVOY MIR columnist Moisey Gelman, date, place and occasion not specified, under rubric "Production": "Semineglected Conversion"; photograph of Shulunov included]

[Text] *Conversion of military-industrial complex enterprises cannot be viewed or conducted in isolation, separate on the one hand from realization of new military doctrine and the rearming of the Army connected with it, and on the other hand from the reform of our unbalanced economy. DELOVOY MIR columnist Moisey Gelman talks about problems of conversion and development paths with Aleksey Shulunov, president of the League for Assistance to Defense Enterprises, director of Central Radiotechnical Scientific Research Institute.*

[Gelman] The majority of military-industrial complex enterprises belong to the state. As postwar experience shows, they will not be able to change their kind of activity with greatest benefit for society without a proprietary hand. Aleksey Nikolayevich, in your view what kind of strategy and management of conversion should there be?

[Shulunov] Conversion of the military-industrial complex is being carried out for the second time in the last 50 years. While conversion went rather quickly and in an organized manner after the end of the Great Patriotic War inasmuch as it was based on a rigid, state, planned, industrial and financial policy, the present one is spontaneous: its successes depend fully on the decision of each of the approximately 3,000 independently functioning military-industrial complex enterprises—plants, OKB [special design bureaus], scientific research institutes. This occurs as a result of an insufficiently considered conversion ideology and because of the absence of funds, of clear prospects for producing both defense as well as necessary civilian products, of an effective financing mechanism, of corresponding regulatory documents, and of a market infrastructure. But perhaps the most important reason for the present failures of conversion is the psychology of economic and state leaders of all ranks and of specialists, which remains the same as before: they can create and

manufacture products, but for now without proper consideration of market needs and they cannot carry on trade in the products. Therefore first and foremost it was necessary to develop conceptual approaches, clearly understand our goals based on what we have and what we wish to reform, and determine the rules of the game for all and for each enterprise.

Military-industrial complex enterprises were producing a clear surplus of military equipment and arms whose export was strongly reduced in recent years while consumption within the country has been cut back substantially. At the same time, many technologies of military-industrial complex enterprises are obsolete and their products do not always conform to modern demands.

Our commodity production never has been balanced, especially now after disintegration of the USSR. We were purchasing materials, semimanufactures, complete sets, dyes and chemicals as well as final products abroad for an annual average of \$30 billion. Therefore it is necessary to assess our needs for particular products that previously were imported and begin producing them here after converting the corresponding enterprises. Thus, money must be invested above all in those technologies which will allow saving currency. For example, in Soviet times oilmen would purchase five billion dollars worth of equipment annually. After disintegration of the USSR, seven billion dollars worth already is required in Russia today.

Another vast sphere requiring its share of conversion consists of the technologies of harvesting, processing, transporting and storing farm products. Their imperfection turns into annual losses of approximately 30 percent of the harvest.

Military-industrial complex enterprises use numerous technologies previously inaccessible to the remaining part of industry because they were classified. Today their transfer to all sectors of the national economy is necessary.

There also are other strategic directions of conversion. But conversion will be doomed without a planned state policy. Not only our postwar experience, but also the unsuccessful experience of conversion conducted in the United States during the 1960's and 1970's attests to the need to conduct such a policy. Having ended up without state support, approximately 90 percent of U.S. companies failed, among them also the famous firm of Boeing, which was attempting to master production of intercity buses. Having replaced the word "plan" with "market," we thereby separated state tasks from state management functions, although we try to conduct conversion on a pseudoplanned basis. But it is impossible to be just a little pregnant.

[Gelman] Conversion programs are to be developed and introduced in a package of measures for building a balanced market economy. What do you see these ways to be?

[Shulunov] With all the shortcomings of our present economic system, which is devoid of market feedback, the rejection of macroeconomic planning of production based on an intersectorial balance was a serious, even tragic

mistake. Dashing from one extreme, where everything from needles to aircraft was planned and distributed, to the other, total anarchy, is called a transition period for some reason, although specifically macroeconomic planning would have been the necessary foundation for indicative reform management, including conversion. The fact is, such planning is an invariable attribute of government activity in any developed country. If 75 percent of our gross domestic product [GDP] consists of means of production and the rest is means of consumption, then we cannot get by without centralized intervention in order at least to equalize these portions. It is like in a band: no matter how good its musicians may be as professionals, without a director and a score there will be cacophony instead of a composition. Therefore it is necessary to write a score for reforms and outline the range and descriptions of commodities which are of great state importance. Then the ways of structural perestroika of the economy will become clear and it will be necessary to give all kinds of support to manufacturing that product which enjoys a demand on the world market. Many enterprises naturally will prove to be unnecessary, but they will be abolished or converted according to the plan, while thinking first of all about people and their retraining. Today each enterprise is being reformed according to its own understanding, often increasing the imbalance of commodity production.

[Box insert] In the assessments of experts, our present conversion will last 7-10 years and will require approximately \$150 billion. Essentially only R117 billion (in 1992 prices) were allocated for conversion over the last two years. The cost of conversion is commensurable with volumes of GDP, and brushing aside problems of its financing means becoming like the ostrich: neither enterprises' own funds nor private capital is enough for its implementation. [End box insert]

[Gelman] Such chaos may lead to another crisis phase—overproduction of a particular product. Recently 19 new enterprises for producing television sets were created on account of conversion, although I recall that in the late 1980's the sets, even color sets, were being sold on credit because of overproduction.

[Shulunov] The danger of overproduction and of a qualitatively new crisis phase is not precluded. This is why the creation of a balanced economy is required, which is impossible without centralized planning and restoration of a credit and financial system. Unfortunately, credits and finances today have been separated from commodity production, although they are called upon to service it and cannot exist independently. Speculation in money leads only to its devaluation. Today it is not commodity production that is the priority for us, but the fight against inflation by any methods.

[Gelman] Conversion programs of military-industrial complex enterprises must be coordinated with Russia's new military doctrine. What are its fundamental provisions with respect to rearming the Army?

[Shulunov] The new military doctrine only declares the need for its rearming. Therefore a long-range program of

rearming and technical modernization of the Army must be developed. Often 8-10 years go by from development of new weapon systems to their mass introduction to the troops, and they usually are operational for 25-30 years. During this time military strategy and tactics change, and so Army weapons and equipment are improved. These factors also must be taken into account in a future program. But the important thing is the creation of precision weapons and modern means of rapid troop movement, and also restoration of strategic arms to the level of defense sufficiency, inasmuch as a considerable portion of them remained in former Union republics.

The absence of a program for rearming prevents seriously planning and beginning the reform and conversion of military-industrial complex enterprises, since it is not known which of them should continue to work on defense and which should change their kind of activity.

[Gelman] The uncertainty with military orders and with the financing forces many enterprises to remain hostages of the existing situation. They found themselves threatened with destruction, which is fraught with serious consequences not only for national security, but also in the social sphere: on the order of 15 million persons are employed there (together with the service infrastructure). What must be undertaken to prevent a breakdown of the military-industrial complex?

[Shulunov] This depends not so much on the military as on the government and Federal Assembly, which finally are obligated to resolve problems of financing defense orders and conversion and to come to a precise agreement that budget appropriations for defense should be reduced, for example, from 18 percent of GDP in 1989 to 6 percent in 2000. But these decisions again are connected with development of a long-range arms program which also takes financing of the program into account. And for now military-industrial complex enterprises are forced to take credits to fulfill state orders due to the state debt and the absence of working capital. Last year alone they paid R400 billion to repay credit, while the state continues to be their debtor.

[Gelman] In your opinion, how should conversion be financed?

[Shulunov] An incorrect scheme of financing conversion projects is a fundamental mistake of organizers of the present avalanching, chaotic conversion. The fact is, both client and performer as a rule act in the form of one person, the conversion enterprise, and projects are financed through commercial banks and without necessary control. The result of this was parallelism in developing new conversion products. For example, 12 plants simultaneously mastered production of oil producing pumping units, while three plants can satisfy the requirement for them. In addition, up to 70-80 percent of allocated funds did not reach conversion enterprises or were placed at their disposal with an enormous delay. It ended up where conversion credits actually went to pay off commercial banks.

In our opinion, conversion money must be allocated to the client of civilian products (transport workers, gas workers,

oilmen, farmers and so on), who will select for themselves the performers of conversion programs on a competitive basis. With such financing the client also is capable of finding additional funds if he is interested in realizing his project. Conversion projects must have serious technical and economic grounds and undergo independent expert examination. With meager state financing, it is necessary to make wide use of funds of various joint stock companies and banks and also attract foreign capital.

It is necessary to attract commercial banks for allotting conversion credits under the following conditions: impermissibility of diverting allocated resources for commercial credits to third parties; precise determination of time periods for drawing up documents connected with obtaining credits; harsh sanctions with respect to commercial banks for violating terms of granting credit; Russian Central Bank supervision over the activity of commercial banks financing conversion projects.

A merger of various financial structures with production is inevitable under conversion. It would appear to be most rational to accumulate money intended for conversion financing in regions in the corresponding oblast, kray and republic conversion assistance funds. Fund income should be formed from allocations from the local budget and contributions from interested commercial structures with any form of ownership, from enterprises, from fund founders and so on. The state could support such funds by granting them tax exemptions and cost benefits.

It is very important that conversion projects be financed continuously (in 1992 money came in July and in 1993 it came in August). And the military-industrial complex could do this in part independently, above all from extrabudgetary funds, and also from the wide export of arms and military equipment. The fact is, a decrease of state orders for arms and military equipment by no means always permits partially curtailing production capacities. This concerns flow-line technologies above all. Take aircraft production. Whether ten or a hundred are needed, one still must keep the entire production line in working capacity without reducing costs. Therefore defense enterprises must be given wide freedom for arms export in order to make effective use of the present potential of the military-industrial complex and earn funds for conversion.

[Box insert] Splendid technological equipment has been created in the Leningrad Mekhanobr Association for recycling many kinds of military equipment, and its production also must be included in corresponding conversion programs. [End box insert]

[Gelman] How is conversion going today?

[Shulunov] Over the last two years around a thousand conversion programs, including 14 federal programs, have been developed and have undergone expert examination. They include "Russian Navy Revival," "Civilian Aircraft Development," "Developments and Production of New Kinds of Medical Equipment" and so on. In addition, regional programs have been developed in Moscow, St. Petersburg and Udmurtia, in Sverdlovsk and Rostov

oblasts and so on, but they also are [not] being fulfilled because of poor financing. The fact is, money was allocated only for a tenth of all programs.

One should note successes of defense enterprises in creating new passenger aircraft (particularly the IL-96 and IL-204) and helicopters. Military-industrial complex enterprises will take part in designing high-speed railroads, developing the Barents Sea oil shelf, and creating petrochemical equipment. The domestic industry, including the military-industrial complex, is capable of rapidly mastering production of the entire necessary set of equipment for the oil and gas industry for that money which we spend annually on its import.

There are tens of thousands of possible conversion projects. It is impossible to enumerate them all. I would like to note that even under the present unfavorable conditions, the defense establishment somehow is building up the manufacture of civilian products by approximately 2 percent annually.

[Gelman] Obviously one direction for conversion of the military-industrial complex is the introduction of technologies for recycling arms and military equipment and other property. It is no secret that an enormous amount of written-off ships, tanks and aircraft have accumulated in the Army. At the same time, there is not enough scrap for smelting metals and so the amount of ore used for this has grown. Military electronic equipment with gold-containing components is written off each year, but industry does not recover it. There are enormous reserves for further (but now civilian) use of many engines and vehicles which have served their time in the Army, but are suitable in peacetime life after some renovation. Much more can be enumerated that is subject to recycling. The profit from secondary use of military property which has used up its life can be enormous. What place is set aside in conversion programs for secondary recovery and use of resources?

[Shulunov] For a long time there has not been the amount of garbage dumps and equipment graveyards in a single leading country such as we have. Their recycling is a component part of world industrial production. In particular, half of the metals abroad are smelted from scrap. Here too we finally have turned to recycling. A corresponding program has been developed within the framework of conversion, subsidies for which will be needed only for recycling strategic nuclear missiles; it will be profitable for all the rest. I will give just one example. Over the last 20 years around a thousand tons of gold were used in our military equipment, not to mention other valuable as well as rare-earth metals. And we have to introduce technologies for their complex recovery by building corresponding concentration factories.

With respect to turning written-off tanks and ships into scrap metal, microexplosion methods have been developed for this that are more productive than conventional gas cutting. And commercial enterprises are ready to take up this work; only an appropriate organization of matters is needed.



**[Gelman] What must be undertaken for wide involvement of private capital in conversion?**

[Shulunov] This requires above all normalizing the general economic situation in the country. Businessmen do not wish to invest money for long-term projects because of the continuous devaluation of the ruble. They undertake investments basically when recoupment of investments does not exceed a year. Nevertheless, the ice has begun to break. The most far-sighted business people invested their money in creating new civilian aircraft and refrigerators. There are plenty of completed developments awaiting their hour of introduction.

Many already understand that reform of our economy is impossible without conversion of the military-industrial complex, but if it is not properly financed and managed, then all conversion programs will turn out to be hare-brained schemes. Like Earth, you will not create conversion from chaos without the direction of a "superior office"—like the market economy as a whole, by the way.

**Nuclear Shipbuilding Center Hit by Conversion Failure**

94UM0496A Moscow *SEGODNYA* in Russian 7 Jul 94 p. 3

[Article by Yuri Golotyuk under rubric "The 'Vavorok': "Russia's Nuclear Might Is Maintained Free at the Northern Machine Building Enterprise: Nuclear Powered Submarine Builders Have Not Yet Coped With Conversion"]

[Text] It is not precluded that electricity will be turned off in Severodvinsk tomorrow or the day after, as there is no money to pay the power workers. Local boiler rooms already have cleaned out the solid and liquid fuel reserves: the heating season had to be ended a month earlier than usual, and hot water also stopped coming to homes on 24 June. This would not be too bad—it is an average little Russian city of 300,000 in far-off Arkhangelsk Guberniya... But the fact is, in this case TsAS, the state Nuclear Shipbuilding Center, the only yard in Russia and the largest in Europe from whose shipbuilding ways nuclear powered submarines are launched, also will not receive power.

Federation Council Chairman Vladimir Shumeyko, who visited Severodvinsk at the end of last week, was met at the gates of the Sevmash PO [Northern Machine Building Enterprise Production Association] by one lone picket protesting against the Ministry of Defense delaying payment of money for military orders fulfilled by Severodvinsk personnel (no less than R250 billion). One need not be surprised—they have become too accustomed to visits by leaders here: the entire Russian leadership has called on Sevmash in recent times. The only one who did not come was Gaydar. They were already preparing for his visit here, but Yegor Timurovich was removed from his position prematurely... (Of all recent visitors only one delegation, that of the Grand Duke House of Romanov, drew a crowd of the curious at the enterprise: it was interesting, they are

princes after all.) In addition, military-industrial complex enterprises always had a reputation for harsh discipline; to this day protest actions here are considered a sign of ill breeding. And no matter how difficult things may be, defense industry workers believe in the State as in God—in the State with a capital "S," whether it be the Union, Russia or whatever. One can understand them in principle. Just as it had a state order for producing nuclear powered submarines, so the Nuclear Shipbuilding Center has it to this day. Nineteen nuclear powered submarines of two modifications now stand in various degrees of readiness on shipbuilding ways of the Northern Machine Building Enterprise Production Association: here they build the Tayfun, which carries strategic missiles, and the Bars, armed with cruise missiles. And the shipbuilders were not told about a single one of them: "Give it up, we don't need it." This is understandable: according to international agreements, silo missiles in Russia's nuclear strategy must fade into the background in the future and concede their place to submarine-based missiles. And correspondingly, to deprive oneself of a production base putting out missile-carrying submarines essentially would signify rejection of nuclear weapons in general for Russia. The last bottle of champagne was broken against the hull of a newly built submarine which exited the enterprise caisson gate just a month ago. The next one was planned to be launched in the fall, but... There have been difficulties with set-completing articles, many of which were being manufactured outside of Russia in Ukraine and Moldova... It seems the time limits will be totally wrecked.

Yes, of course, nowadays Sevmash is far from what it was previously. "More than half of today's Russian submarine fleet order of battle slid right from these ways; in our best times we launched an average of four submarines a year," says Sevmash Deputy Chief Engineer Oleg Maksimenko with nostalgia. "I will not say how many we are building now, these are classified figures, but believe me, it is incomparably fewer." Severodvinsk's shining hour fell in the mid-1970's, when the enterprise was renovated for producing the new series of Tayfun strategic missile-carrying submarines. Financing was practically unlimited: the important thing was to catch up with and overtake America under water! Several unfinished shops remain as a monument to those bright times for Sevmash people: money for their completion is not anticipated in the foreseeable future, and they are hardly needed by anyone now. It is not about fat: nowadays the plant is in a far from honorable 17th place in average level of pay among Severodvinsk's scarce industrial enterprises. It cannot be said this is causing a drain of workers: just as around 40,000 persons used to work at Sevmash, they still work there. But this constancy is linked above all with the fact that the Nuclear Shipbuilding Center is the main enterprise in the city. Strictly speaking, Severodvinsk was built for it, and there is nowhere to go in particular.

When serious pressure began—and financing difficulties began from about 1990—the Sevmash people honestly tried to convert at least somewhat, but producing equipment for the agroindustrial complex proved to be not quite

such a profitable matter as it appeared initially. And some twenty river barges and a pair of harbor tugs built for the Dutch under contract also were of no decisive importance. Hopes linked with the production of floating platforms for developing the shelf's natural gas fields also most likely will prove just as illusory. There also are not many clients for the tourist submarine *Neptun*, produced at Sevmash in a single copy, although she underwent sea trials... To a certain extent the state of affairs is being saved by the fact that the enterprise not only produces submarines, but also engages in recycling them. Sevmash is the world's only shipyard with experience in working with titanium submarine hulls (at one time the Americans planned to set up the output of missile-carrying titanium submarines, but later evidently deemed this to be a luxury; the cost of a titanium hull is tens of times higher than that of a steel hull). Therefore taking apart titanium submarines is the prerogative of Sevmash. "Although it is said that breaking up allegedly is not the same as building and your heart does not bleed, what kind of work is this?" they say at the plant. By the way, this already is not the first "recycling" period in Sevmash history: they specialized in cutting up cruisers and battleships here during Khrushchev's reduction of the Navy.

...One Severodvinsk old-timer used the unfamiliar word "*vavorok*" to describe the present condition of the Northern Machine Building Enterprise. There is an explanation in the "Pomorskiy tolkovyy slovar russkogo moreplavaniya" [Pomor Explanatory Dictionary of Russian Seafaring]: "*Vavorok* is the corpse of a marine animal cast ashore by the sea which has not had time to decompose."

#### Commentary on Budget Fight, Defense Industry Situation

94UM0494A Moscow *SEGODNYA* in Russian 7 Jul 94  
p 3

[Article by Pavel Felgengauer: "Unskilled Redistribution of the Budget: Military-Industrial Complex Against the Army"]

[Text] As was to be expected, the fight over the 1994 defense budget ended with a major defeat for the military-industrial lobby. Of course, the president has not yet signed the final version, but no one in the apparatus, in the government or in the Ministry of Defense has any doubt that he soon will sign it and that there will be no additional funds—it will be necessary to exist somehow with what they did give.

Representatives of the Ministry of the Economy and Ministry of Finance quite openly admit that absolutely insufficient funds have been allocated for defense. In accordance with the officially predicted annual inflation of 4.7 times (a deflator), military expenditures should have been R55 trillion in order to preserve the Ministry of Defense budget at the 1993 level. The R37 trillion proposed by the Ministry of Finance, which the State Duma later corrected to 40.6 trillion, reflect neither inflationary expectations nor the Army's actual requirements, but only

the fact that the level of military expenditures should not exceed five percent of gross domestic (national) product (GNP). And inasmuch as the Russian GNP is rapidly decreasing with the reduction in level of production, real military expenditures accordingly also are dropping outside of any dependence on the course of Army reforms.

Moreover, the Ministry of Finance makes it no secret that defense expenditures in the present year by no means will be R40.6 trillion as prescribed by the budget, but much less. During five months of 1994 only 17 percent of taxes planned for the year had been collected. If this trend is preserved (which is fully likely), the income part of the budget will be fulfilled by about half or perhaps a bit more. Accordingly, the Ministry of Finance promises to spend for defense actually 60 (in the best case 70) percent of the promised R40.6 trillion in the budget. By the way, this means that in 1994 real military expenditures will end up almost half of those in 1993 with approximately the very same Army. No one either in the Ministry of Defense or in the State Committee for the Defense Industry or (at an unofficial level) in the Ministry of Finance and Ministry of the Economy takes seriously the promised extrabudgetary funds for saving the Army and military-industrial complex.

The Army was "shorted" 3.2 trillion already in the first half year, when the Ministry of Defense was financed based on R37 trillion for the year. By the way, the distribution of "deficient payments" by military budget items is far from even. The Ministry of Finance is allocating money first of all for Army pay (65 percent of the entire defense budget) to avoid social tension in divisions, regiments and brigades. The debt for pay for the first half year was "only" R162 billion. At the same time, it will be lucky if expenditures for weapon procurements, RDT&E and capital construction are 25 percent of what was previously planned.

It is fully obvious that the extensive process of reducing military expenditures which began in 1992 has reached a limit—the defense budget essentially has been reduced to one item, paying soldiers' salaries. This never was the case even in times of the Roman Empire—at that time there still was at least some kind of capital construction. It is no less obvious that the modern Army and Russia's military industry will not exist stably for any length of time in such an unnatural situation.

The State Committee for the Defense Industry, the main representative of our military-industrial complex in the government, proposes to reduce the Army's numerical strength sharply. Inasmuch as almost the entire budget today goes for Army pay (by 1 January 1995 there are to be 1.9 million servicemen and 600,000 civilian employees in the Ministry of Defense establishment), it seems fully logical to demobilize "excess" officers and men and spend the pay authorized for them to produce new weapons with which it is possible to defend against enemies while having fewer military personnel. Naturally the Ministry of Defense hardly agrees with such a solution. From the standpoint of the economic situation in the country,

spending money on Army pay also seemingly is preferable, inasmuch as it will be spent basically on consumption and accordingly will end up in the civilian sector of the economy, but the military-industrial complex really will make new weapons to scare enemies.

The pressure on the government and president by the military-industrial complex unquestionably will grow as the situation deteriorates in numerous militarized regions of Russia, where they awaited the state order for 1994 like manna from heaven in order to restart halted production, but they just did not get anything. And this will be not the meek, weak voice of the State Committee for the Defense Industry, but decisive demands of influential regional leaders and of their representative body, the Federation Council.

But a significant reduction in the Army which would permit financing the defense state order at the expense of discharging officers without apartments and allowances hardly is possible. And not only because in principle this can lead to armed rebellion (which, generally speaking, is not in our Army's traditions), but first and foremost because then the stockpiles of dangerous weapons accumulated in the country will be left without security and servicing.

The situation more and more acquires the features of an emergency, but for now the numerous organs of executive authority (government, ministries and departments, the presidential apparat, Security Council and so on), intertwined like tentacles of an octopus, are just tracking the development of events "in a monitoring mode." Everyone understands everything, but no one can do anything, inasmuch as no one is directly subordinate to anyone, and if they are, then they still stubbornly refuse to do anything out of departmental pride or departmental seniority.

#### **Petersburg Defense Plants Get Funds**

94411048C St. Petersburg *NEVSKOYE VREMYA*  
in Russian 21 Jul 94 p 1

[Interview with Aleksandr Belyayev, member of the Federation Council of the Russian Federation, by Sofya Vasilyeva; place and date not given; under the rubric "Firsthand": "The Budget Is Not a Dogma"]

[Text] [Vasilyeva] Of the R55 trillion the Ministry of Defense asked to be appropriated from the budget, St. Petersburg would have received R2.5 trillion. Mainly this money was intended for scientific research and payments for state orders placed with defense enterprises. The budget approved by the Federal Assembly has the figure of R40.6 trillion. What follows from this?

[Belyayev] Generally, the Ministry of Defense spends money extremely inefficiently. I was very surprised to learn that 60 percent of its budget are expenditures that have no direct relation to defense of the motherland—for instance, on social needs. One gets the impression that this is not an army but an all-out transport. Enormous money is spent to maintain military bases. The most mobile units

have already been in advance positions in Germany, the Baltics, closer to the borders, while what was concentrated in Russia proper were mainly rear services. Now these rear services suck out all the money from the budget. As a result, the volume of weapons procurement and expenditures on defense science have fallen below the necessary minimum. This holds the threat of a complete technological failure of the sector. In addition, there is practically no control. The Ministry of Defense gets the money from the budget and then spends it at its discretion. In this connection I found interesting the proposal of Nizhniy Novgorod Governor Boris Nemtsov to have the R800 billion appropriated for the construction of housing for military servicemen to be divided among them, put into personal accounts in the banks, and then under the banks' supervision the officers would use the money on their own, to build apartments or homes for their families. Otherwise this money will sink into a black hole just like everything else.

At the end of May the leaders of trade unions of St. Petersburg's largest defense enterprises sent me a petition. Their complaints are all the same: Credit resources for conversion are envisaged only for the first quarter of the current year. Conversion programs approved by the Russian Federation Government for 1993-1994 are being folded. The president's edict "On Measures for Supporting State Defense Orders" dated 11 June 1993 is not being carried out. Defense complex enterprises are on the verge of final collapse. And now what? The budget is adopted with substantial cuts, but orders have already been placed; they are being worked on, and paid for. Enterprises cannot switch to a production of a different output, and people are not paid their wages. The arrears in St. Petersburg alone currently amount to R150 billion for output already produced and scientific-research work already done.

In addition, the level of taxes collected keeps falling steadily. And not because of production decline, which one could at least understand. It is shrinking as a share of the gross domestic product [GDP]. The year before last 16 percent of the GDP was collected; last year—10 percent; and in the first quarter of this year—already 7 percent. If it continues like this, we will soon collect nothing. One of the reasons is the insolvency crisis. A normal and stable state financing for the defense sector could make a serious dent in the insolvency problem, which in turn would resolve to a large extent the problems with tax revenue.

In my opinion, we have to adopt amendments to the budget as soon as possible. Perhaps by a separate law—on financing of defense orders. The defense doctrine of Russia has been adopted. In keeping with it, the scope of the minimum allowable defense orders has been set. The current financing in the just-adopted budget is below that figure. We have to correct this situation at any cost. Otherwise, irreparable damage will be done to the national security of Russia.

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## FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

### Anniversary of Afghan Attack on Russian Border Noted

944Q0474A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
13 Jul 94 p 1

[Article by Vladimir Urban: "We Remember You, Brothers! The 12th Outpost Engaged in Uneven Fighting One Year Ago on the Pyandzh"]

[Text] On 13 July of last year, our correspondent Anatoliy Ladin phoned the editorial office from Dushanbe and reported that the Dushmans had attacked the 12th Outpost of the Moscow Border Guards Detachment; the fighting there had been going on since morning; the outpost was completely surrounded... Another call was received a minute later: "Reinforcement is heading to the 12th, and I am leaving for there. Wait for a report in 24 hours."

I admit that at that time we had already grown used to such bad news. Our correspondents were almost constantly going to the Tajik-Afghan border, and information about the situation on the banks of the distant Pyandzh was appearing in almost every issue of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA. But what happened that day upset the consciousness of many.

There were 48 people at the 12th Outpost. A powerful shelling from machineguns and by rocket missiles from the territory of Afghanistan began early in the morning. Then a detachment of Mojahedin and fighters of the Tajik opposition numbering about 200 crossed the border. The fighting lasted 11 hours. A group of 22 border guards led by the outpost chief, Senior Lieutenant Mikhail Mayboroda, and three BMP [infantry combat vehicle] crew members from the 201st Motorized Rifle Division went to the ground, defending a small section of the border.

They were not in the mood for generalizations—on that day they fought above all for themselves and their outpost. We have to summarize this. After all, a resident has the right to ask and, incidentally, asked then and is asking now: Why are our lads shedding blood in a "foreign country"? So the "foreign country" will remain on his conscience. A new slaughter has begun in Tajikistan; the war—the reasons are known—will shift into adjacent countries and reach the Russian borders, and even before this will respond with the ruined lives of people "from among the Russian-speaking population" who have become hostages to the situation.

The East—even if it is a subtle matter, in many cases it is quite explainable. The example of Afghanistan—here it is next door. Our troops left, power is changing, and it is hard to understand who is in power, and civil strife continues on the already devastated land. The Mojahedin are penetrating into Tajikistan and working as mercenaries in Nagorny Karabakh and Bosnia. War has become a way of life for many.

A year ago, the big war did not go farther than the 12th Outpost. The price here was great—young lives. May the memory of the heroes of Pyandzh live forever! Border

guards of the 12th Outpost are buried in Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Belorussia, and in Russian republics and oblasts—in the small homelands. It is as if Christ and Mohammed initially decided to gather them together at the mountain outpost, and then disperse them over their former common land with an alarming reminder that these lads wrote with their blood on the Tajik cliffs: there will be big trouble if we do not protect the borders of the commonwealth at Pyandzh.

Serious reinforcement of the border with Afghanistan began last July. Such tragedies as 13 July are no longer repeated. Although in June of this year alone, there were almost 60 attempts at breaching the border and shellings from the territory of Afghanistan, and a wide-scale offensive by Tajik fighters, with support of the Dushmans, planned for the middle of the month fell through. Understanding that nothing would come about in the area of responsibility of the Pyandzh and Moscow border guard detachments, leaders of the irreconcilable opposition began relocating their detachments to Pamir. About 1,000 fighters are now concentrated on the border of Afghanistan and Gornyy Badakhshan.

Inside the republic, members of the underground have chosen a new tactic—open terrorism, primarily against people in shoulder boards. Russian border guard officers Vladimir Borisenkov and Sergey Leontikov were killed in Dushanbe. Mikhail Osipov, an officer of the 191st Motorized Rifle Regiment dies in Kurgan-Tyube. Several servicemen of the Tajik Army who fell into an ambush were shot, including Deputy Minister of Defense Colonel Ramazan Radzhabon. Meanwhile, the new round of intra-Tajik political talks held in Teheran did not produce the main thing—the sides did not reach a ceasefire understanding. That means the war is not over.

By decision of the authorities in Tajikistan, they are now observing a week in memory of those killed in the 12th Outpost. A monument to the border guard heroes was recently set up here, which was opened by the leaders of the republic. But 13 July is also a day of sorrow for our country. All soldiers who defended the outpost, regardless of their citizenship, have been presented Russian decorations. Lieutenant Andrey Merzlinin, sergeants Sergey Yevlanok and Vladimir Yelizarov (posthumously), and privates Sergey Borik (posthumously) and Igor Filkin (posthumously) became Heroes of the Russian Federation.

And whereas up to now we have not realized, although a whole year has passed, that the tragedy of the 12th Outpost is a nationwide pain and an eternal "black day" on the calendar, that means we still have not become a people respecting themselves. We are doomed to live in a great country, but our descendants will judge how we live. The recollections of the border guards left alive, recorded by our correspondents Anatoliy Ladin, Aleksandr Pelets, Nikolay Poroskov, and Vladimir Zhitarenko and published in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA immediately after the tragic events on the Tajik-Afghan border, I am confident, will become an objective reflection of history.

But let this memory also become our conscience.

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